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Khajah Assenoolla Joo Vs. Khajah Abdool Aziz and ors.
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal923
Pigot, J.1 Made an order striking out the defence of Khajah Abdool Aziz under Section 136 of the Code in consequence of his non-compliance with the order of the 29th March 1883; and at the same time mentioned that the party against whom the order was made might come in and seek to set it aside on showing good grounds for the application....
Tag this Judgment!Khatija Bibi Vs. Taruk Chunder Dutt
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal980
Richard Garth, C.J.1. We see no sufficient ground for transferring this suit from the Dacca Court to that of Furridpore.2. Prim facie, the plaintiff as the arbiter litis has a right to bring his suit in any Court which the law allows; and Section 23 is only intended, as we consider to provide for those cases, where, on the ground of expense or convenience, or some other good reason, the Court thinks that the place of trial ought to be changed.3. If for instance, in this case, the defendant could have shown us that great expense could have been saved, or that the balance of convenience was strongly in favour of the case being tried at Furridpore, we might have thought it right to grant his application. But looking at the allegations on both sides, we think it very difficult to say where the balance of convenience lies.4. The plaintiff, on the one hand, says that, though a great part of the property in suit is in Furridpore, some of it is in Dacca; that the defendant himself lives at Dac...
Tag this Judgment!Tiruvengada Ayyangar Vs. Rangasami Nayak
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Mad19
Kindersley, J.1. On the 25th of December 1875, the plaintiff's adoptive mother and guardian, Balambaboye Ammal, and his natural father, Narayana-sami Panditar, both apparently acting on behalf of the plaintiff, who was then a minor, executed a deed mortgaging certain lands, the property of the plaintiff, to the defendant, Tiruvengada Ayyangar. The consideration for the mortgage mentioned in the deed was that the defendant would pay certain debts due by the plaintiff, and amongst others a sum of Rs. 1,801-10-8 due to one Kuppusami Panditar. The defendant failed to pay Kuppusami Panditar, who accordingly brought a suit (No. 268 of 1877) against Narayanasami and the present defendant for recovery of the debt. The present defendant appears to have pleaded in that suit that Kuppusami had no cause of action against him, and that there was an oral agreement that Kuppusami was to give him a bond of indemnity in case the minor, on coming of age, should repudiate the debt, and that, as he had no...
Tag this Judgment!Muppidi Papaya and ors. Vs. Ramana and anr.
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Mad85
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.1. It is a general principle that a person filling an office cannot aliene the emoluments of the office to the prejudice of his successors, and there is authority for holding that the lands attached to the office of karnam in permanently-settled estates cannot be alienated by the holder of the office, notwithstanding that Regulation XXIX of 1802 does not contain a prohibitory provision similar to that which is found in Regulation VI of 1831, M. Seshaiya v. M. Gauvamma 4 M.H.C.R. 336 Diggavelly Parummah v. Goontamookala Surrauze 1 M.S.D. 214 (Select decrees, 1 of 1819) Vencatoovien v. Vencataramyen 2 M.S.D. 85 (Select decrees, 1 of 1844).2. The alienation made by the father of the second and third appellants cannot bind his successor, and the suit has been brought within twelve years from the date when the succession to the office devolved on the second and third appellants.3. The decree of the Lower Appellate Court, in so far as it subjects the restoration o...
Tag this Judgment!Muringa Mangalath Gopalan Nayar and ors. Vs. the Kiyaka Kovilagath Val ...
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Mad87
Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. and Kernan, J.1. A practice has prevailed in Malabar, whereby the karnavan has been recognized as representing the tarwad and entitled to sue or defend suits as such representative without the association of the other members of the tarwad, who were nevertheless held bound by decrees passed in such suits, unless they showed mala fides in their representative. This practice had its origin in convenience, but now that the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 30, contains a special provision to obviate the inconvenience, where a number of persons in the same interest have occasion to assert or defend their rights by suit, it may be doubted how far the practice would be now upheld, and it is advisable that resort should be had to the provisions of Section 30, Civil Procedure Code.2. In the present case, it appears that the karnavan and eight anandravans were impleaded by a jenmkar, under whom the tarwad held a lease, which they alleged was perpetual. They had denie...
Tag this Judgment!Gurupadapa Basapa Vs. Virbhadrapa Irsangapa
Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Bom459
West, J.1. The first question is that of what Act governs this case, and we think it is Act XV of 1877. Acts of limitation, like other laws relating to procedure, apply immediately to all steps taken after they have come into force, except when some provision is made to the contrary. The reason of this is that every one seeking the aid of a Court seeks it on the terms from time to time imposed by the Legislature. He has not the privilege of making any application he likes in any way, and at any time he likes. Other interests than his are at stake, and the Courts are not to exercise their coercive power at his request over another person, except under such regulations as shall make their action compatible with the general welfare. They, accordingly, are commanded to act only in defined ways on applications which satisfy specified conditions. It has been contended that the judgment of the Privy Council in Mangal Prasad's case L.R., 8 IndAp, 123 involves the principle that when a suit has...
Tag this Judgment!Korban Ally Mirdha Vs. Sharoda Proshad Aich and ors.
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1884)ILR10Cal82
Prinsep, J.1. The plaintiff in this case 8ues on an unregistered mortgage bond, the consideration of which is Rs. 99. The defendants, stated to he the mortgagors, denied the execution of the mortgage bond. There is another party who appeared and was brought on the record, who claims this property as having been bought under an unregistered conveyance from the other defendants, the admitted owners.2. Both the lower Courts, on the authority of the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the case of Himmat Singh v. Sewaram I.L.R. 3 All. 157 have dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiff's mortgage bond was one of which registration was compulsory, and, therefore, cannot be made the subject of suit.3. In our opinion the judgments of the lower Courts are erroneous, not being in accordance with a series of decisions delivered by this Court. The High Courts of Madars and Bombay, it may be observed, have adopted the same view of the law. The lower Courts are bound to foll...
Tag this Judgment!Anusuyabai Widow of Balaji Vs. Sakharam Pandurang
Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Bom464
West, J.1. The decree of the Court below being in favour of the appellant, and she seeking no alteration of it, the present appeal must be dismissed. Mr. Ghanasham, for the appellant urges that, though the decision is in his client's favour, one of the grounds on which it is based has been decided unfavourably to the appellant's title and may thus, as res judicata, greatly prejudice her in a future suit between her and the respondent. This fear, though there are some decisions and dicta which support it, does not appear to be well grounded. The judgment is not, and cannot really be based on a ground unfavourable to the successful party, though an opinion unfavourable to him may be expressed on some incidental point. According to the English law, 'the attribute of being conclusive evidence of the facts.stated therein, and properly tending thereto, seems to have been thought to belong to every adjudication emanating from a competent Court'--Crepps v. Durden 1 S L.C. (1876) 716; nee too E...
Tag this Judgment!Sriraja Venkataramaya Apparau Bahadur Vs. Anumukonda Rangaya Nayudu
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Mad41
1. The case was posted for hearing for the 2nd October 1882.2. On that day, at the request of the defendant's vakil, the case was adjourned until the 7th November 1882.3. On this latter day, plaintiff and his vakil were absent, and the defendant was present.4. The Judge dismissed the suit without going into the case, defendant's vakil denying plaintiff's claim.5. An application was made to the Court on the 6th December 1882, under Section 103, * Chapter VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside the dismissal, on proving that the plaintiff was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing on the 7th November.6. The Judge, however, on the 6th December records that the dismissal was under Section 158 of the Code, and that the order cannot be set aside as requested.7. We think the Judge was in error in holding that the suit was dismissed under Section 158, as the facts of the case are not within that Section, but are within Section 157.8. Section. 158 applies to a party to whom time ...
Tag this Judgment!Yusuf Khan and anr. Vs. Sirdar Khan and ors.
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Mad83
Kindersley and Hutchins, JJ.1. It has been held in Raja Rau v. Tolasi Ammal not reported, see I.L.R. 7 Mad. 82 Sabhanatha v. Subba Lakshmi I.L.R. 7 Mad. 80 that the words, 'a certain date' in Article 179 (6) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, require that an actual date shall have been specified, either absolutely or in relation to some contingency, and that it is not enough that the payment has been ordered to be made monthly or annually, leaving it for the Court to say whether it is to be made at the end, or beginning, or middle of the period. The petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on that clause, for his decree is simply that the money shall be paid annually. The words in Section 230 of the Procedure Code are the same, and that section, therefore, would also be a bar to the execution of this decree of 1854.2. The appeal is dismissed with costs.1 [Article 179:______________________________________________________________________________________________________Description of appli...
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