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Om Parkash Vs. Rangil Singh

Om Parkash vs Rangil Singh

Disposition Petition dismissed Court Punjab and Haryana Decided Jan 17, 2006
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/618862

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Citation
Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Civil Revision No. 3089 of 2004
Subject
Tenancy
Disposition
Petition dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Sections 80 (2) & 89 & Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Rules 85 & 80: [T.S. Thakur, CJ, Jasbir Singh & Surya Kant, JJ] Appeal against orders of State or Regional Transport authority imitation Held, A stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly con...

Key legal issue
Tenancy
Outcome / disposition
Petition dismissed

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Om Parkash

Advocate A.M. Punchi, Adv.

Respondent

Rangil Singh

Advocate Akshay Bhan, Adv.

Legal References

Cases Referred
Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal
Reported In
(2006)143PLR456

Excerpt

- sections 80 (2) & 89 & punjab motor vehicles rules, 1989, rules 85 & 80: [t.s. thakur, cj, jasbir singh & surya kant, jj] appeal against orders of state or regional transport authority imitation held, a stipulation regarding the period of limitation available for invoking the remedy shall have to be strictly construed. that is because any provision by way of limitation is in the nature of a restraint on the remedy provided under the act. so viewed two inferences are clear viz., (1) sections 80 and 89 of the act read with rule 85 of the rules make it obligatory for the authorities making the order to communicate it to the applicant concerned and (2) the period of limitation for any appeal against the order is reckonable from the date of such communication of the reasons would imply communication of a copy of the written order itself, a party who knows about the making of an order cannot ignore the same and allow grass to grow under its feet and do nothing except waiting for a formal communication of the order or to choose a tenuous plea that even though he knew about the order, he was waiting for its formal communication to seek redress against the same in appeal. if a party does not know about the making of the order either actually or constructively it may claim that the period of limitation would start running from the date it acquires knowledge of the making of an order but one cannot understand how a party, who has acquired knowledge of the making an order either directly or constructively can ignore the same and belatedly seek redress just because the authority making the order had made a default in formally communicating the order to him. allowing a party to do so would amount to placing a premium on the lack of diligence of a party, who is remiss in seeking a remedy that was available to it. therefore, knowledge whether actual or construction of the order passed by the state or regional transport authority should result in commencement of the period of..........the petitioner has vehemently argued that since shops are contiguous and landlord has admitted in his cross-examination that utility of the shops are same, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned appellate court is clearly not sustainable and order of ejectment, consequently, could not have been passed by the learned appellate authority.4. however, i am of the view that though reasoning given by the appellate authority may be fallacious but the fact remains that shop no. 86 has been occupied by another son of the landlord, namely, jagtar singh. the requirement of shop is in dispute for another son supinder singh. at the time of filing of the present ejectment petition, jagtar singh was minor aged 17 years, therefore, if during the pendency of the ejectment petition another shop has become available in which one of the sons can be adjusted that will not show that the requirement of supinder singh son of the landlord does not survive.5. learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the hon'ble supreme court reported as deena nath v. pooran lal : [2001]3scr925 to contend that if the landlord is in occupation of more than one shop, the order of ejectment could not have been passed in favour of the landlord. however, the said judgment has no application in the facts of the present case where the landlord has established the requirement of two shops for his two sons.6. it cannot be said that said requirement is mere wish or a desire. when the landlord has two adult sons, it is the natural desire of the father to settle his two sons independently. the said action of the landlord cannot be suffering from any patent illegality or irregularity which may warrants interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 7. dismissed in limine.

Full Judgment

Hemant Gupta, J.

1. The present revision petition is directed against the ejectment order passed by the Courts below in respect of shop No. 83 owned by respondent at Badheri, falling within the city of Chandigarh.

2. The respondent-landlord sought ejectment of the petitioner on the ground that the said shop is required for establishing his son Supinder Singh for the purpose of Cycle repairs shop. The said plea of the tenant was accepted by the Rent Controller and order of ejectment was passed on 13.8.2001. During the pendency of the appeal, it was pointed out that the landlord is owning four contiguous shops bearing shop Nos. 83, 84, 85 and 86. One of the shops No. 86 has become available for use and occupation of the landlord. Therefore, the ground of personal requirement sought by the landlord is not available. The tenant has filed an affidavit before the learned Appellate Authority that shop No. 86 has been occupied by his another son Jagtar Singh, who is running a STD booth in the said shop. However, learned Appellate Authority while considering the subsequent events found that there is nothing on record to show similarity between shop Nos. 83 and 86 and to show that both the shops were in equally good location.

3. In view of the findings recorded, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that since shops are contiguous and landlord has admitted in his cross-examination that utility of the shops are same, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Appellate Court is clearly not sustainable and order of ejectment, consequently, could not have been passed by the learned Appellate Authority.

4. However, I am of the view that though reasoning given by the Appellate Authority may be fallacious but the fact remains that shop No. 86 has been occupied by another son of the landlord, namely, Jagtar Singh. The requirement of shop is in dispute for another son Supinder Singh. At the time of filing of the present ejectment petition, Jagtar Singh was minor aged 17 years, therefore, if during the pendency of the ejectment petition another shop has become available in which one of the sons can be adjusted that will not show that the requirement of Supinder Singh son of the landlord does not survive.

5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 to contend that if the landlord is in occupation of more than one shop, the order of ejectment could not have been passed in favour of the landlord. However, the said judgment has no application in the facts of the present case where the landlord has established the requirement of two shops for his two sons.

6. It cannot be said that said requirement is mere wish or a desire. When the landlord has two adult sons, it is the natural desire of the father to settle his two sons independently. The said action of the landlord cannot be suffering from any patent illegality or irregularity which may warrants interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

7. Dismissed in limine.

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