Privy Council Cases

Chutterdharee Lall Vs. Rambelashee Koer and ors.

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal319

Ainslie, J.1. It appears to us that this case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Ram Kishen Doss v. Hurkhoo Singh 7 W.R. 329 and Gujendro Narain Roy v. Hemanginee Dassee 13 W.R. 35 in which it was held that Section 204[1] I does not apply to parties who have become sureties after the decree. In the present case the security was demanded and taken under Section 342 before the decree, for the purpose of securing to the respondent his costs in the event of his being successful.2. The case must, therefore, go back to the Subordinate Judge in order that he may allow execution to proceed against the sureties; but before doing so, it will, of course, be necessary that the decree-holder should give the surety notice of his intention to proceed against him instead of proceeding against the original judgment-debtor; he should be served with notice to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him.3. We may also observe that in this case the original surety appears to be d...

In Re: Thomson's Policy

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal348

Markby, J.1. Even if we assume that the transfer of a policy of insurance is a conveyance of property situate in British India so as to be prima facie chargeable under Article 15, Schedule I of the Stamp Act (as to which we express no opinion), still the difficulty arises with regard to the endorsements which the Board of Revenue consider ought to be stamped as conveyances, that it is impossible to say that any specific sum was paid as consideration for either of these transactions.2. Under Section 34--q. v. supra I.L.R. 3 Cal. 347 vendor and purchaser, in cases of sale, are both required to set forth truly in words the full consideration-money directly or indirectly paid or secured, &c.;, &c.;, under certain penalties for failure to do so. Section 11 is restricted in its application to bonds, mortgage-deeds or settlements; and in the case of a conveyance, an option as to the amount of stamp to be used with a corresponding limitation of the rights secured by the instrument, is not allo...

Rughooburdyal Vs. Sham NaraIn Singh

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal508

Kennedy, J.1. In this case there is an appeal from the judgment of the Judge of Patna reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge. As I understand, three points have been argued on behalf of the special appellant. The first question which he raises is with respect to the nature of the property which is claimed by the plaintiff. The special appellant contends that, in truth, this is not ancestral immoveable property. We are, however, of opinion that it must be treated as being ancestral immoveable property.2. The ancestor, Brij Lall, acquired this property by a deed of conditional sale. Now it has been held, and I have no hesitation in saying with perfect correctness, that up to the time of the foreclosure becoming absolute, the interest of the vendee by the conditional sale amounts only to securing his money. He has the land, he has it simply as security. One must remember, however, that from the beginning it was not so. Originally it was really a conditional sale, which became abs...

Sobha Bibee Vs. Mirza Sakhamut Ali and ors.

Court : Kolkata

White, J.1. The appellant in this case applied, under Section 208 of the Code of 1859, for leave to execute a decree, which she alleged she had purchased at an auction sale. The Court below, taking into consideration a certain judgment that had been passed by this Court in a suit to which the present appellant was a party, has decided that she is not entitled to take out execution of the decree, and, accordingly, has refused her application.2. Now, by the 364th section of the Code, no appeal lies against this order, unless an express provision can be found in the Code which allows of an appeal. The only express provision is contained in Section 283 of the Code. This section has been repealed by Act XXIII of 1861, and Section 11 of the latter Act has taken its place. Hence, unless the appellant has a right of appeal under Section 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, she cannot carry the case further so far as the present suit is concerned. The only part of Section 11 which we need consider is that ...

Chunder Sekhur Mookerjee and ors. Vs. the Collector of Midnapore on th ...

Court : Kolkata

L.S. Jackson, J.1. We do not think it necessary to call upon the Government vakeel in this case, because we are of opinion that the judgment of the Court below is substantially correct. The terms of the kabooleut, which were read to us from page 7 of the paper-book, and which, it may be admitted, are binding on the Government as well as the zemindar, are extremely vague, and it would he dangerous to impose upon the Government, on the strength of such terms as 'the excavation of the silt of khals, the closing of the mouth of Khalsai,' so extremely onerous an obligation as the plaintiffs seek to impose in the present case. But in addition to that there is an objection on principle, to requiring the Government, or any person whom it is sought to bind by such words, not to do that which may, upon a proper consideration of the whole subject, carry out the purpose obviously intended, but to do a particular thing, because that particular thing was once done in view of that same object. The Go...

Sangapa BIn Baslingapa Vs. Gangapa BIn Niranjapa and ors.

Court : Mumbai

Reported in : (1878)ILR2Bom476

Michael Westropp, C.J.1. The plaintiff, a Lingayet, by this suit claims as against the three defendants a declaration of his right (which he alleges to be hereditary) to take a cupola to a Lingayet temple and to place it upon the car of the idol, and to take a nandicola (bamboo) with tom-toms from his house to the temple, and to offer the first cocoanut to the idol at the annual festival held in honour of Gangapaya Maha Purush, a Lingayet saint, A singular circumstance is, that the second defendant is a Mussulman, and at the bar has been stated to be a species of trustee of the temple conjointly with the first defendant (who is the Lingayet pujari of the idol), and to be associated in the trust, because the temple has been built partly on the grave of Mussulman pir or saint. The third defendant alleges the car to have been built at his expense (a disputed fact, not decided in the Courts below), and that he has the right to place the cupola upon it and to offer the first cocoanut to the...

Holodhur Pal Vs. Ekram Mundul and ors.

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal271

Richard Garth, C.J.1. We think that this appeal should be decreed. The facts of the case are correctly stated in the decision of Mr. Justice Ainslie; and we quite agree with that learned Judge, that before the plaintiff in this case (the landlord.) could sue the tenant for increased rent, upon the ground that the land demised consisted of more than 47 bigas and 5 cottas, he was bound to give the defendant a previous notice that the increased rent would be required of him.2. It seems to us that this notice was rendered necessary by Section 14 of Beng. Act VIII of 1869; because we have had the lease in question read, and it appears to be one 'not specifying the period of the engagement;' so that, until he had received such a notice as the section requires, the defendant could not be called upon to pay a higher rent than he did in the year preceding the suit. Mr. Justice Ainslie considers that the defendant was entitled in this case to some notice, though he thinks that Section 14 does no...

Parbutty Nath Roy Chowdhry and ors. Vs. Mudho Paroe and ors.

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal276

Richard Garth, C.J.1. We have felt some difficulty in coming to a conclusion upon this case, partly from the peculiar nature of the rights claimed by the plaintiffs, and partly from there being no provision in the Limitation Act of 1871 which applies to, or contemplates, a suit of this nature.2. The plaintiff's claim to be entitled to an 8-anna share of a certain jalkar, and they pray for a declaration as against the defendants,--first, that they are entitled to receive rent from them for fishing in their jalkar; or, secondly, that the defendants have no right to fish there without paying them (the plaintiff's) rent; or, in other words, that the plaintiffs are entitled to enjoy their jalkar, rights without the defendants interference.3. The Munsif very properly dismissed the first portion of the plaintiffs' claim, upon the ground that the defendants were not, and had never claimed to be, the plaintiffs' tenants. But he decreed their claim in the other alternative, declaring in substanc...

The Empress Vs. Thacoor Dyal Sing and anr.

Court : Kolkata

Reported in : (1878)ILR3Cal320

Ainslie, J.1. Independently of this there is another reason for which the order must be set aside. In the order of the Magistrate by which he referred the case to the Deputy Magistrate for explanation, it is said that the petitioner before him had asserted that six and twenty villages out of the thirty which formed the subject of the order were actually held in ticca. The Deputy Magistrate in his reply does not deny that there are certain villages in the possession of ticcadars, but he contends that there being a dispute between the contending parties as to collection of rent, it is necessary to decide the question of possession in respect of all the villages held in Khas and ticca jointly, by which he apparently means all the villages, whether held khas or leased out. No doubt it has been held that questions between zemindars as to the right of collecting rents directly from the ryots may be considered by Magistrates, and that this right of so collecting rents is in fact possession wi...

Birchunder Manickya Vs. Hurrish Chunder Dass

Court : Kolkata

Richard Garth, C.J.1. We think that, in this case, the lower Court is in error, through misconstruing the meaning of the Full Bench decision--Beer Chunder Munick Bahadoor v. Ramkishen Shaw 14 B.L.R. 370 : S.C. 23 W.R. 128.2. The plaintiff sued the defendant for rent due for the year 1279 at the same rate which had been decreed to him for the previous year 1278, in a suit which he had brought against the same defendant for rent of the same property, and the plaintiff relied upon that former decree as almost conclusive evidence of the proper amount due to him from the defendant.3. It seems that this decree for the rent of 1278 was obtained by the plaintiff ex parte, the defendant not appearing at the trial; and it is admitted that no execution had ever been taken out by the plaintiff upon the decree, and that his right to take out execution had been barred by limitation.4. The Court of first instance held that this former decree was evidence against the defendant in the present suit, and...