Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1884)ILR10Cal1095
Mitter and Pigot, JJ.1. These appeals arise out of suits instituted by the plaintiff, who is the lessor of the mouzah in which the lands in suit are situated, to eject the defendants from their holdings.2. Amongst other pleas, the defendants pleaded want of sufficient notice, and set up their right of occupancy in bar of the plaintiff's claim for ejectment. As regards the notice, the admitted facts are these: The notice itself is dated 19th Bysack 1288, corresponding with the 3rd May 1881. The notice informed the ryot that he was to quit his holding within seven days. It was served on the ryot on the 23rd Bysack 1288, corresponding with the 7th of May 1881, and the present suits were brought on the 13th of May 1881, that is to say, one day before the term given in the notice expired. Upon both these points issues were framed by the Munsif, who came to the conclusion that the defendant's plea, as regards the insufficiency of notice, was fully made out, but the Munsif's finding was again...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : 44Ind.Cas.930
Barnes Peacock, C.J.1. It is always a most unpleasant duty for a Judge to be compelled to vindicate his own honour, or the dignity of the Court over which he presides, by adopting measures which may cause pain, or wound the feelings of any man. Bat a Judge who would shrink from the discharge of what he considers to be his public duty, merely because it is to him a painful one, is not fit to be entrusted with the office which he holds. To me the duty which I am now called upon to perform is all the more painful, because the gentleman whose conduct is called into question is one with whom in times gone by I have held social and friendly intercourse. The case is one of public importance, and I am anxious that there shall be no misunderstanding of the views and opinions of the Judges and of the reasons which induced them to adopt the course which they have pursued. Above all, I am desirous that there shall be no further misrepresentations such as those with which unhappily we are called up...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : 45Ind.Cas.113
Barnes Peacock, C.J.1. An advertisement publislied in a newspaper for a demonstration against a Judge for acts done in Court may be a contempt of Court as well as defamation, although it cannot be said that in every case a demonstration got up in order to obtain an expression of public opinion concerning the acts of a Judge would bo a contempt, [p. 125, col. 1.]2. If anonymous letters are sent to the press containing false statements), the press is responsible for them if the name of the author is not given up. [p. 144, col. 2.]3. To say that a sentence is 'cruel' may be a con-tempt of Court, though it would be no contempt if the remark is merely that, the sentence is a severe one. [p. 142, col 2; p. 143, col. 1.]4. Per Macpherson, J.--The High Court has power to proceed by way of contempt oven when the contempt is not committed in Court or during the pendency of a suit. [p. 145, col. 2.]5. Per Curiam.--The fact of his making an apology does not entitle the person charged with contempt...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1879)ILR4Cal551
Mitter, J.1. The question raised in this special appeal is whether, according to Hindu law, an unchaste mother is entitled to succeed to the properties of a deceased son, it being established that she became unchaste before the succession opened out to her?2. The District Judge in the lower Appellate Court has answered this question in the affirmative. In this opinion we do not concur. The District Judge relies upon a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court--Musamat Ganga Jati v. Ghasita I.L.R., 1 All., 46. He is also of opinion, upon the authority of the judgments of Mr. Justice Markby and the Chief Justice Sir Barnes Peacock in the case of Matangini Debi v. Joykali Debi 5 B.L.R., 466, that Act XXI of 1850 removed the bar to the succession of an unchaste woman arising from loss of caste.3. The question raised in the case before the Allahabad High Court was different. It was whether unchastity in a woman does not incapacitate her from inheriting any stridhan property? And the C...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : 30Ind.Cas.567
ORDER1. We think the passage in our judgment, as to the exclusion of Amrita under the Hindu Law, there seems to be no ground for that, because although a widow at the time of her father's death still she could certainly, as the law now stands, remarry and have issue', should be struck out but we do not think it necessary to alter the decree....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1876)ILR1Cal1
Mitter, J.1. From the foregoing statement it is clear that the defendant put the legality of her marriage, and consequently the legitimacy of her son, upon a social custom obtaining among her caste people.2. The contention raised in special appeal is that the decision of the lower Court, both on the question of the validity of the marriage and the heritable rights of an illegitimate son of a sudra, is erroneous in law; and I am of opinion that this contention is valid. After having expressed his opinion that an illegitimate son of a sudra under the Hindu law inherits his putative father's property, the District Judge, with reference to the question of marriage, says: 'But more than this I am not at all sure that the son is illegitimate; the defendant lived as his wife with Radhoo for twenty years, and still asserts that she was married to him. The marriage therefore may, I think, be presumed, and the disproof of it lies upon the plaintiff. I cannot say that he has succeeded in disprovi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1876)ILR1Cal198
Macpherson, Offg. C.J.1. In this case it appears that upon the 15th of September 1873, Baboo Nuffer Chunder Bhutt, the Officiating Additional Subordinate Judge of Moorshedabad, sitting as a Court of Appeal, reversed the decision of the Munsif of Jungipore. On the 30th of May and 1st of June 1874, Baboo Nuffer Chunder Bhutt having ceased to hold the office of Additional Subordinate Judge of Moorshedabad, Baboo Nobo Kumar Banerjee, the Second Subordinate Judge of that district, admitted a review of the judgment of Baboo Nuffer Chunder Bhutt, and, reversing his decision, restored and confirmed the decree of the Munsif of Jungipore. It is objected in special appeal that Baboo Nobo Kumar Banerjee had no power to review the judgment of Baboo Nuffer Chunder Bhutt; that no sufficient reason was shown for his reviewing it; and that his proceedings ought to be set aside. For the respondent it is contended that whether the review was rightly or wrongly admitted, the matter is not one which can be...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1876)ILR1Cal92
L.S. Jackson, J.1. The two questions raised in this appeal, which are of most importance, are, first, whether compound interest stipulated by the instrument on which the plaintiffs sue will run beyond the due date, which is the end of Choitro 1275; and secondly, whether, with reference to the Hindu law, the plaintiffs and the defendant being both Hindus, a larger amount of interest than the principal can be recovered. As to the first question, we can have no doubt, I think, that the terms of the bond appear clearly to import that there was to be payment of interest in two instalments,--viz., a half-yearly and yearly payment, the word including not only the particular year which was to elapse before the amount was due, but each year until the whole sum was recovered. As to the second point, no authority has been laid before us to justify our adoption for Courts in the mofussil, of the rule of Hindu law that more interest than the principal could not be recovered. We are referred to a de...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1876)ILR1Cal43
Phear, J.1. As to this claim the defendants maintain there has been no binding award made; and clearly, as it seems to me, the plaintiffs, on their own showing, cannot succeed on this footing alone.2. In the first place it is not the fact that all the items in the schedule were awarded by any arbitrators, and in the second place there is not a pretence for saying that the award of the 16th April made in respect of the Dumphaile Castle parcel was a decision binding on the defendants on the terms of the contract. Neither of the arbitrators, who assumed to make that award, was appointed by the defendants' agents; nor had the contract at that time been made a rule of Court, and therefore none of the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 (even assuming that they could be of any use to the plaintiff) applied. In other words, the defendants had not then appointed an arbitrator either actually, or constructively, and had in fact absolutely refused to do so.3. As to the award of th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1878)ILR1Cal28
Macpherson, Officiating C.J.1. The answer to this question depends upon the construction to be put on the Dayabhaga of Jimutavahana, the founder of the Bengal school. The other authorities current in Bengal are all of them based on the Dayabhaga, and such differences as exist between them and the Dayabhaga scarcely ever involve conflicts of principle. According to the Dayabhaga, the whole theory of inheritance is founded on the principle of spiritual benefit conferred: and it is by that principle that questions relating to inheritance must be tested and determined see the judgment of the Full Bench in Guru Gobind Shaha Mandal v. Anand Lal Ghose Mazumdar 5. B.L.R. 15 the question now before us being no exception to this general rule.2. It appears to me that the Dayabhaga (with the exception of one clause, Chap, xi, Section 5, Clause 35, to which I shall presently refer at length) clearly shows that, where there has been no separation, uterine brothers take to the exclusion of half broth...
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