Mahesh Kumar Vs. Vidhya Vati and anr.

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........hospitalised for about 12 days between 6.2.1985 and 18.2.1985 and was plastered. he could not work for considerably long time. looking to the evidence etc. the lower court came to the conclusion that rs. 5,500/- would be justifiable amount.2. the fact that the accident took place between the moped no. mbu 3010 and truck no. mms 566 is not disputable and, therefore, not disputed. the respondent no. 2, who also filed cross-objections has objected only on the ground that according to the evidence before the court, it has not issued the policy referred to by the applicant in his application.3. mr. patwa appearing for the appellant argued that looking to the injuries which are proved, the amount of the award is much on the lower side. he said looking to the recent judgments of this court including a division bench judgment in khashti devi v. amar nath, 1994 acj 873 (mp), the court has to take into consideration the development in law and the trend shown by parliament. he argued that the law at present is that for the permanent disability, no fault liability also has to be at least rs. 25,000/-. he said apart from the injuries, the loss of leave, the expenses on the treatment etc, and the other sufferings of the appellant have not been taken into account and, therefore, he would be entitled to the amount he has claimed, which was rs. 40,500/-.4. mr. surjeet singh appealing for the other side argued that there is no liability of the respondent no. 2. he also argued that even if this court were to be considering that the policy of insurance, which subsequently by amendment has brought in, the insurance company could not be held liable then the lower court was not justified in granting the award as it has done. he argued that the loss to the appellant is amply compensated by the award by the lower court.5. looking to the law as it prevails by the judgments delivered by this court time and again for a fracture rs. 25,000/- now cannot be too much on the higher side whereas.....