Court : Australia High Court
1. FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN AND BELL JJ. Section 12(2) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ("the Liability Act") directs a court, when awarding damages relating to the death of or injury to a person, to disregard the amounts (if any) by which the claimant's gross weekly earnings would, but for the injury or death, have exceeded three times the amount of average weekly earnings at the date of the award ("the s 12(2) limitation"). The s 12(2) limitation applies to awards of damages for past and future economic loss due to the deprivation or impairment of earning capacity, for past economic loss due to loss of earnings, and for "the loss of expectation of financial support"[1]. The latter expression is apt to describe an award of damages under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) ("the Relatives Act"). The issue presented by the appeal is whether, in the case of an award of damages for the loss of expectation of financial support, the s 12(2) limitation is to be construed as applying ...
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FRENCH CJ, CRENNAN, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ. Introduction 1. On 24 June 2008 the appellant was convicted after trial by a judge and jury in the District Court of New South Wales of three counts of supplying prohibited drugs contrary to s 25 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985 (NSW) ("the Drug Act"). The counts on which he was convicted[1] alleged respectively that he supplied a prohibited drug, 3,4-methylenedioxymethylamphetamine ("MDMA")[2] (count 1), that he supplied an amount not less than the commercial quantity[3] of MDMA (count 2) and that he supplied an amount not less than the large commercial quantity[4] of methylamphetamine (count 4). 2. The appellant was sentenced to a total of 14 years imprisonment, backdated to 16 August 2006, with a non-parole period of six years expiring on 15 August 2012. A Crown appeal to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal against the inadequacy of the sentences, individually and collectively, was allowed on 16 August 2011[5]. The Court of...
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1. FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ. Not all human beings can be classified by sex as either male or female[1]. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) ("the Act") expressly recognises that a person's sex may be ambiguous[2]. It also recognises that a person's sex may be sufficiently important to the individual concerned to warrant that person undergoing a sex affirmation procedure to assist that person "to be considered to be a member of the opposite sex"[3]. When a person has undergone a sex affirmation procedure, Section 32DC of the Act empowers the Registrar to register a change of sex of the person upon an application by that person. 2. The question in this appeal is whether it was within the Registrar's power to record in the Register that the sex of the respondent, Norrie[4], was, as she said in her application, "non-specific". That question should be answered in the affirmative. 3. It is convenient to begin an explanation of the reasons why that ...
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1. FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, KIEFEL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ. This appeal concerns the construction of s 167(4) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) ("the Act"), the opening words of which provide that "[n]o action shall lie for the recovery of any sum paid to the Customs as the duty payable in respect of any goods". 2. Section 167(4) operates to bar all actions for the recovery of sums paid to the Customs as duty payable in respect of goods, irrespective of whether a dispute as to the amount or rate of duty payable in respect of the goods had arisen at the time of payment, subject only to two exceptions. The exceptions are actions under Section 167(2), commenced within times specified in Section 167(4), and actions to enforce rights or to compel exercise of powers under Section 163. The Act 3. Goods imported into Australia become subject to the control of the "Customs" “ at times relevant to this appeal, the Australian Customs Service “ at the time of their importation[1]. The owner must en...
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FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, KIEFEL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ. 1. In 1964, the State of Western Australia made an agreement with some joint venturers about the development and exploitation of iron ore deposits at Mount Goldsworthy. The agreement was approved by s 4(1) of the Iron Ore (Mount Goldsworthy) Agreement Act 1964 (WA) and it is convenient to refer to it as "the State Agreement". The State Agreement obliged the State to grant, and the State did grant, to the joint venturers mineral leases for iron ore (in a form provided by the agreement). Two leases are relevant to this matter. Each was for a term which expired in 1986, with the right to renew from time to time for further periods each of 21 years. Each has been renewed and is still in force. 2. The parties to this litigation agree that, subject to the question of extinguishment, the Ngarla People hold native title to the land which is subject to the two mineral leases. The parties agree that the relevant native title rights and interests ar...
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FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN, KIEFEL, BELL AND KEANE JJ. 1. The appellant was convicted following a trial in the Supreme Court of Victoria (Williams J) of intentionally causing serious injury to a man named Khadr Sleiman[1]. A second count, an alternative to the first, charged the appellant with recklessly causing serious injury to Mr Sleiman[2]. Mr Sleiman suffered multiple injuries as the result of being struck by a motor vehicle that at the time was being driven by the appellant. It was the prosecution case that the appellant deliberately struck Mr Sleiman with the vehicle intending thereby to cause him serious injury. It was the defence case that Mr Sleiman was struck accidentally while the appellant manoeuvred his vehicle in reverse in an endeavour to get away from Mr Sleiman, who was menacing him with a knife. 2. During the course of its retirement the jury sought clarification of the distinction between an intention to cause serious injury, the mental element of the offence charged...
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FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, CRENNAN AND KIEFEL JJ. 1. The first issue in these appeals is the construction and application of a long term gas supply agreement ("the GSA") between Electricity Generation Corporation trading as Verve Energy ("Verve") and various gas suppliers in Western Australia including Woodside Energy Ltd ("the Sellers"). The Sellers are the respondents to the first appeal and the appellants in the second. 2. Verve, a statutory corporation, is the major generator and supplier of electricity to a large area in the southwest of Western Australia, including Perth. Verve purchases natural gas under the GSA for use in its power stations. Separate contracts between Verve and each of the Sellers are contained in the GSA[1], which obliges each Seller to make available for delivery to Verve a proportionate share of a maximum daily quantity of gas ("MDQ"), delivered in a common and commingled stream[2], and to use "reasonable endeavours"[3] to make available to Verve a supplemental maxim...
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HAYNE J. The issues 1. An election of six senators for the State of Western Australia to serve in the Senate of the Parliament of the Commonwealth was held on 7 September 2013. The election for the fifth and sixth places was very close. A re-count was directed, but not all of the ballot papers to be re-counted could be found: 1,370 of them had been lost. On the re-count, the candidates who won the fifth and sixth places differed from those ascertained by earlier counts. 2. Was the result of the election likely to be affected by the loss of the ballot papers? Can this Court now decide who should have been elected? Can it do so by looking at records of earlier counts of the lost ballot papers? And need it now examine ballot papers whose formality is disputed? Or must it instead declare the election absolutely void? 3. The resolution of these questions depends on the proper construction of the Act under which the election was held and under which the result of the election is now challeng...
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FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, BELL, GAGELER AND KEANE JJ. Introduction 1. This appeal concerns the construction and application of a provision of Pt 10.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) ("the Code") which creates one of a number of offences under the general designation "money laundering". That provision, s 400.3(1), makes it an offence for a person to deal with money or other property of a value of or exceeding $1,000,000 if the person intends that the money or property will become an "instrument of crime". Property is an "instrument of crime" if it is used in the commission of, or used to facilitate the commission of, an indictable offence[1]. 2. In February 2005 the appellant effected a disposition of shares the beneficial interest in which was held by a company under his control, Barat Advisory Pty Ltd ("Barat Advisory"). The shares were in a publicly listed company, Admerex Ltd ("Admerex"). They were swapped, at the appellant's direction, for shares in a Swiss software development company, Temenos...
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FRENCH CJ, HAYNE, KIEFEL AND BELL JJ. 1. Each applicant pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court of Victoria to serious offences against laws of the Commonwealth. Each was sentenced to a very lengthy term of imprisonment: Mr Barbaro to life imprisonment with a non-parole period of 30 years, Mr Zirilli to 26 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years. 2. Each seeks special leave to appeal to this Court to allege that the sentencing hearing was procedurally unfair and that the sentencing judge failed to take into account a relevant consideration. The applications were referred for argument, as on an appeal, before an enlarged Bench. The applications were heard together. Each application for special leave to appeal should be granted but each appeal dismissed. The applicants' arguments 3. The applicants submitted that the sentencing hearing was unfair because the sentencing judge (King J) said at the outset that she did not seek, and would not receive, any submission from the pros...
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