Raghunath Vs. Sushil Kumar

.....of the husband. a petition seeking protection of minor child was thereupon filed by father of the husband before delhi high court. a direction for handing over custody of child to father of husband was also sought. the high court considering fact that the u.k. court was already in seisin of matter and had passed an interim order and by relying on principle of comity of nations and comity of judgments of the courts of two different countries in deciding the matter directed the wife to take the child of her own to u.k.or hand it over to father of husband to be taken to u.k. as measure of interim custody and that it would be for the u.k. court to decide the question of custody - order was challenged by wife - held, the order of high court was not liable to be interfered with. although, on first impression, it would appear that the interests of the minor child would best be served if she is allowed to remain with the wife, the order of u.k. court cannot be lost sight of., the order of u.k. court except for insisiting that the minor be returned to its jurisdiction, the english court did not intend to separate the child from the mother until a final decision was taken with regard to the custody of the child. the ultimate decision in that regard has to be left to the english court having regard to the nationality of the child and the fact that both the parents had worked for gain in the u.k. and had also acquired permanent resident status in the u.k. english court has not directed that the custody of the child should be handed over to the father but that the child should be returned to the jurisdiction of the courts in the u.k. which would then proceed to determine as to who would be best suited to have the custody of the child. the high court has taken into consideration both the questions relating to the comity of courts as well as the interest of the minor child, which, no doubt, is one of the most important considerations in matters relating to custody of..........has referred me to : [1967]2scr50 (after singh v. inder kumar) in order to support his submission that after the construction of the shop on it the property ceased to be 'rented land'. the supreme court while dealing with section 2 (f) of the act observed :- 'thus rented land is a piece of land on which there is no building - residential or non-residential-, but which has been let for business or trade, as in this case, for keeping a firewood stall.'5. the ending words of the observation were concerned with the particular letting out in that case for keeping a firewood stall. nevertheless, the court was while spelling out the meaning of the provision giving effect to its plain phraseology. what is rented out is to be determined as on the date when it is let out. it has not been urged that on 2nd of october, 1957 what was leased out in terms of ex. pa was not 'rented land' falling within the definition of section 2 (f) of the act. even after the illegal and unauthorized construction by the petitioner on the 'rented land' the nature of what was rented out could not be concluded to have changed. it is not contended and it could not have been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the land under the shop does not belong to the municipal committee. to such land the notification mentioned in paragraph 7 of the impugned appellate judgment would by applecable. the virus of the notification is not impugned before me. according to that notification the provisions of the act have been expressly made inapplicable to the land owned by a municipal committee.6. the present case bears sufficient similarity to the one reported in (1970) 72 pun lr 431 (kirpal singh v. parabhjot singh).7. the other aspect with which the appellate authority dealt was that the present petitioner could not be held as the landlord of the respondent. after scrutinizing the reasons advanced by the appellate authority, i am of the view that considering the scope of the definitions the assailed.....