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Joyunti Dasi Vs. Mahomed Ally Khan and ors.
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal423
Wilson, J.1. In this case the District Judge has reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and dismissed the suit, on the ground that it is barred by Section 27 of Beng. Act VIII of 1869, as not having been brought within a year after the plaintiff was dispossessed.2. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the District Judge. It has been repeatedly decided both under Section 23 of Act X of 1859, and under the corresponding Section 27 of Act VIII of 1869, that the one section or the other has no application to a case in which the plaintiff relies upon his title and seeks to recover possession upon the strength of that title, and in which the defendant denies that title.3. Such a suit might have been tried in a Civil Court while Act X of 1859 was in force; and such suit is not subject to the limitation laid down by Section 27 of Act VIII of 1869. Gooroo Doss Roy v. Ram Narain Mitter, J. B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 628; 7 W.R. 186; Nistarinee v. Kally Pershad Dass Chowdhry 21 W.R. 53; Nil...
Tag this Judgment!Prasidha Narayan Koer Vs. Man Koch
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal330
Mitter, (Offg.) C.J.1. I am of opinion that in the Assam Valley Districts, Act X of 1859 is not in force. That Act was passed by the Legislative Council of India which was constituted by the 16 and 17 Vic., Cap., 95. There is no clause in the body of the Act to show that its operation was limited only to a particular portion of British India. Prima facie, therefore, it applies to the whole of British India, unless it can be shown from the context that its operation was intended by the legislature to be limited to any particular portion of British India. But from the provisions of the Act itself it is quite clear that it does not apply to the whole of British India. for instance, the systems of land tenures and the settlements of Government revenue prevailing in the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras would make the provisions of this Act wholly inapplicable to those Presidencies. We have, therefore, to determine to what portion of British India the Act in question was, intended by the Le...
Tag this Judgment!Bally Dobey Vs. Ganei Deo and anr.
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal388
Tottenham, J.1. We are of opinion that the lower Courts' judgment is correct. The question involved in the suit is whether a shikmi ghatwali tenure, held under the superior ghatwal, is liable to be sold in execution, or its proceeds liable to attachment for satisfaction of the debt due from its holder. The lower Court has held that it is not liable for such debts, and we entirely, concur in that opinion. The shikmi tenure partakes of the nature of the superior ghatwali tenure, and as the latter has been repeatedly held by this Court to be not liable for such, debts, the former will be necessarily so. The inferior tenure cannot have larger incidents attached to it than the superior.2. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs....
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Purmannadas Jeewandas and anr.
Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1883)ILR7Bom109
Latham, J.1. At the request of counsel on both sides I now deliver my judgment on two preliminary points in this case viz., (1) is the covenant for renewal contained in the lease of October 1, 1794, a covenant for perpetual renewal or for a single renewal only; and (2) is the lessee under that lease, as confirmed by the indenture of May 10, 1870, entitled to remove and sell the soil and stones of the hilly ground comprised in that lease.2. The first question, though probably not of much pecuniary importance, is of considerable speculative interest. The current of legal opinion seems to have changed towards the end of last century, and then to have set against construing such covenants so as to import a perpetual renewal. The history of the earlier cases on the point is fully given in Cruise's Digest, Vol. 4, page 393, et seq. Tie earliest case there referred to is Bridges v. Hitchcock 5 Brown's Parl. Cases (2nd ed.) p. 6 a strong authority in favour of the lessee, but one which has in ...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: the Matter of the Petition of Henry Kyte and Vs. Henry Kyte
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal223
Maclean, J.1. The vakil for the petitioner has failed to satisfy me that the conviction, dated 1st December 1881, is not founded upon a correct view of the law; and, under any circumstances, I object to re-opening a case after the lapse of six months from the date of the conviction.2. I am not prepared to say that the petitioner was not in possession of the liquor. It had, it is admitted, been passed out to him from the Customs, and he was about to despatch it to the consignee at Agra. Neither am satisfied that the holder of a license, not granted by the Excise authorities here, is a licensed vendor within the meaning of Beng. Act VII of 1878. In this view of the law, the petitioner, whether in possession on his own account, or for the consignee, was a person 'other than a licensed vendor,' and being admittedly without a pass from the Collector or other officer duly empowered in that behalf, I see no illegality in his conviction under Section 61, Beng. Act VII of 1878.Macpherson, J.3. ...
Tag this Judgment!Futtehma Begum and ors. Vs. Mohamed Ausur and ors.
Court : Kolkata
Reported in : (1883)ILR9Cal309
Wilson, J.1. It is not the ordinary course of procedure for this Court to interfere in 2nd appeal with any findings of fact which have been arrived at by the lower Appellate Court; but we are well within the scope of the authorities in holding that where the lower Appellate Court has clearly misapprehended what the evidence before it was, and has thus been led to discard or not give sufficient weight to important evidence, and to give weight to other evidence to which it is not entitled, and has thus been led not into any mere incidental mistake, but totally to misconceive the case, this Court may interfere. Now in this case there were several material questions to be decided; the first was whether the bond sued upon was executed by Ausur. As to that the Judge of the lower Appellate Court said in his judgment at p. 15 of the Paper Book: 'It appears to me that the evidence as to Ausur's signature to the bond is most unsatisfactory, and that that signature is in no way proved; (Section 6...
Tag this Judgment!Sri Sri Chandramala Patta Mahadevi Vs. Sri Muktamala Patta Mahadevi an ...
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1883)ILR6Mad20
Kindersley, J.1. The plaintiff, as the widow of the late Sri Ramachandra, zamindar of Hatgada, claimed to be trustee of a certain temple in the fort of Hatgada, and, as such trustee, she sued to recover possession of the village of Jannapuram, with the revenues of which that temple had been endowed; for the sum of Rs. 540, being arrears of revenue for Fasli 1288, and for subsequent revenue at the same rate; also for an injunction restraining the first defendant from interfering.2. The first defendant claimed to be the trustee of the temple in question as the widow of her late husband Sri Chaitania Chandra, who, she alleged, had been adopted by the plaintiff as directed by her husband, the late zamindar. She also alleged that she was the mother and guardian of the minor son of the said Chaitania Chandra. In a second written statement the first defendant alleged that the late zamindar, plaintiff's husband, has made his will on the 2nd December 1859, whereby he had appointed the first def...
Tag this Judgment!indukuri Rama Raju Vs. Yerramilli Subbarayudu
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad387
Innes, Officiating C.J. and Tarrant, J.1. The contention is that, as there was other land of the original mortgagor which the second defendant, the second mortgagee, might have attached and sold for realization of the mortgage amount, he ought in equity to be required to realize from that land instead of the portion of the mortgaged land which plaintiff purchased.2. The purchase of plaintiff was subject to existing encumbrances, and there is no foundation for his contention that the mortgagee should be thus deprived of what are his legal rights.3. We must dismiss the second appeal....
Tag this Judgment!Hassaji and anr. Vs. the East India Railway Company
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1882)ILR5Mad388
Innes, Officiating C.J.1. This appeal arises in a suit in which the plaintiffs seek compensation for goods belonging to them carried by the East India Railway for delivery to them and not delivered. The consignment consisted of 220 bags of grain, out of which plaintiffs received all but 93. Of these 28 were lost and 65 bags, after arrival, were damaged (as is found upon the evidence by the Courts below) by a complication of causes against which it was impossible for the defendants to provide, and had to be destroyed under orders of the Magistrate. As to the 65 bags, therefore, the defendants cannot be held answerable.2. In regard to the 28 bags the Company are undoubtedly liable, unless the claim is, as contended, barred. The loss occurred on the 20th September 1877, at latest, as it was discovered on that date, and if the question of the period of limitation be governed by Article 30 of the Second Schedule of Act XV of 1877, this suit is undoubtedly barred as it was not instituted til...
Tag this Judgment!Chengaya Vs. Appasami Ayyar
Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1883)ILR6Mad172
Innes, Officiating C.J. and Kindersley, J.1. It appears to us that the application on the 14th December 1877, though an application 'under the section' in the sense of the third clause of Section 230, was not an application which was granted within the meaning of that clause. It was simply an application on which a notice was issued under Section 248. The applicant cannot be brought, therefore, within the twelve years rule of Section 230, and, as his last application was presented on the 10th December 1880 (not as the District Judge says 18th December), it was within three years from the last preceding application, and is in time.2. We must reverse the order and allow the appeal with costs....
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