Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1897)7MLJ251
1. In this. case the plaintiff, the holder of a permanently settled estate, seeks, among other things, to eject the defendant from certain lands. Admittedly, the lands are situated within the plaintiff's estate and are subject to an annual' assessment payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.2. The decision of the case depends solely upon these facts, no other facts having been satisfactorily established by the evidence.3. In this state of the case the Lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit in so for as the prayer far possession was concerned. On behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that the dismfssal was erroneous and that the error was caused by the lower appellate Court having wrongly thrown the onus of proof on the plaintiff. The argument in support of the contention. was that upon the admitted facts, the finding must be that the defendant was a tenant from year to year and as due notice to quit had been given, the tenancy had been determined before the date of the action an...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1898)8MLJ205
1. In a case like this a second order or order absolute, on application by the mortgagee was imperative under the Transfer of Property Act to enable the plaintiff to obtain possession of the property. On such an application being made by the mortgagee, the mortgagor (defendant) is entitled under the proviso to Section 87 of the Act to obtain an extension of time for payment of the money on showing good cause. We cannot agree with the appellant's contention before us that the mortgagor cannot apply for such extension after the expiry of the time fixed for payment in the first order inasmuch as the mortgagee himself could apply for an. order absolute only after the expiry of such time. It is next contended by the appellant that even if the mortgagor could ask for an extension after the expiry of the time fixed for payment in the first order, he could not do so after the passing of the final order, and that such final order was in fact passed in the present case. ..That order was, however...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1972)1MLJ141
N. Krishnaswamy Reddy, J.1. Defendants 1 to 3 are the appellants. The plaintiff, the younger brother of the first defendant, filed the suit in forma pauperis for partition of his half share in schedules A,B,G mentioned in the plaint and for rendition of accounts of joint family business of Soda and Cigar factories. The learned Subordinate Judge passed a preliminary decree for partition of items 1 and 3 of A schedule properties into two equal shares and to allow one such share to the plaintiff and for a division of items 6 to 8 and 16 to 18 of the moveable C schedule properties. Under the preliminary decree, the plaintiff was made liable to pay a moiety of the debt due under Exhibit B-8. The suit was dismissed in other respects. The plaintiff filed a memo, of cross-objections.2. Defendants 2 and 3 are the minor sons of the first defendant, the brother of the plaintiff, and the fourth defendant is the wife of the first defendant. The case of the plaintiff is that he and his brother, the ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad173
Innes, Officiating C.J.1. The learned Judge considered that the question for decision was, Did the timber which the plaintiff tendered answer the description stipulated for? Referring to the specific clause in the contract whereby plaintiff agrees to submit to the judgment of Colonel Kerrich (the Superintendent of the Gun Carriage Factory), he was of opinion that the case was distinguishable from the cases of building contracts, in which the certificate of a third party is a condition precedent to the right to recover. He thought that Colonel Kerrich being one of the contracting parties, his judgment could not be regarded as conclusive, and that it was open to the plaintiff to question the reasonableness of the refusal to accept delivery and to show that his tender ought to have been accepted.2. The clause in the contract is as follows:The timber shall be of unexceptionable quality, and shall be liable to be rejected if not approved of by the said Lieutenant-Colonel D'Oyly Kerrich, E. ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad33
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. and Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. The powers of the Government of British India to make laws and exercise jurisdiction over British subjects outside British India but within the territories of Princes of States in India in alliance with the British Government, are declared in and regulated by English Statute Law.2. By the Indian Council's Act 1861, power was given to the Governor-General in Council at meetings for making laws and regulations to make, inter alia, laws and regulations for European British subjects, being servants of the Government of India within the dominions of Princes and States in alliance with Her Majesty. By 28 Vic., Cap. 17, this power was enlarged so as to enable the same authority to make laws for all British subjects of Her Majesty in the places before mentioned; and the doubts which had arisen as to the power of the same authority to make laws binding on Native Indian subjects in the same places were set at rest by 32 and 33 Vic., Cap. 98....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 17Ind.Cas.586; (1912)23MLJ347
Kindersley, J.1. In the present case, the plaintiff, as the person having hereditary right to the management of a public charity, sues a person whom he regards as a trespass er. This is not the case of one of the general public and suing without the authority of the Advocate-General or other officer to secure the due performance of the trust, and, I think, that Section 539, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply. The decision of the two lower Courts must be reversed and the suit must be remanded to the Subordinate Courts for decision on the merits.2. The costs will be disposed of by the final decree.Forbes, J.3. Section 539 is applicable only in cases of an alleged breach of an express or constructive trust created for a public charitable purpose. The restriction on the right of suing is thus confined to cases where the person sued is a trustee. In the present case, the suit is brought against an alleged trespasser, whose title to manage is denied and who, if he is without title, cannot ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR7Mad341
1. Sivasami Tevar, the respondent's father, claimed the zamindari of Ramnad, but, in release of his claim, accepted, in January 1861, certain villages and a monthly allowance of Rs. 700 to be paid out of the revenues of the zamindari. Sivasami Tevar died on 1st July 1861, leaving a widow, Kolanathai Nachiar, and according to the respondent's case, another widow, Ramamani Ammal, the mother of the respondent and of his sister since deceased.2. Kolanthai Nachiar obtained a certificate to collect the debts of the deceased and denied the status of Ramamani Ammal as a widow of the deceased and the legitimacy of her children, consequently Ramamani Ammal instituted Original Suit 13 of 1864 on the file of the District Court of Madura to establish the right of the respondent as the son and sole heir of Sivasami to inherit the movable and immovable estate left by him. Kolanthai Nachiar disputed the claim on the grounds that Ramamani was a prostitute and of a class with which a marriage, if celebr...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad106
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. and Muttusami Ayyar, J.1. We are unable to agree with the Judge that under the circumstance the sale made in pursuance of the order contained in the decree' should not be set aside when on appeal that order was reversed.2. The purchaser was no other than the plaintiff in the suit who, averring that the interests of appellant, the second defendant, were bound by a mortgage executed by his brother, sued to enforce the lien, and, although he obtained a decree in the Court of First Instance and caused the sale to be carried out, he was aware that the appeal had been instituted and purchased subject to the result, the reversal of the order for sale.3. The order of the Lower Appellate Court is reversed and that of the Court of First Instance restored with costs in all Courts....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad37
Innes, J.1. These cases were heard on the 6th January. On the 8th we were prepared to give judgment, but we thought it desirable to hear argument upon a point which had been apparently overlooked. We accordingly heard Counsel again on the 15th March.2. The plaintiff in each case got a decree against Viraragava (the father of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th defendants in the present suit), and, on proceeding to execute against some of the property assumed to be that of Viraragava, was met by a claim made by the present 2nd, 3rd, and 4th defendants--Viraragava's sons--on the property attached.3. Plaintiffs were eventually required to institute regular suits against the claimants and the attached property was released. Plaintiffs brought the suits 452 and 503 of 1878, out of which the appeals arise.4. The question in appeal in each case is whether the learned Judge was wrong in finding that the interest of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th defendants in the house No. 9, Armenian Street, is liable to be seized unde...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad108
Innes, J.1. The questions in this appeal have relation to three promissory notes (Exhibits A, B, C) executed by defendant on the 1st November 1876, the 5th September 1877, and the 21st September 1877, respectively. The notes Exhibits A and C were executed in favour of Alfred Arathoon; but the note, Exhibit B was executed in favour of Augustus Arathoon and by him on the same day endorsed to Alfred Arathoon. The notes were all endorsed to the plaintiff long after their execution.2. The defence was that on the 21st February 1878 defendant had sold his business; carried on under the style of Taylor and Co., to Augustus Arathoon and Willoughby Van Ingen for and on behalf of themselves and of Alfred and Samuel Arathoon, and that it was one of the terms of the said sale that defendant should be discharged from the debts and liabilities then due from him in respect of the said business, and that these liabilities included the said promissory notes, which were then in the hands of Alfred and Au...
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