M. Muthambika Vs. the Chairman,

M. Muthambika vs The Chairman,; the Chief Executive Officer, Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board And; the G

Type Court Judgment Court Chennai Decided Apr 23, 2010

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https://sooperkanoon.com/case/848447

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/848447
Court: Chennai High Court
Judge: T. Raja, J.
Decided On: Apr 23, 2010
Case Number: W.P. No. 12735 of 2005
Subject: Service

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- What remains to be seen is as to whether Pinki died an un-natural death within seven years of her marriage and whether her death was attributable to the demand of dowry and further whether she was dealt with cruelty soon before her death. If these ingredients are proved by the prosecution then the conviction of th...

Key legal issue: Service

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

M. Muthambika

Advocate J. Saravanavel, Adv.

Respondent

The Chairman,; the Chief Executive Officer, Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board And; the G

Advocate S. Packiaraj, Adv. for Respondents 1 to 3

Excerpt

- what remains to be seen is as to whether pinki died an un-natural death within seven years of her marriage and whether her death was attributable to the demand of dowry and further whether she was dealt with cruelty soon before her death. if these ingredients are proved by the prosecution then the conviction of the accused under section 304b, ipc will be complete.[para 9] the question is, in the absence of corpus delicti, could it be presumed that the accused persons alone were responsible for the death of pinki. we must hasten to add here that the accused persons have already been acquitted of the murder charge. [para 9] it is clear that pinki's death was caused because of the burns and not in the normal circumstances. the finding of the trial court and the appellate court in that behalf is correct. for this reason we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel that in the absence of corpus delicti, the conviction could not stand. [para10] it is clear that the prosecution has not only proved the offence under section 304b, ipc with the aid of section 113b, indian evidence act but also the offence under section 201, ipc. [para 15] held: we have gone through the judgments of the trial court as well as the appellate court carefully and we find that both the courts have fully considered all the aspects of this matter. we, therefore, find nothing wrong with the judgments and confirm the same. the appeal is, therefore, dismissed.[para 16].....to adhere to this principle creates an apprehension of bias on part of the said judge. in this context, it will be useful to refer to a fascinating observation of justice p.n. bhagwati in ashok kumar yadav v. state of haryana : 1985 (4) scc 417:one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence is that no man can be a judge in his own cause. the question is not whether the judge is actually biased or has in fact decided partially but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias 'it is in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the judge likely to be so biased should incapacitated from sitting'. the basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.3. further, the basic principle underlying the above said rule is that justice must not only be done, but must also appear to be done. therefore, the impugned order passed in such proceedings is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the same is set aside on the basis of the principle that no man can be a judge on his own costs. accordingly, following the ratio laid down by this court in w.p. no. 2296 of 2005 this court while setting aside the impugned order, remands the matter back to the appellate authority for disposal of the said appeal in accordance with law. in the present case, the appellate board has been re-constituted and, therefore, the matter is remanded back to the appellate authority for fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.4. the parties are at liberty to raise all the issues before the appellate board. accordingly, the present writ petition is disposed of. no costs.

Full Judgment

ORDER

T. Raja, J.

1. The short point raised in the present Writ Petition is that the petitioner was removed from service by the second respondent, by an order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority who was also a member in the Appellate board. Therefore, the impugned appellate order confirming the order passed by the original authority cannot stand the test of scrutiny of this Court. Similar matter has already been considered by this Court in W.P. No. 2296 of 2005 dated 17.06.2009, wherein this Court has held that if the disciplinary authority who has dealt with and imposed the punishment of removal from service, has become a member of the Board hearing the appeal, then there is always a likelihood of the bias against the petitioner.

2. It is an accepted principle of natural justice that a person should not be a judge in his or her own cause. In common law, this principle ha been derived from the Latin maxim - 'nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa'. A reasonable permutation of this principle is that no judge should adjudicate a dispute, which he or she had dealt with in any capacity, other than a purely judicial one. The failure to adhere to this principle creates an apprehension of bias on part of the said judge. In this context, it will be useful to refer to a fascinating observation of Justice P.N. Bhagwati in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana : 1985 (4) SCC 417:

One of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence is that no man can be a judge in his own cause. The question is not whether the Judge is actually biased or has in fact decided partially but whether the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. If there is a reasonable likelihood of bias 'It is in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the Judge likely to be so biased should incapacitated from sitting'. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.

3. Further, the basic principle underlying the above said rule is that justice must not only be done, but must also appear to be done. Therefore, the impugned order passed in such proceedings is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the same is set aside on the basis of the principle that no man can be a judge on his own costs. Accordingly, following the ratio laid down by this Court in W.P. No. 2296 of 2005 this Court while setting aside the impugned order, remands the matter back to the Appellate Authority for disposal of the said appeal in accordance with law. In the present case, the Appellate Board has been re-constituted and, therefore, the matter is remanded back to the Appellate Authority for fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.

4. The parties are at liberty to raise all the issues before the Appellate Board. Accordingly, the present writ petition is disposed of. No costs.

Same Court & Year Chennai · 2010 Same Parties M. Muthambika vs The Chairman,; the Chief Executive Officer, ... Same Subject Service Same Judge T. Raja, J.

Service