Reported in : (1999)121PLR26
.....came in their hands on the death of judgment-debtor. it is clear from the judgment that severance of the joint family was accepted in view of the fact that a suit for partition was filed on 1.10.1956, resulting into disruption of the joint family. in para 14 of the judgment reference was made to the decision of the case by the supreme court, wherein it was held that sons are liable under the theory of pious obligation for the pre-partition debts incurred by the father qua which no arrangement was made at any point of time to discharge the pre-partition debts at the time of partition. it was in this context held in para 15 of the judgment that so far as the liability of sahay's wife is concerned, her position is different, and the doctrine of pious obligation cannot be applied to the wife and she, therefore, cannot be held liable to the creditors on the principles applicable to the sons and on a partition between a coparceners and his sons, a share is allotted to the wife in her own right and she cannot be treated as mere representative of the husband. this judgment thus has no application to the facts of the present case as it is no where shown or held that the property owned.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 1998VIIAD(SC)520; AIR1999SC463; 1998(2)ARBLR619(SC); JT1998(7)SC128; (1999)IMLJ117(SC); 1998(5)SCALE589; (1998)7SCC129; [1998]Supp2SCR302; 1999(1)LC89(SC)
.....etc. at gaddiwara within the municipal limits of panipat. the second respondent, the national fertilizer limited, had installed a plant for the manufacture of fertilisers in the vicinity. the second respondent had constructed a 'kucha' bund around the original pond and was using it for depositing effluents. the bund was made of earth which breached due to the excessive pressure of the effluents and the accumulation of burnt ash. the result was that water and ash had escaped from the pond and had damaged the writ petitioners' standing crops, mango gardens and residential properties. there had been a loss of soil from 6 inches to 2 feet, on their lands which had made them unfit for cultivation until such time as they were reclaimed. the second respondent had not done anything to redress the grievances of the writ petitioners. the writ petition, therefore, prayed for a direction to the second respondents to close its plant until effluent disposal arrangements were made and 'to pay the damages of rs. one crore for the destruction of residential houses, crops and mango garden. the respondent no. 2 may also be directed to reclaim the agricultural land of the petitioners which has been.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 1998VIIAD(SC)487; AIR1998SC3389; 1999(1)ALLMR(SC)233; JT1998(7)SC171; (1999)IMLJ47(SC); (1999)121PLR315; 1998(5)SCALE595; (1998)7SCC456; [1998]Supp2SCR312; 1999(1)LC9(SC)
.....the military estate officer (for short 'meo') was conditional, when under the contract the purchaser had undertaken to get, the permission.3. brief facts are as under :-4. the property in question is a bungalow on plot nos. 258 and 258a situated at old grant on the mall road in the cantonment area, meerut. the appellants (hereinafter called the 'vendors') are the owners of the suit property. the first respondent (hereinafter called the 'vendee') entered into an agreement with the appellants (vendors) on 3.11.65 for the purchases of the suit property for consideration of rs. 70,000. in terms of the agreement, a sum of rs. 11,000 was paid as earnest money to the vendors on 11.10.65. the vendee filed a suit for recovery of the said amount of rs. 11,000 contending, inter alia, that the understanding was that the vendors would get unconditional permission from the meo, meerut, for the transfer; that the vendors have cunningly incorporated in the said agreement that the permission from the meo for the agreed sale shall be obtained by the vendees; that there were minors among the vendors and by concealing that factor the agreement was entered into and that there were already.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 1999IIAD(Delhi)846; 77(1999)DLT314
.....i propose to dispose of s.no.1756/94 & i.a. 4635/85, objections under section 30 of the arbitration act filed by objector/ respondents. 2.1. facts in brief are as under : 2.2. an area of 2,743 sq. yards approximately of northern railway, new delhi was leased out by the petitioner to respondent no.1 vide agreement dated 9th may, 1969. subsequently the disputes arose between the parties. the respondent filed a petition under section 20 of the arbitration act. the dispute was referred accordingly vide order dated 24.4.1981 in suit no. 363-a/1977 to shri k.c. tandon gave a speaking award on 24.9.1984. the petition was moved under section 14 of the arbitration act. award has been filed. 2.3. the respondent filed objections under section 30 vide i.a. 4635/85 inter alias on the ground that the arbitrator misconducted the proceedings. the arbitrator ought to have given a reasoned award in view of the fact that the matter involved was heavy and voluminous evidence had been recorded. the arbitrator misconducted as well as committed error in not looking at the basic document of lease which gave the open land to use as open land. the award is said to be beyond the reference. 3.1. i.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 1998(2)CTC661
.....provisions of section 10 of the interpretation and general clauses act, 1125, (act vii of 1125), corresponding to section 11 of the general clauses act, 1897 (act x of 1897) which provides as follows:- 10. measurement of distances. --in the measurement of any distance, for the purposes of any act, that distance shall unless a different intention appears, be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane. now that the toddy shop was being conducted for the last four months in the premises in sy.no.907/14, i think, ends of justice would be met if a direction is given to the respondents that when the abkari year expires on 31.3.1981, the shop should not be allowed to be conducted in the present premises in sy.no.907/14, unless an officer not below the rank of the assistant commissioner of excise satisfies himself personally that the distance between the school and the building in which the toddy shop is to be conducted is outside the distance of 400 metres measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane or as the crow flies,'the said decision was taken in appeal, and the judgment rendered by the division bench is reported in 1981 klt 596. in paragraph 15, it was held.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : 1998(3)CTC385
.....arbitrator in his place. 2. in order to determine whether or not to revoke the authority of respondent no.2, it is appropriate to set out certain facts and circumstances pertaining to his appointment, conduct during the arbitral proceedings and the pecuniary interest in the respondent no.l organisation. they are stated as under:- respondent. no.1 invited tenders on march 24, 1988 for the construction of l.s.h.s. (low sulphur heavy stock) project for neyveli lignite corporation. the petitioner's tender was accepted by respondent no.l who issued a letter of intent dated june 27,1988, for execution of the said project and the petitioner had completed the job which was awarded to it. one of the conditions stipulated therein was that disputes, if any, that would arise in relation to the contract, are to be settled through arbitration. the petitioner by his letter dated april 9, 1992, requested respondent no.l herein, to refer the disputes to arbitration, since some disputes had arisen between him and respondent no.l. but no positive action was taken to appoint the arbitrator to resolve the disputes as per tender conditions. the inaction on the part of the respondent no.l, led the.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : [2000]246ITR638(Mad)
.....tax, and for relief in respect of improper or erroneous orders made by the revenue authorities. it is for the revenue authorities to ascertain the facts applicable to a particular situation, and to grant appropriate relief in the matter of assessment of tax. resort to the high court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction conferred or recognised by the constitution in matters relating to assessment levy and collection of income-tax may be permitted only when questions of infringement of fundamental rights arise, or where on undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess.'27. from the above extracted text of the administrative law by sir william wade and the apex court judgment, it is clear that the existence of alternative remedy may not be a ground to dismiss the writ petition.28. in a recent judgment of the apex court reported in cit v. u. p. forest corporation : [1998]230itr945(sc) , the apex court has observed as follows (page 957) :'before concluding, we would like to observe that the high court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions when adequate alternative remedy was available to the respondent......
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : [2000]241ITR94(Mad)
....., is pending before the apex court for consideration.5. i have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. the fact remains that the settlement commission in its order in anjum mohammed hussein ghaswala, in re : [1998]230itr1(sc) , has overruled its earlier decision in ashwani kumar aggarwal's case : [1992]195itr861(sc) and held as under (headnote) :'that where orders under section 245d(4) were passed, without considering on the merits, the applicants' request for reduction/waiver of interest under sections 234a, 234b and 234c, on requisite applications being filed in those cases, these may be examined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case and, where the grant of any relief is justified, such relief may be granted.'6. in view of the aforesaid decision of the special bench of the settlement commission, the impugned order of the settlement commission that it has no power to consider the request of the petitioner for waiver of interest is not legally sustainable in law. the settlement commission in anjum mohammed hussein ghaswala, in re : [1998]230itr1(sc) , has also made the following observations (page 43) :'we hold that.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : (2000)IIILLJ1438Mad
.....found that the concerned employees are 'learners', held that they cannot be construed as 'apprentices' for the purpose of getting exemption under section 2(f)(ii) of the said act.3. it is not disputed before me that apprentices appointed under the standing orders, will not come under the purview of the said act. the only objection that has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the basis of the impugned order is that the learners cannot be construed as 'apprentices'. though the employees have been called as 'learners' they are on par with the apprentices engaged on the basis of the standing orders. since they are on par with the apprentices, merely because different nomenclature has been given, it cannot be said that they cannot be construed as 'apprentices', when it is admitted that if they are apprentices, they will not come under the purview of the said act. the employees who have been appointed as 'learners' cannot be said other than the 'apprentices', in view of the standing orders in which both of them have been treated equally.4. in view of the above findings, the order of the respondent, dated january 16, 1992, cannot be sustained, and.....
Tag this Judgment! Ask ChatGPTReported in : (1999)1MLJ262
.....time in view of section 25(1) (b) which keeps alive the liability of the deceased member for a period of two years, is in my view erroneous. on the facts there could be no doubt that the claim filed against the petitioners on 16th august, 1972 is beyond the period of 3 years provided for in rule 56. the claim is based on the act or omission said to have taken place when the deceased ex-president was functioning as the president, for the period 1st april, 1966 to 31st march, 1969. therefore, the last date before which the act or omission could have taken place can only be on 31st august, 1969. therefore, the arbitration claim having been filed more than three years before that last date before which the act or omission could have taken place, it is clearly out of time as per rule 56(1). both the arbitrator as well as the cooperative tribunal have proceeded on the basis that the limitation will begin to run under rule 56 only from the date of the audited report from which the society came to know about the act or omission of the ex-president. i do not see how the date of the audit report will be material for interpreting rule 56. the rule says that the limitation will begin 'from.....
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