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V.L. Lakshmanakumar Vs. the District Manager, tasmac Limited and anr.

V.L. Lakshmanakumar vs The District Manager, "tasmac" Limited and anr.

Disposition Petition allowed Court Chennai Decided Nov 25, 2005
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/834461

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Citation
Court
Chennai High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
W.P. No. 6893 of 2005 and W.P.M.P. No. 7494 of 2005
Subject
Service
Disposition
Petition allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- T.N. ESTATES (ABOLITION & CONVERSION INTO RYOTWARI) ACT, 1948 [Act No. 26/1948]. Sections 5(2) & 67; [A.P. Shah, CJ, Mrs. Prabha Sridevan & P. Jyothimani, JJ] Suo motu revisional powers Held, On a bare reading of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it is clear that the power conferred on the Director by Se...

Key legal issue
Service
Outcome / disposition
Petition allowed

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

V.L. Lakshmanakumar

Advocate K. Srinivasan, Adv.

Respondent

The District Manager, "tasmac" Limited and anr.

Advocate Thick Vijayapandian, Adv.

Legal References

Cases Referred
Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Base National Centre
Reported In
(2006)IILLJ685Mad; (2006)2MLJ317; 2006(1)CTC660

Excerpt

.....had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the act, then to set right that mistake, the director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the act and to implement the purpose behind the act. the fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under section 67 for making an application to the director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in section 5(2) of the act is in any way curtailed or taken away. therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under section 5(2) of the act is not tenable. -- t.n. estates (abolition & conversion into ryotwari) act, 1948. sections 5(2) & 67; suo motu revisional powers held, on a bare reading of the provisions of section 5(2) of the act, it is clear that the power conferred on the director by section 5(2) to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the settlement officer is very wide. in the first place, the director need not necessarily be moved by any party in that behalf, and the power could be exercised either on an application by an aggrieved person or suo motu. for example, if the director comes to know that contrary to the scheme of the act or due to misrepresentation or fraud played, a patta had been granted to a person under the relevant provisions of the act, then to set right that mistake, the director should be enabled to exercise his power so as to effectuate the scheme of the act and to implement the purpose behind the act. the fact that the rule making authority has prescribed procedure in exercise of the powers under section 67 for making an application to the director does not mean that the suo motu power which is explicit in section 5(2) of the act is in any way curtailed or taken away. therefore, the contention of the respondent that making an application is sine qua non for invoking the power under section 5(2) of..........and mr. thickyaija pandian, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.4. so far as the appointment of the petitioner is concerned, there is no dispute that it was purely on contractual basis as could be seen from the appointment order. in fact, one of the conditions in the appointment order relates to the summary dismissal for breach of the rules and regulations. by the said conditions imposed in the appointment order, the respondents are entitled to pass a summary order of termination and to that extent there cannot be any dispute.5. however, a perusal of the impugned order shows that the petitioner was not dismissed pursuant to the contract. for the purpose of dismissal, the first respondent has relied upon a surprise inspection carried out in the tasmac shop, which revealed that some of the bottles were adulterated by mixing water and that such act of the staff of the tasmac had brought disrepute to the corporation. therefore, the petitioner/supervisor has been removed from service.6. by the above reasoning the first respondent has found that the petitioner has committed certain misconduct and the impugned order is not an order of termination simpliciter. whether an order is an order of simple termination or would amount to stigma, thereby resulting in civil consequences, is only to be determined considering the facts and circumstances of each case. a plain reading of the impugned order passed by the first respondent makes it clear that it is not an order of termination simpliciter.7. the apex court, in more than one case, has held that when an order of termination involves civil consequences and consequently amounts to stigma, the same cannot be passed without there being a charge memo, enquiry and the finding as to those charges. this proposition of law has been recently reiterated by the apex court in the judgment state of hariyana v. satyender singh rathore . in that judgment, the supreme court has relied upon the earlier judgment dipti prakash.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

D. Murugesan, J.

1. The petitioner was appointed on contractual basis in the post of Bar Supervisor in TASMAC. By the impugned order, his services were terminated. The impugned order is questioned on the ground that inasmuch as the same was passed on the ground of certain misconduct, it causes stigma.

2. The respondents have filed the counter affidavit.

3. I heard Mr. K. Sreenivasan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. Thickyaija Pandian, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents.

4. So far as the appointment of the petitioner is concerned, there is no dispute that it was purely on contractual basis as could be seen from the appointment order. In fact, one of the conditions in the appointment order relates to the summary dismissal for breach of the Rules and Regulations. By the said conditions imposed in the appointment order, the respondents are entitled to pass a summary order of termination and to that extent there cannot be any dispute.

5. However, a perusal of the impugned order shows that the petitioner was not dismissed pursuant to the contract. For the purpose of dismissal, the first respondent has relied upon a surprise inspection carried out in the TASMAC shop, which revealed that some of the bottles were adulterated by mixing water and that such act of the staff of the TASMAC had brought disrepute to the Corporation. Therefore, the petitioner/Supervisor has been removed from service.

6. By the above reasoning the first respondent has found that the petitioner has committed certain misconduct and the impugned order is not an order of termination simpliciter. Whether an order is an order of simple termination or would amount to stigma, thereby resulting in civil consequences, is only to be determined considering the facts and circumstances of each case. A plain reading of the impugned order passed by the first respondent makes it clear that it is not an order of termination simpliciter.

7. The Apex Court, in more than one case, has held that when an order of termination involves civil consequences and consequently amounts to stigma, the same cannot be passed without there being a charge memo, enquiry and the finding as to those charges. This proposition of law has been recently reiterated by the Apex Court in the judgment State of Hariyana v. Satyender Singh Rathore . In that judgment, the Supreme Court has relied upon the earlier judgment Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Base National Centre for Basic Sciences , and has held that if findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to misconduct behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as 'founded' on the allegations and will be bad.

8. In view of the above pronouncement of the Apex Court, the impugned order cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the same is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. However, the order of this Court will not stand in the way of the respondents to initiate action against the petitioner strictly in terms of the appointment order.

No costs. Consequently, the connected W.P.M.P. is closed.

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