Judgment:
A.K. Rajan, J.
1. The petitioner herein has filed the present writ petition challenging the award dated January 21, 1994, passed by the Labour Court in I.D. No. 1478 of 1992.
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
The worker, the second respondent herein was appointed by the management by its order dated September 14, 1990, initially for a period of two months from October 5, 1990 till December 5, 1990. Again he was freshly appointed by another order dated November 26, 1990 for a period of two months from December 5, 1990, till February 4, 1991. Thereafter, he was offered regular employment on probation for a period of six months from February 5, 1991, till August 4, 1991. By its letter dated August 1, 1991, the period of probation was extended for another six months from Augusts, 1991, to February 4, 1992, and finally it was again extended for another period of one month from February 4, 1992, till March 4, 1992. Thereafter, on February 24, 1992, the management terminated the services of the second respondent, on the following terms: 'Your probation period having come to an end as on March 4, 1992, you are discharged from your duties on the same date. You may settle your accounts if any after contacting Administrative Office, Coimbatore.'
Against this termination order, an industrial dispute was raised and the Labour Court, after going through the records, on the basis of evidence and documents available, set aside the order of termination. It is that order of the Labour Court that is being challenged in this writ petition. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of appointment issued to the second respondent was only for a specific period, and the appointment comes automatically to an end on the date specified therein. Therefore, it is purely a temporary appointment and the word 'probation' has been used inadvertently and it has no effect at all. The contention of the second respondent worker is that on completion of the period of probation, he should have been absorbed as a regular worker, since his juniors were absorbed as regular workers. But learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the second respondent was only a probationer and, there-fore, he has no right to be appointed permanently nor has any right to continue in the service after completion of the period of probation. Learned counsel for the second respondent pointed out that though the Labour Court gave a definite finding that the worker was appointed only for a specific period, it had set aside the order on the ground that no enquiry was conducted before terminating the services of the second respondent and he should have been given a charge memo and only after conducting a regular enquiry and giving an opportunity of being heard, he should have been terminated. In view of the facts that no such charge memo was given and no subsequent enquiry was conducted, the order was bad. It is true that the Labour' Court has come to a definite conclusion in more than one place as follows:
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(i.e.) On a perusal of the evidence, it is clear that the employer appointed the worker only for a specific period. He also reiterated the same in the another context as follows:
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(i.e.) From the documents filed before this Court, it is crystal clear that the management appointed the worker temporarily for a specific period, only with an intention of continuing his service till that period alone. Yet, having said that, the Labour Court went on to set aside the order on the ground that no enquiry was conducted.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the Labour Court relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Hari Singh Mann v State of Punjab, , or the proposition that in such circumstances, the worker's service can be terminated only after conducting an enquiry and proving the charges levelled against him. Learned counsel pointed out that this decision is not an authority for the proposition and it has been wrongly quoted. Learned counsel also took this Court through the judgment. The ratio of the judgment is as follows:
'......... termination of service at the end ofextended period of probation on ground that he was unfit for confirmation, held, not punitive termination on such ground and does not attach any stigma, involving any turpitude.'
4. Therefore, the learned Labour Court has misinterpreted the decision of the Supreme Court referred to therein. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme-Court in Unit Trust of India v Bijaya Kumar . In paragraph 4 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has held thus at p. 242 of LLJ:
'It is settled law that the order of discharge is not an order of punishment and, therefore, there was no question of giving the hearing before the termination of service.'
He has also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, . In para. 12 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has held thus at p. 1163 of LLJ:
'... the requirement to hold a regular departmental enquiry before dispensing with the services of a probationer cannot be invoked in the case of a probationer especially when his services are terminated by an innocuous order which does not cast any stigma on him.'
Therefore, counsel for the petitioner submitted that in terminating the second respondent, there is no stigma attached and, therefore, the Labour Court's finding that the non-holding of enquiry vitiates the order of termination, is not correct. Learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that this probationer has been terminated due to some misconduct, for which he was served with a memo and, this termination order though does not specifically mention that it is for the same reason contained in the memo, it is only for that reason the termination has been made and, therefore, this termination is attached with stigma and, in such cases, enquiry ought to have been conducted on the basis of the charge memo. He also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in D.P. Banerjee v. S.N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, wherein it is held as follows in 1999 I LLJ 1054:
'..... .the words amounting to 'stigma' neednot be contained in the order of termination but may also be contained in an order or proceeding referred to in the order of termination or in an annexure thereto and would vitiate the order of termination.'
5. Therefore, learned counsel argued that even though the termination order does not reveal any stigma, still the order of termination is attached with stigma. A perusal of the order of termination, which is extracted above, shows that it does not refer to any document nor it contained any annexure. Therefore, thisdecision does not come to the help of the second respondent herein.
6. Learned counsel for the second respondent also referred to another judgment of this Court in Management of Pandiyan Roadways Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Additional Labour Court, Madurai, , wherein it is held that when theservice of the worker was not satisfactory, the management could have well terminated the services at the earliest point of time and could not have extended the probation and hence the contention of the appellant that the terminationwas due to unsatisfactory performance of the second respondent does not seem to be sound. Equally, here also is that the order of termination was passed without issuing notice, without assigning any reason and withoutpayment of any compensation. There it referred to the standing order to arrive at the conclusion. But, in this case, the standing order had not been relied upon by the petitioner before the Labour Court. Therefore, thisstanding order cannot be brought to the notice of this Court while disposing of this writ petition.
7. While exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution, thisCourt can only go into the question whether the award of the Labour Court is illegal on the face of it. The Labour Court has clearly come to the conclusion and also held that the appointment was only for a specific period. The LabourCourt did not hold that he was a probationer. The last order of appointment dated February3, 1992, extending the period of probation for one month from February 5, 1992, to March4, 1992, reads as follows:
'Period of employment. One month on probation from February 5, 1992, to March 4, 1992. Your service will automatically come to an end after the one month period.
Salary : Rs. 600 per month consolidated salary plus Rs. 200 per month, as other allowances.
Reporting to : The Manager, ABTPS, Madras.Conditions:
(a) You are liable for transfer from place to place.
(b) You will be governed by the company rules/policies/standing orders in force.
(c) The company docs not guarantee employment after the one month's service.
(d) The company retains the right to terminate the contract without notice and. without assigning any reason whatsoever.
(c) If and when any information furnishedby you at the time of this appointment isfound to be incorrect or not true you will beliable for dismissal.'
8. From a perusal of the same, it is seen that in this order it is specifically stated that the service of the worker automatically comes to an end after the period specified thereunder. Therefore, this order can only be considered as an appointment for a specific period of time and on the completion of the specified period, the worker's services have been terminated. That being so, the Labour Court is not correct in holding that before terminating the employee,the worker should have been given opportunity to explain all the charges levelled against him. In view of the fact that there was no charge memo served on him, there was no question of conducting enquiry. The termination order docs not refer to any charge or misconduct. Even assuming that some memos were issued to him during the period of service and the order of termination is attached with any stigma, there is no question of conducting any enquiry on all the memos. Here, as there is no any enquiry at all, there is no need to conduct any enquiry. Therefore, the Labour Court is not right in coming to the conclusion, especially after holding specifically that the order of appointment is only for a specific period. The termination of the worker without assigning any reason does not infringe any of the rights conferred upon the workman, inasmuch as the workman has no right to continue beyond the term of the service as specifically stated in the order of appointment.
9. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. No costs.