Devdas Babu Shetty Vs. General Education Academy and anr.

.....desai & d.b. bhosale, jj] arrest of accused - held, a police officer or a person empowered to arrest may arrest a person without intervention of the court subject to the limitations specified under the provisions of the code. the provisions of section 41 of the code provides for arrest by a police officer without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant. a distinct and different power under section 44 of the code empowers the magistrate to arrest or order any person to arrest the offender. under section 44 of the code, that power is vested in the court of the magistrate when an offence is committed in his presence. if the legislature has taken care of providing such specific power under section 44 of the code, then there could be no reason for such a power not to be specified under the provisions of chapter xii of the code. in terms of section 41, a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant or order from the magistrate for any or all of the conditions specified in that provision. language of this provision clearly suggested that the police officer can arrest a person without an order from the magistrate. thus, there appears to be no reason why on the strength of section 156(3) of the code, any restriction should be read into the power specifically granted by the legislature to the police officer. of course, freedom of investigation is the essence of these provisions but in order to suppress the mischief it is sufficiently indicated under different provisions of the code that the arresting officer should exercise his power or discretion judiciously and should be free of motive. some kind of inbuilt safeguard is available to the accused in the cases where the magistrate directs investigation under section 156 (3) of the code by taking recourse to the provisions of section 438 of the code by approaching the court of session or the high court for such relief. thus, during the course of investigation of a criminal case, an accused is not .....1. by this petition, the petitioner challenges the order passed by the learned single judge by which the learned single judge has allowed the petition filed by the respondent by setting aside order passed under section 33(c)(2) of the industrial disputes act, 1947 by the industrial tribunal.2. the petitioner was a non-teaching employee in an unaided private school. he filed an application before the industrial court under section 33(c)(2) for giving him benefits of medical reimbursement. admitted position is that the conditions of service of the appellant as also of the other non-teaching employees working in unaided recognized private school are governed by maharashtra employees of private school (conditions of services) regulations act, 1977 and the rules framed' thereunder. there is no provision made either in the act or the rules for giving reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by non-teaching employee of an unaided private recognised school.3. in this background, therefore, though there may be a right conferred by the act on the employees of unaided private recognized school that they are entitled to the same conditions of service and benefits as applicable to the employees of aided recognized private schools, unless the director in exercise of his powers under the act issues direction in that regard, an application under section 33(c)(2) for grant of reimbursement would not be maintainable.4. taking overall view of the matter, we do not find any patent illegality in the order passed by the learned single judge. the appeal therefore fails and dismissed. no order as to costs.