Full Judgment
Khare, C.J.
1. The question that arises in these appeals is, whether the BangaloreCity Planning Area Zonal Regulations (Amendment & Validation) Act,1996 (Karnataka Act No. 2 of 1996) [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'], isconstitutionally valid?
2. Civil Appeal No. 831/98 has been filed at the instance of the State ofKarnataka whereas Civil Appeal No. 8951/97 is by the builders [hereinafterreferred to as 'the builders'].
3. In the year 1980 the builders were granted permission to constructeight-storied building eighty feet in height in the locality of 9th Main Road,Rajmahal Vilas Extension, Bangalore by the Karnataka MunicipalCorporation, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation').
4. The respondent has the property adjoining to the site where eight-storiedbuildings were to be constructed. When the builders were about toconstruct the building, the respondent herein filed a petition challenging thepermission granted to the builders to construct eight-storied residentialbuilding. In the writ petitions, it was alleged that the aforesaid sanction is incontravention of the Outline Development Plan and the Zonal Regulationsframed for the City of Bangalore under the provisions of the KarnatakaTown & Country Planning Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'thePlanning Act'). In the writ petition it was prayed that a writ of mandamusbe issued to the Corporation to issue forthwith a fresh licence to the buildersin conformity with the Outline Development Plan and Zonal Regulationsappended thereto promulgated under Section 13(4) of the Planning Act.Here it is relevant to notice that outline development plan and the ZonalRegulations framed under the Act provided maximum height of newconstruction as 55 feet, whereas Rule 16 of Bye-laws 38 framed by theBangalore Municipal Corporation provided maximum height of newbuilding as 80 feet. In the writ petition, the respondent prayed for grant of aninterim order. However, the prayer for interim order was refused. Therespondent thereafter preferred writ appeal against the refusal of the grant ofinterim order before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. TheDivision Bench of the High Court passed an order restraining the builderfrom constructing the building. Aggrieved, the appellants challenged theaforesaid order by means of a special leave petition before the apex Court.This Court set aside the impugned order subject to the builders' furnishingthe undertakings to the effect that in the event of the writ petition beingdecided against them, they would have no objection to the demolition of theportion of the building made by them. It is not disputed that the buildersgave undertakings before the High Court in terms of the order of the apexCourt. Similarly, every purchaser and occupier of the flats in the aforesaidbuilding also gave individual undertakings before the Court. Subsequently,the writ petition filed by the respondent came up for hearing before aDivision Bench of the High Court. The High Court by means of the (sic)and judgment dated 11th of June, 1982 allowed the writ petition. Thebuilders thereafter filed appeals before the apex Court, but their appealswere dismissed on 19.1.1987. After dismissal of the civil appeals by thisCourt, some of the occupants of the premises filed writ petitions challengingthe action of the Commissioner in implementing the writ issued by the HighCourt. However, the said writ petitions were disposed of by an order andjudgment dated 29.10.1987. In terms of the directions given by the HighCourt and after giving opportunity of hearing to all the occupiers of thebuilding, the Commissioner passed an order that 3 floors (6th, 7th and the 8thfloors) of the building constructed by the builders be demolished.Thereafter, different proceedings were taken, which are not relevant for thepurpose of the present case. However, the respondent filed a contemptpetition in the High Court for non-compliance of the order of the HighCourt. While the matters were pending, the Amending and Validating Actwas passed by the Karnataka Legislature, modifying the maximum height ofthe new building upto above 165 feet and validating the new constructionraised in violation of Outline Development Plan and the Zonal Regulations.
5. After the impugned Act was passed, the respondent herein filed apetition challenging the constitutional validity of the Act. The State ofKarnataka and the builders defended the validity of the Act. Subsequently,the writ petition came up for hearing before the Division Bench of theKarnataka High Court which allowed the writ petition and struck down theimpugned Act holding it to be constitutionally invalid. The High Court was,inter alia, of the view that the impugned Act instead of curing the basis ofthe decision rendered by the High Court, purported to set at naught thedecision given by the High Court which was upheld by the Supreme Court;that the object of the impugned Act was to invalidate the pronouncement ofthe High Court and not to remove the fact of invalidity on the action takenby the appellant; and that Section 2 of the Act only amends the ZonalRegulations appended to the Outline Development Plan made and framed bythe Executive in exercise of the delegated power of legislation vested in itwithout amending the provisions of the Planning Act.
6. S/Shri Harish N. Salve and Gopal Subramanium, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the appellants argued that the impugned Act isconstitutionally valid and the view taken by the High Court is erroneous anddeserves to be set aside. However, Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the respondents defended the view taken by the HighCourt.
7. On the arguments of the parties, the question that arises forconsideration is whether the Karnataka Legislature by the impugned Act hasremoved the basis of the judgment of the High Court or it, without amendingthe basis, has purported to nullify the judicial decree per se and, therefore,such an Act is ultra vires the competence of the State Legislature.
8. Here it would be relevant to advert to the relevant provisions of thePlanning Act and the Zonal Regulations framed under Section 13 and Bye-lawsframed by the Corporation and the impugned Act.
9. The Planning Act provides for regulation by way of planned growthof land use and development and execution of Town Planning Scheme in theState of Karnataka. Section 4A of the Planning Act empowers the StateGovernment to declare any area in the State to be a Local Planning Area forpurposes of the act. Section 4C of the Planning Act provides forconstitution of Planning Authority for the purpose of performing thefunctions assigned to it. Chapter III relates to Outline Development Planauthorising every Planning Authority to carry out a survey of the area andprepare and publish an Outline Development Plan and submit the same tothe Government for provisional approval. An Outline Development Plan isto indicate the manner in which the development and improvement of theentire planning area within the jurisdiction of the Planning Authority isrequired to be carried out and regulated. Under Section 13 of the PlanningAct the State Government has authority to approve the Outline DevelopmentPlan in the manner and the procedure prescribed therein. Section 14provides that on and from the date of declaration no change in the land useor development can be made except with written permission of the PlanningAuthority. In exercise of power conferred under Section 13, the Authorityhas framed Zonal Regulations appended to Outline Development Plan. Thesaid Regulations provide maximum height of the building to be constructedin the area as 55 fts.
10. Chapter IV of the Planning Act deals with ComprehensiveDevelopment Plan providing for preparation of such plan, its contents andapproval by the State Government and the manner of its enforcement. TheComprehensive Development Plan is to supersede the Outline DevelopmentPlan. The Corporation has framed its bye-laws providing for maximumheight of building constructed within the Corporation's limits. Rule 16 ofBye-law 38, which is relevant for the present case, and was in existence atthe material time, runs as under:
'16. Height of the Buildings:- No person erectingor re-erecting a building on a site which abuts on a streetshall, so construct it that any point of it is at a heightgreater than 1-1/2 times the width of the street includingdrain and pavement immediately in front of it, and anyopen space immediately in front of such building and inno case more than eighty feet.'
(Emphasis added)
11. The impugned Act, which received the assent of the Governor on14.3.1996 and was published in the Karnataka Gazette Extra-ordinary on thesame day, reads thus:
'1. Short title and commencement:- (1) This Act maybe called the Bangalore City Planning Area ZonalRegulation (Amendment and Validation) Act,1996.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment of Zonal Regulations appended to the OutlineDevelopment Plan.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment,decree or order of any court, tribunal or any other authority,Zonal regulations appended to the Outline Development Plan ofthe Bangalore City Planning Area made under the KarnatakaTown and Country Planning Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act 11 of1963) as they existed during the period from 22nd May 1972 to12th October, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the said ZonalRegulations) shall be deemed to have been modified asspecified in the Schedule with effect from the 22nd day of May,1972.
3. Regularisation of certain constructions:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the KarnatakaTown and Country Planning Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act11 of 1963) or in the said Zonal Regulations as modifiedby this Act if any person after obtaining permission fromthe Corporation of the City of Bangalore during theperiod from 22nd May 1972 to 12th October, 1984 hasconstructed any building deviating from the said ZonalRegulations as modified by this Act or the permissiongranted by the Corporation of the City of Bangalore suchperson may within thirty days from the date ofcommencement of this Act, apply to the StateGovernment for regulation of such construction inaccordance with the provisions of this Section.
(2) There shall be a committee for the purpose ofregularisation of constructions referred to in Sub-section(1) consisting of the following members, namely:-
(i) The Secretary to ChairmanGovernment, UrbanDevelopmentDepartment
(ii) The Commissioner, MemberCorporation of theCity of Bangalore
(iii) The Commissioner, MemberBangaloreDevelopmentAuthority
(iv) The Director of Town Member SecretaryPlanning
(3) The Committee shall scrutinise the applications received underSub-section (1) and after holding such enquiry as it deems fit itit is satisfied that the deviation referred to in Sub-section (1)does not constitute material deviation from the said ZonalRegulations as modified by this Act or the permission grantedby the Corporation of the City of Bangalore it may makerecommendations to the Government for regulation subjectto payment of such amount as may be determined by it havingregard to,-
(i) the situation of the building;
(ii) The nature and extent of deviation;
(iii) Any other relevant factors.
Provided that the amount so determined shall not be less thanan amount equivalent to one and half times the then marketvalue of such construction.
(4) The State Government may, on receipt of the recommendationof the committee and after payment of the amount by theapplicant towards regularisation of such construction, order forregularisation of the construction.
4. Validation:- Notwithstanding anything con16.tained in anyjudgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority, anypermission to construct building granted by the Corporation of theCity of Bangalore during the period from 22nd May 1972 to 12th October 1984 and building constructed in pursuance to suchpermission and regularised under Section 3 shall be deemed to havebeen validly granted or constructed and shall have effect for allpurposes as if the permission had been granted and buildings had beenconstructed in conformity with the said Zonal Regulations as modifiedby this Act, and accordingly;
(a) all such permissions granted, buildings constructed orproceedings or things done or action taken shall for allpurposes deemed to be and to have always been done ortaken in accordance with law.
(b) No suit or other proceeding shall be instituted,maintained or continued in any court or before anytribunal or other authority for cancellation of suchpermission or demolition of buildings which wereconstructed after obtaining the permission from theCorporation of the City of Bangalore and wereregularised under Section 3, or for questioning thevalidity of any action or things taken or done inpursuance to the said Zonal Regulations as modified bythis Act, and no Court shall enforce or recognise anydecree, judgment or order declaring any such permissiongranted or buildings constructed, action taken or thingsdone in pursuance to the said Zonal Regulations asmodified by this Act as invalid or unlawful.'
12. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that with effect from 1972to 1984 under the Zonal Regulations the maximum height permissible forany new building was upto 55 fts. However, Rule 16 of Bye-law 38provided height of the erection or re-erection of any new building up to 80fts. It is also not disputed that the said Zonal Regulations ceased to haveeffect after the Comprehensive Development Plan came into force in theyear 1985 and after passing of the impugned Act, the height of the newbuilding could be raised to above 50 meters, i.e., 165 fts.
13. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, the validity of the impugnedAct has to be looked into.
14. The validity of any Statute may be assailed on the ground that it isultra vires the legislative competence of the Legislature which enacted it orit is violative of Part III or any other provisions of the Constitution. It is wellsettled that the Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary powers oflegislation within the fields assigned to them and subject to someconstitutional limitations, can legislate prospectively as well asretrospectively. This power to make retrospective legislation enables thelegislature to validate prior executive and legislative acts retrospectivelyafter curing the defects that led to their invalidation and thus makesineffective judgments of competent courts declaring the invalidity. It is alsowell settled that a validating Act may even ineffective judgments andorders of competent Courts provided it, by retrospective legislation, removesthe cause of invalidity or the basis that had led to those decisions.
15. The test of judging the validity of the Amending and Validating Actis, whether the legislature enacting the Validating Act has competence overthe subject matter, whether by validation, the said legislature has removedthe defect which the Court had found in the previous laws; and whether theValidating law is consistent with the provisions of Part III of theConstitution.
16. In Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills v. Broach Borough Municipality, : [1971]79ITR136(SC) , it was held that-
'When a Legislature sets out to validate a taxdeclared by a court to be illegally collected under anineffective or an invalid law, the cause forineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed beforevalidation can be said to take place effectively.
.....
Granted legislature competence, it is not sufficient todeclare merely that the decision of the Court shall notbind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision inexercise of judicial power which the legislature does notpossess or exercise. A court's decision must alwaysbind unless the conditions on which it is based are sofundamentally altered that the decision could nothave been given in the altered circumstances. ..... Thelegislature may follow any one method or all of them andwhile it does so it may neutralise the effect of the earlierdecision of the court which becomes ineffective after thechange or the law. ....
If the legislature has the power over the subject matterand competence to make a valid law, it can at any timemake such a valid law and make it retrospectively so asto bind, even past transactions. The validity of aValidating law, therefore, depends upon whether thelegislature possesses the competence which it claimsover the subject matter and whether in making thevalidation it removes the defect which the courts hadfound in the existing law and makes adequateprovisions in the Validating law or for a valid impositionof the tax.'
17. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. HindustanMachine Tools Ltd., : AIR 1975 SC2037 , this Court observed:
'We see no substance in the respondent's contentionthat by redefining the term 'house' with retrospectiveeffect and by validating the levies imposed under theunamended Act as if, notwithstanding anythingcontained in any judgment decree or order of any court,that Act as amended was in force on the date when thetax was levied, the Legislature has encroached upon ajudicial function. The power of the Legislature to pass alaw postulates the power to pass if prospectively as wellas retrospectively, the one no less than the other. Withinthe scope of its legislative competence and subject toother constitutional limitations, the power of theLegislature to enact laws is plenary.....
The State legislature, it is significant, has not overruledor set aside the judgment of the High Court. It hasamended the definition of 'house' by the substitution ofa new Section 2(15) for the old section and it hasprovided that the new definition shall have retrospectiveeffect, notwithstanding anything contained in anyjudgment, decree or order of any court or other authority.In other words, it has removed the basis of the decisionrendered by the High Court so that the decision couldnot have been given int he altered circumstances. Ifthe old Section 2(15) were to define 'house' in themanner that the amended Section 2(15) does, there isdoubt that the decision of the High Court would havebeen otherwise. In fact, it was not disputed before us thatthe buildings constructed by the respondent meet fullythe requirements of Section 2(15) as amended by the Actof 1974.'
18. In State of Mysore v. Fakrusab Babusab Karanandi, : 1977 CriLJ1005 , it was held-
'It is new settled law that when a legal fiction is enactedby the Legislature, the Court should not allow itsimagination to boggle but must carry the legal fiction toits logical extent and give full effect in it. We must,therefore, proceed on the basis that the words 'orpolice' were always there in Clause (b) of Section 60,event at the time when the learned Judicial Magistratemade his order dated 3rd October, 1970 refusing to takecognizance of the offence and returning the charge-sheetto the police. If these words were in Clause (b) ofSection 60 at that time, then obviously the learnedMagistrate was in error in refusing to take cognizance ofthe complaint on the ground that the charge-sheet was notfiled by an exercise officer but by the police. That is theclear effect of the legal fiction enacted in Section 23 ofMysore Act 1 of 1971.'
19. In Hindustan Gam and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors. : AIR 1985 SC1683 , this Court held-
'It is now well settled that it is permissible for acompetent Legislature to overcome the effect of adecision of a court setting aside the imposition of a taxby passing a suitable legislation amending the relevantprovisions of the statute concerned with retrospectiveeffect, thus taking away the basis on which the decisionof the court had been rendered and by enacting anappropriate provision validating the levy and collectionof tax made before the decision in question wasrendered.'
20. In Vijay Mills Company Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., : AIR 1994 SC1114 , it was held-
'18. From the above, it is clear that there are differentmodes of validating the provisions of the Actretrospectively, depending upon the intention of thelegislature in that behalf. Where the Legislature intendsthat the provisions of the Act themselves should bedeemed to have been in existence from a particular datein the past and thus to validate the actions taken in thepast as if the provisions concerned were in existencefrom the earlier ate, the Legislature makes the saidintention clear by the specific language of the validatingAct. It is open for the Legislature to change the verybasis of the provisions retrospectively and to validatethe actions on the changed basis. This is exactly whathas been done in the present case as in apparent from theprovisions of Clauses (3) and (5) of the AmendingOrdinance corresponding to Sections 2 and 4 of theAmending Act No. 2 of 1981. We have already referredto the effect of Sections 2 and 4 of the Amending Act.The effect of the two provisions, therefore, is not only tovalidate with retrospective effect the rules alreadymade but also to amend the provisions of Section 214itself to read as if the power to make rules withretrospective effect were always available under Section214 since the said section stood amended to give suchpower from the time the retroactive rules were made. TheLegislature had thus taken care to amend the provisionsof the Act itself both to give the Government the (sic)to make the rules retrospectively as well as to validate therules which were already made. The contention that theValidating Act cannot validate rules made or acts doneprior to the date it was enacted, if accepted, will strike atthe very root of the concept of retrospective validation..
The device of validating a statute is forged precisely toadopt the law to meet the exigencies of the situations.The validation, therefore, may be done in the mannerrequired by the needs of the time. All that is required isthat the agency which validates the statue must have thepower to do it. The manner and method of doing it is tobe left to the authority. If the intentions are clear, thevalidation has to be interpreted according to theintentions. The Courts have in fact upheld suchvalidation regarding it to be an important weapon in thearmoury of legislative devices. It is to emphasis thisaspect that we have endeavoured to summarise the lawon validation as above, at the cost of lengthening thejudgment.'
21. In Indian Aluminium Co. and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors., : [1996]2SCR23 , explaining Madan Mohan Pathak's judgment, this Courtobserved, thus-
'From the observations made by Bhagwati J. (permajority,) it is clear that this Court did not intend to laydown that Parliament, under no circumstance, has powerto amend the law removing the vice pointed out by thecourt. Equally, the observation of Chief Justice Beg is tobe understood in the context that as long as the effect ofmandamus issued by the court is not legally andconstitutionally made ineffective, the State is bound toobey the directions. Thus understood, it isunexceptionable. But, it does not mean that the learnedChief Justice intended to lay down the law thatmandamus issued by court cannot at all be madeineffective by a valid law made by the legislature,removing the defect pointed out by the court.'
22. In Comorin Match Industries (Pvt) Ltd. v. State of TN, : 1996ECR233(SC) , this Court held-
'We are unable to uphold the contention that merelybecause an order was passed in the contempt proceedingto make payment, the respondent is estopped fromclaiming the amount of tax raised by an assessment ordervalidated by the Act of 1969. If this argument isaccepted, a strange result will follow. The assessmentorder will remain valid. That notice of demand raisedpursuant to the assessment order will remain intact and inforce, but it will not be open to the Department to realisethe amount of tax merely because of the order passed inthe contempt proceeding. The writ court's order had tobe carried out, which is why the refund order was passedin the contempt proceeding. This direction to refund theamount of tax already collected was given only becausethe assessment orders had been set aside by the writcourt. But, when the assessment orders were validatedby passing the Amendment Act of 1969 withretrospective effect, the tax demand became valid andenforceable. The tax demand is a debt owed by anassessee which can be realised by the State in accordancewith law. Merely because the amount of tax which hadbeen realised earlier was directed to be refunded bycourt's order on the finding that the assessment order wasinvalid, will not preclude the State from realising the taxdue subsequently when the assessment order wasvalidated by the Amending Act of 1969. The orderpassed in the contempt proceeding will not have theeffect of writing off the debt which is statutorily ownedby the assessee to the State. The State has filed a suit forrecovery of this debt. Unless it can be shown that thedebt does not exist or is not legally due, the court cannotintervene and prevent the State from realising its duesby a suit. All that the Department has done in this case isto bring a suit to recover the amount of tax due andpayable to it as a result of what must now be treated as avalid assessment order.'
23. In T. Venkata Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, : [1985]3SCR509 , this Court held-
'It is a settled rule of constitutional law that the questionwhether a statute is constitutional or not is always aquestion of power of the legislature concerned,dependent upon the subject matter of the statute, themanner in which it is accomplished and the mode ofenacting it. While the courts can declare a statuteunconstitutional when it transgresses constitutionallimits, they are precluded from inquiring into theproperty of the exercise of the legislative power. It hasto be assumed that the legislature discretion is properlyexercised. The motives of the legislature in passing astatute is beyond the scrutiny of courts. Nor can thecourts examine whether the legislature had applied itsmind to the provisions of a statute before passing it. ...'
24. This Court in Gurudevdatta VKSS Maryadit and Ors. v. State ofMaharashtra and Ors., : [2001]2SCR654 , observed thus-
'The Constitution Bench observed that the motive of thelegislature in passing a statute is beyond the scrutiny ofthe courts. It is not only the property to follow theConstitutional Bench judgment but we are definitely ofthe opinion and view that by no stretch the courts caninterfere with a legislative malice in passing a statute.Interference is restrictive in nature and that too on theconstitutionality aspect and not beyond the same.'
25. The decisions referred to above, manifestly show that it is open to thelegislature to alter the law retrospectively, provided the alteration is made insuch a manner that it would no more be possible for the Court to arrive at thesame verdict. In other words, the very premise of the earlier judgmentshould be uprooted, thereby resulting in a fundamental change of thecircumstances upon which it was founded.
26. Where a legislature validates an executive action repugnant to thestatutory provisions declared by a Court of law, what the legislature isrequired to do is first to remove the very basis of invalidity and then validatethe executive action. In order to validate an executive action or anyprovision of a statute, it is not sufficient for the legislature to declare that ajudicial pronouncement given by a Court of law would not be binding, as thelegislature does not possess that power. A decision of a Court of law has abinding effect unless the very basis upon which it is given is so altered thatthe said decision would not have been given in the changed circumstances.
27. Here, the question before us is, whether the impugned Act has passedthe test of constitutionality by serving to remove the very basis upon whichthe decision of the High Court in the writ petition was based. This questiongives rise to further two questions - first, what was the basis of the earlierdecision; and second what, if any, may be said to be the removal of thatbasis.
28. In the earlier decision of the High Court, it was found that licence toconstruct the building upto 80 feet was repugnant to the Zonal Regulationsframed under Section 13 of the Planning Act which provided a maximumheight of new building as 55 feet. Thus, the provision of Zonal Regulationswhich provided maximum height of 55 feet in case of a new building was,therefore, the basis upon which the High Court proceeded to conclude thatthe construction of the building violated the prescribed norms. It is manifestthat the impugned Act has retrospectively modified the Zonal Regulations of1972 by raising the height of a building from 55 feet to above 165 feet. Theprovision of law upon which the High Court has placed reliance has,therefore, undergone a material alteration. The High Court would now findit impossible to take the view that the said building was erected in violationof the law, and that the licence granted therefore, was accordingly legallyinvalid.
29. It was urged on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent thatthe impugned amendment was tantamount to a naked usurpation of judicialpower inasmuch as its stated purpose and effect were to nullify the effect ofthe earlier judgment adjudicating the rights between the parties. The adverseeffect of the provision on the rule of law, as well as on the doctrine ofseparation of powers would, therefore, impart detrimentally upon the constitutional validity of the same. We do not find any merit in theargument. Although it would stand to reason that when viewed in isolation,Section 4 of the impugned Act would suggest an appearance of legislativeimpropriety, but it is a well-established canon of statutory construction thatthe impugned provision of any statute must be considered in the context ofthe statute as a whole. It is manifest that what we are concerned with in thepresent proceedings are not the vires of Section 4 only, but the entireValidation Act constitutionality of which has been brought into question.
30. A perusal of the impugned Act further reveals that the stipulatedmaximum height upon which a building may be constructed under the ZonalRegulations, 1972, has been retrospectively modified, thereby allowing amaximum height of any building above 165 feet, as opposed to the earlierpermissible maximum height of 55 feet. The legislature has, therefore, notmerely negated the effect of any prior judgment; but it has removed theactual basis upon which the judgment was based and thereafter validated theactions. It would nor more be possible for a Court to conclude that theconcerned buildings violated the terms of Zonal Regulations, since the legalbasis has now been altered through an enhancement of the maximumpermissible height retrospectively. We are, therefore, of the view that theimpugned Act is constitutionally valid.
31. It was then urged on behalf of the respondents that a perusal of theStatement of Objects and Reasons for the Validation Act shows that theintention of the legislature was rather to render the decision of the HighCourt infructuous than to correct any infirmity in the legal position. For this,reliance was sought to be placed on the Statement of Objects and Reasons ofthe impugned enactment. It is well settled by the decisions of this Courtthat when a validity of a particular statute is brought into question, a limitedreference, but not reliance, may be made to the State of Objects andReasons. The Statement of Objects and Reasons may, therefore, beemployed for the purposes of comprehending the factual background, theprior state of legal affairs, the surrounding circumstances in respect of thestatute and the evil which the statute has sought to remedy. It is manifestthat the Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot, therefore, be the exclusivefooting upon which a statute is made a nullity through the decision of aCourt of law.
32. In T. Venkata Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, : [1985]3SCR509 , and Gurudevdatta VKSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtraand Ors., : [2001]2SCR654 , it has been laid down that the intention of thelegislature in enacting a particular statute is immaterial in terms of thequestion relating to its validity. The intention of the legislature in passingof a particular statute is beyond the pale of judicial review. In the presentmatter, the supposedly nebulous intention of the legislature to defeat thejudicial process is, therefore, outside the bounds of our consideration.
33. It would be pertinent for us to observe at this stage that in view ofSection 3(1) of the impugned Act, and building that has deviated from theZonal Regulations, as modified, may nonetheless be regularized by the StateGovernment as an authorised construction. It may be seen, then, that thenature of the provision under the Regulation, stipulating a height of 55 feethas thereby undergone a radical change. The provision that was earlier inthe nature of a sine quo non would now be subject to post-constructionregularization to the extent that under Section 3(3) of the impugned Act theconcerned authority is empowered to determine a penalty for deviations notamounting to material deviations.
34. It follows that the basis of the decision of the High Court hasundergone a change. Earlier, the High Court could not but take the view thatconstruction of a building in excess of a height of 55 feet was in violation ofZonal Planning Regulations. Now, under the changed law, it would not bepermissible for the High Court to take that view.
35. Lastly, Shri Ranjeet Kumar, learned senior counsel inter alia, urgedthat the impugned Act though described as an Amendment Act has notamended any provisions of the principal Act, inasmuch as Zonal Regulationhas not been amended in the manner it was provided in the Act and,therefore, the Amendment and the Validation Act have not removed thebasis of the earlier judgment and, therefore, the impugned Act isunconstitutional. We do not find any merit in the submission.
36. It is true that under Section 13, the method of framing of ZonalRegulations is provided under which a maximum height of building can beprovided by the impugned Act. The legislature in its wisdom thought toprovide a maximum height of a new building in the statute itself and it is nolonger left to the discretion of the authority to provide a maximum height ofa new construction by framing Zonal Regulations under the Act. Now, theOutline Development Plan as prescribed in the Schedule appended to thenew Act, cannot even be amended by the procedure prescribed underChapter III of the Planning Act. The impugned Act substituted the existingRegulations with a statutory Zonal Regulation to the extent it providedmaximum height of new building. Further, this is done with retrospectiveeffect i.e. for the entire period during which the Outline Development Planremained in force i.e. from 1972 to 1984. It is settled law that where a law isretrospectively amended, the consequences of such retrospective amendmentare that all actions have to proceed on the premise that the law, as amended,was always the law in force. In that view of the matter there was neither anyneed for the legislature to modify the maximum height of a new building inthe manner provided in the Planning Act nor to amend the provisions of thePlanning Act providing for method of framing Zonal Regulations.
37. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the impugned Act isconstitutionally valid and the view taken by the High Court in striking downthe Act was erroneous.
38. For the reasons aforementioned, the judgment under appeal is setaside. The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.