Latest Cases

Deputy Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs. I.C. Khurana

Court : Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ITAT Delhi

.....by the assessee in his wealth-tax return.4. the ao considered the assessee's reply and rejected the same on the following grounds : "(a) the mere fact that the exemption was allowed in the earlier year does not make it correct. the original claim made by the assessee himself was wrong and was a deliberate attempt to file inaccurate particulars of wealth. the facts that the department overlooked this point does not absolve the assessee from making a false claim. (b) the assessee has claimed that he has not surrendered this amount. he has sought the production of the records to verify this statement. even though the assessee's claim may be correct. there is no denying the fact that the assessee has accepted the addition since he did not file an appeal against the assessment order. (c) the assessee has stated that there can be no distinction between the agricultural land and the farm house. this again in untenable statement since the legislature has clearly stated under what circumstances a farm house be considered for the purpose of exemption under section 2(e). (d) the fact that any exemption may have been allowed or disallowed being a matter of difference of opinion and not.....

Us Airways, Inc. Vs. Barnett

Court : US Supreme Court

.....employees, the district court granted the company summary judgment. the ninth circuit reversed, holding that the seniority system was merely a factor in the undue hardship analysis and that a case-by-case, fact intensive analysis is required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship. held: an employer's showing that a requested accommodation conflicts with seniority rules is ordinarily sufficient to show, as a matter of law, that an "accommodation" is not "reasonable." however, the employee remains free to present evidence of special circumstances that makes a seniority rule exception reasonable in the particular case. pp. 396-406. (a) many lower courts have reconciled the phrases "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" in a practical way, holding that a plaintiff/employee (to defeat a defendant/employer's summary judgment motion) need only show that an "accommodation" seems reasonable on its face, i. e., ordinarily or in the run of cases. the defendant/employer then must show special (typically case-specific) circumstances demonstrating undue hardship in the particular circumstances. neither us airways'.....

Thompson Vs. Western States Medical Center

Court : US Supreme Court

.....entire new drug approval process. the government therefore needs to be able to draw a line between small-scale compounding and large-scale drug manufacturing. the government argues that the fdama's speech-related provisions provide just such a line: as long as pharmacists do not advertise particular compounded drugs, they may sell compounded drugs without first undergoing safety and efficacy testing and obtaining fda approval. however, even assuming that the fdama's prohibition on advertising compounded drugs "directly advance[s]" the government's asserted interests, the government has failed to demonstrate that the speech restrictions are "not more extensive than is necessary to serve [those] interest[s]." central hudson, supra, at 566. if the government can achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict commercial speech, or that restricts less speech, the government must do so. e. g., rubin v. coors brewing co., 514 u. s. 476 , 490-491. several non-speech-related means of drawing a line between compounding and large-scale manufacturing might be possible here. for example, the government could ban the use of commercial scale manufacturing or.....

Upendra Yadav Vs. State of Bihar and ors.

Court : Patna

.....before the court below and filed a petition on 15-9-2000 to proceed with the complaint case to hold inquiry and to put the accused on trial.2. the facts of the case may be narrated with brevity as the same has been spelt out in details in the order which is impugned before this court. the petition of complaint bearing complaint case no. 134 c of 2000 was filed by the complainant upendra yadav on 17th may, 2000 against, five named persons and also some unknown persons for an incident that allegedly took place on the 12th may, 2000, in which not less than 10 persons suffered casualties, white 4-5 persons suffered injuries on their persons. as usual, the learned additional chief judicial magistrate, lakhisarai, sent a copy of the complaint petition to subdivisional officer, lakhisarai, for instruction of a case thereon under section 156(3) cr.p.c. in case no case had been instituted with respect to such offences, and to hold investigation and submit a report before the court. pursuant to receipt of petition of complaint, it appears that the subdivisional police officer, submitted a report to the court that with identical offence, the police case bearing lakhisarai p.s. case no......

Om Prakash Prasad @ Om Prakash Singh Vs. State of Bihar and ors.

Court : Patna

.....illegal and unsustainable. on the basis of that decision the provision of the board's standing order would prima facie appear to be bad. but in the facts and circumstances of the case the question of validity of the board's standing order may not arise because the petitioner's case is bound to fail for the reason that his claim of having been adopted by ram chandra prasad is based on a judgment and decree which are not enforceable against the board.5. at this stage, it will be appropriate to briefly state the facts of the case and the developments taking place before the matter has reached its present state.6. as noted above, ram chandra prasad died on 29.7.1996 while still in service. on 20.8.1997 the petitioner made an application for appointment on compassionate grounds, claiming to be the adopted son of ram chandra prasad. the board turned down his claim and at that stage the petitioner came to this court in c.w.j.c. no. 3801 of 1998. that writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn by order dated 10.3.1999. it is a brief order reading as follows:as prayed by mr. srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, the writ application is permitted to be withdrawn with a liberty.....

Shyam Chandra Chaudhary Vs. State of Bihar and ors.

Court : Patna

.....for release from bhagalpur jail. on behalf of the state reference was made to the provisions of section 27 and section 34(1) of the reorganisation act. section 27 provides that the high court of jharkhand shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in the state of jharkhand, all such jurisdiction, powers and authorities as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, are excrcisable in respect of that part of the said territories by the high court at patna. sub-section (1) of section 34 bars the jurisdiction of the patna high court except in respect of proceeding contemplated by sub-sections (2) and (3). it is not in dispute that no proceeding is pending before this court and, therefore, sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 34 can have no application. the petitioner having been convicted by a court at dumka, falling under the jurisdiction of the jharkhand high court, in terms of sub-section (1) of section 34 the high court at patna has no jurisdiction in respect of any matter arising at or within the territories now comprising the state of jharkhand. it is obvious that if any order of the dumka court is to be challenged, the petition would lie.....

Ravindra Marutrao Shelar Vs. Kalpana Ravindra Shelar

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : 2002(5)BomCR631; (2002)3BOMLR456; 2002(3)MhLj741

.....has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion. we fail to see as to how this judgment helps the appellant. in fact, this judgment has been specifically referred in the above referred division bench judgment in sunita nikalje v. rajendra nikalje (supra). in para-22, the division bench has clarified trie ratio of the apex court judgment by observing as under :--'.....mere disinclination or reluctance to accept the other spouse isnot sufficient. there should be attempt of making it impossible for a spouse to resume cohabitation after the decree for restitution of conjugal rights is passed. discretion is conferred to strike a balance. the court should not grant the decree lightly or defeat it when the marriage is broken down completely. all this is necessary to be viewed against the backdrop of facts and circumstances of each case.'8. in the facts of the present case, we have noted that since the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was obtained by the respondent wife, the appellant was not satisfied and, therefore, he had preferred appeal to this court which was dismissed. thereafter taking advantage of the very decree he filed the above.....

Sonewadi Vividh Karyakari Seva Sahakari Society Limited Through Its Di ...

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : (2002)104BOMLR520

.....by way of revision before the registrar. therefore, this court should not interfere in the order passed by the divisional joint registrar,9. on facts it was pointed out that the district deputy registrar has recorded a finding of fact that the total business of the proposed society is likely to exceed rs. 50 lacs and, therefore, even according to the circular, as the turnover was likely to exceed rs. 50 lacs, the district deputy registrar ought to have granted registration which he has legally done and, therefore, the decision of the district deputy registrar, as confirmed by the divisional joint registrar, should not be interfered with. proposition for consideration10. whether it is necessary to grant hearing to the first society (and for that mater all earlier societies) in every case before the registration of a second or any new co-operative society having the same classification and sub-classification, needs to be tested on principle as well as on precedents.proposition tested on principle11. the provisions relating to the registration of the societies are contained in chapter ii of the act. section 3 of the act provides that the state government may appoint the.....

Surendra Alias Altaf Vs. State of Maharashtra and anr.

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : 2002BomCR(Cri)628; 2002CriLJ4137

.....are identical and both the detenues were involved in the same offences and hence both these petitions are being decided by this common judgment.2. facts :the petitioner in criminal writ petition no. 76/2002 is a student studying in ll.b. part i and is 24 years old. the petitioner in criminal writ petition no. 59/2002 is the wife of detenu rakesh lachhiramani who is a young boy of 24 years of age. one laxmikant gupta who is the partner of somras distillers, filed an application on 11-4-2001 addressed to shri piulwant kumar, deputy commissioner of police, crime branch, nagpur. in the said application, he has mentioned that on 11-4-2001 at 18.45 hours when he came to his office at parwati tower, indora chowk, he received a telephone call on his mobile phone no. 9823035000 from mobile phone no. 9822238184. he was told on the phone that the caller's name was salimbhai and he demanded rs. 25 lacs as ransom money and he was informed that the caller belongs to 'd company.' he was threatened that if the money was not paid, he would be killed. the said laxmikant, therefore, filed an application and discussed the matter with the deputy commissioner of police, crime branch, nagpur, and.....

Suneel Kumar Vs. Regional Assistant Director of Education (Basic) and ...

Court : Allahabad

Reported in : 2002(4)AWC2844; (2002)3UPLBEC2742

.....servants (termination of services) rules, 1975 by giving a month's notice that from the date of issuance of this notice, his services will stand terminated. it is this notice which has been challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the order of termination does not give any reason. this court while entertaining this writ petition granted an interim order which interim order is still continuing.2. learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner who has been working since 1988 by virtue of the aforesaid interim order and now cannot be allowed to be thrown on the roads, as in between he has become overage. so far as the order of termination is concerned, in view of this letter of appointment, the order dated 5.9.1988 is unassailable and nor could any defect be pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner.3. in this view of the matter, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed, interim order stands vacated.