Full Judgment
R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.
1. Heard the learned Advocates for the parties.Perused the records.
2. The petitioners are challenging the judgment and order dated 30-11-1999, passed by the Industrial Court in Revision Application No. 18 of 1997,partly allowing the revision application and quashing and setting aside the orderpassed by the Labour Court on 19-2-1996 in Complaint No. 333 of 1987. By thesaid order dated 19-2-1996, the complaint filed by the respondent alleging thatthe petitioner-company was engaged in unfair labour practices under Item 1(a),(b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule-IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of TradeUnions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, hereinafter calledas 'the said Act', was dismissed by the Labour Court on account of failure on thepart of the respondent to prove the allegations therein. By the impugned order,the Industrial Court, while setting aside the said order, has held that thepetitioners have committed unfair labour practices under Item 1(g) of Schedule-IV of the said, Act and, therefore, directed the petitioners to appoint thecomplainant within three months from the date of passing of the order. Theimpugned order is sought to be challenged mainly on the ground that the same istotally in contravention of the powers of the revisional Court under Section 44 ofthe said Act.
3. Upon hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and on perusal of therecords, it is seen that the Industrial Court while being fully conscious of thescope of revisional powers under Section 44 of the said Act, had proceeded toconsider whether the applicant in the revision application i.e., the respondentherein, has been able to disclose the error apparent on the face of the record so asto warrant interference in the order passed by the Labour Court, however,thereto merely by referring to the list of reported decisions which had been reiiedupon by the Labour Court while dismissing the complaint, jumped to theconclusion that interference by the Industrial Court was necessary 'as there aresome vague allegations in the charge sheet' and thereafter proceeded to re-appreciate the evidence by itself. However, in the process of appreciation of theevidence rather than considering the materials placed before the Labour Court inthat regard, merely referred to the charge sheet and holding that there isdiscrepancy between the English translation and the Marathi version of thecharge sheet, and held that the Labour Court ought to have applied its mind to thecharge sheet in English as well as in Marathi and has observed that the allegationsof setting fire, as alleged in the Marathi version of the charge sheet, without anyevidence in support thereto, was baseless and without substance and thattherefore on 'humanity ground' if the employment is offered to the respondentafresh it would not cause irreparable loss to both the parties and therefore setaside the order of the Labour Court. Apparently, the revisional Court has exercised its jurisdiction not only arbitrarily but in total breach of procedure. It isto be noted that before deciding to re-appreciate the evidence on record, it wasnecessary for the revisional Court to ascertain whether the findings arrived at bythe Labour Court were either contrary to the materials on record or disclosedperversity. The revisional Court has not done any such exercise in the matter inhand. Merely by referring to the charge sheet and comparing the Marathi versionthereof with the English translation of the same, has jumped to the conclusionthat the same justifies interference by the revisional authority in the order passedby the Labour Court. The records apparently disclose that the charge sheetfurnished to the workman in English did not disclose the allegation of anyincident of setting of fire to the property. Undisputedly, the reply to thecharge sheet was submitted by the workman in the English language. There wasno grievance of any prejudice having been caused to the workman on account ofthe alleged discrepancy in the charge sheet in the English language as comparedto its Marathi version. Being so, unless the respondent in the revision applicationhad disclosed either perversity in the findings arrived at by the Labour Court orthe same being contrary to the materials on record, which could have justifiedinterference in the order of the Labour Court, there was no justification for theIndustrial Court to set aside the order passed by the Labour Court whichapparently disclosed detailed analysis of the materials on record and properapplication of mind after taking into consideration the various decisions relevantto the point in issue. Being so, it is apparent that the revisional authority hasexceeded its jurisdiction while dealing with the matter under Section 44 of thesaid Act and that itself justifies interference by this Court in the impugned orderand to set aside the same.
4. The impugned order also does not disclose any analysis of the materialson record, though the revisional Court has observed in para 17 that it would re-appreciate the evidence. Apparently, thereafter, while setting aside the orderpassed by the Labour Court, without any appreciation of the evidence, theIndustrial Court has arrived at the conclusion that the complainant hadestablished the act of unfair labour practices on the part of the petitioners underItem 1(g) of Schedule-IV of the said Act vis-a-vis the employee. The saidfinding, therefore, is totally perverse and cannot be sustained.
5. In the course of the hearing, a grievance was made by the learnedAdvocate for the respondent that even though the services of the respondent wassought to be terminated, the necessary terminal benefits have not been paid to therespondent. The learned Advocate for the petitioners, however, has fairlysubmitted that as per the calculations made by the petitioners, they are ready andwilling to pay the same and has in fact handed over to the Advocate for therespondent four cheques in that regard, all dated 17-6-2003 and drawn in thename of the respondent. One of such cheques is for the sum of Rs. 5,303/-, drawnon State Bank of India, being the amount payable towards the privilege leave andsick leave, another cheque for the sum of Rs. 71,371/-, drawn on GrindlaysBank, being the contribution from pension fund as the employer's share, the thirdone for the sum of Rs. 15,691, drawn on State Bank of India, being the amountof gratuity and the fourth for the sum of Rs. 66,535.50, drawn on StandardChartered Grindlays Bank, towards the contribution by the respondent to the provident fund (employees' account) as well as the interest thereon. All thesecheques are handed over to the learned Advocate for the respondent, who hasreceived the same without prejudice to the rights of the respondent, also whilemaking grievance about the fact that the amount paid does not include theinterest payable on the dues. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has alsoplaced on record the statement of account disclosing the amount due and payableand copy thereof has also been furnished to the Advocate for the respondent. Thesaid amount having been received by the Advocate for the respondent withoutprejudice to the rights of the respondent, it is not necessary for this Court to dealwith the said issue any further in this matter. Suffice to observe that the amount,as disclosed from the statement of account filed by the petitioners, stands paid tothe respondent. Needless to say that the cheques are subject to realisation. Therespondent is required to issue proper receipts in relation to each of the chequesdrawn in his favour by the petitioners and to forward the same to the petitioners.
6. The learned Advocate for the petitioners states that the petitioners haddeposited a sum of Rs. 6,479/- in the Industrial Court towards the wages payableto the respondent. In view of the petitioners having paid the terminal dues as pertheir calculations submitted today, and considering the request by the learnedAdvocate for the petitioners to permit the said amount of Rs. 6,479/- depositedby them to be withdrawn, I do not find any justification to reject the said prayer.Needless to say that the withdrawal of Rs. 6,479/- would not in any wayprejudice the respondent as the amount paid today towards the terminal benefitshas been accepted by the learned Advocate for the respondent without prejudiceto the rights of the respondent. Accordingly, the petitioners are permitted towithdraw the said amount of Rs. 6,479/- deposited by the petitioners with theIndustrial Court at Mumbai. The Industrial Court to do the needful on thepetitioners approaching for withdrawal of the same.
7. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order passed by theIndustrial Court is liable to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly herebyquashed and set aside while confirming the order passed by the Labour Court.The rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.