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Divisional Manager, Eastern Railway and anr. Vs. Sona Devi

Divisional Manager, Eastern Railway and anr. vs Sona Devi

Disposition Appeal allowed Court Jharkhand Decided Jan 06, 2003
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/523523

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Citation
Court
Jharkhand High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
AFOO No. 149 of 1999 (R)
Subject
Labour and Industrial
Disposition
Appeal allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 173(1) Proviso; [D. Biswas, Amitava Roy & I.A.Ansari, JJ] Appeal without statutory deposit but within limitation/or extended period of limitation Maintainability - Held, If the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal ...

Key legal issue
Labour and Industrial
Outcome / disposition
Appeal allowed
Acts & sections
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 - Sections 3(1), 3(2) and 30

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Divisional Manager, Eastern Railway and anr.

Advocate D.N. Chatterjee, Adv.

Respondent

Sona Devi

Advocate None

Legal References

Acts
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 - Sections 3(1), 3(2) and 30
Reported In
[2004(2)JCR621(Jhr)]

Excerpt

.....extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act does not extend to the provision relating to the deposit of statutory amount as embodies in the first proviso. therefore an appeal filed within the period of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. - on 28.9.1986, he made complain of stomach pain and reported sick. in course of treatment, he did on 30th september, 1986. according to the death certificate, exhibit..........employer's liability to pay compensation under the act. firstly, there must be an accident in the sense of actual physical happening or occurrence of untoward event of mishap, which was not expected. secondly, such an accident must directly result in a personal injury to the workman and thirdly, the accident must arise out of and in the course of the employment of the workman.7. in the present case, we find that the workman concerned did not die owing to injury by accident, rather he died of peptic perforation, the disease he was suffering from before.8. herein, admittedly there was no question of any occupational disease or applicability of section 3(2) of the act.9. since there was no accident at all in course of the employment of the deceased workman, the very foundation of the claim under section 3(1) of the act is eroded.10. accordingly in the face of the evidence and the factors of this case, we hold that death of karu cannot be considered owing to any physical or occupational injury, under section 3 of the act and the schedule iii thereof. so the claimant was not entitled to any compensation under the act and consequently the impugned order/award passed by the presiding officer, labour court, hazaribagh, are set aside and w.c. case no. 3 of 1990 stands dismissed.11. in the result, this appeal is allowed, but without costs.

Full Judgment

ORDER

1. Admittedly, Karu, husband of Sona Devi, the sole respondent herein was employed as a Gang man in Dhanbad Division of Eastern Railways. On 28.9.1986, he made complain of stomach pain and reported sick. A sick Memo, Exhibit M-1 was, therefore, given to him on the same day. He was admitted in Gajendih Hospital, from where he as referred to Dhanbad railway hospital for treatment. In course of treatment, he did on 30th September, 1986. According to the death certificate, Exhibit M, cause of his death was peptic perforation and Cardio respiratory failure. At railway hospital, Dhanbad, Karu was surgically operated for Peptic perforation.

2. His widow, Sona Devi filed W.C. Case No. 3 of 1990 for compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act'). She claimed total amount of compensation at Rs. 56,592.96 under the Act.

3. The Railway contested the claim on the ground that the workman concerned did not die by an accident arising out of and in course of his employment and, therefore, present proceeding was not maintainable and his widow was not entitled to any compensation under the Act.

4. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hazaribagh, allowed the prayer of the claimant and by impugned order dated 13.2.1999 held that the claimant was entitled to a sum of Rs. 56,592.96 as compensation under the Act. The Divisional Manager, Eastern Railways has, therefore, filed the present Appeal under Section 30 of the Act.

5. Mr. D.N. Chatterjee, learned counsel for appellants submitted that unless the happening of actual accident was first established, which directly resulted in injury to the workman, there, was no question of payment of any compensation under Section 3(1) of the Act. In the present case there was no complain of any occupational disease, covered by Section 3(2) of the Act and, therefore, acceleration of death by such disease or exertion was wholly irrelevant to the present issue.

6. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer is liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Hence, the statute provided three basic pre-conditions for the employer's liability to pay compensation under the Act. Firstly, there must be an accident in the sense of actual physical happening or occurrence of untoward event of mishap, which was not expected. Secondly, such an accident must directly result in a personal injury to the workman and thirdly, the accident must arise out of and in the course of the employment of the workman.

7. In the present case, we find that the workman concerned did not die owing to injury by accident, rather he died of peptic perforation, the disease he was suffering from before.

8. Herein, admittedly there was no question of any occupational disease or applicability of Section 3(2) of the Act.

9. Since there was no accident at all in course of the employment of the deceased workman, the very foundation of the claim under Section 3(1) of the Act is eroded.

10. Accordingly in the face of the evidence and the factors of this case, we hold that death of Karu cannot be considered owing to any physical or occupational injury, under Section 3 of the Act and the Schedule III thereof. So the claimant was not entitled to any compensation under the Act and consequently the impugned order/award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hazaribagh, are set aside and W.C. Case No. 3 of 1990 stands dismissed.

11. In the result, this Appeal is allowed, but without costs.

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