Full Judgment
A.K. Rajan, J.
1.This writ petition is filed against the awardpassed by the Labour Court in I.D. No.213/90. The petitionerbefore this court was the workman in the second respondentsociety, namely, Pollachi Co-operative House ConstructionSociety. The workman joined the service on 25.10.7 6. On19.5.89 he submitted his resignation. It was handed over tothe Secretary in person. Subsequently on 29.5.89 he sent aletter withdrawing the resignation letter. After thiswithdrawal letter was given, a communication was received fromthe second respondent dated 11.10.89, which was received on13.10.89 by the petitioner herein stating that his resignationletter was accepted already. Therefore, the petitioner hereinraised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court. Beforethe Labour Court he submitted that on 11.10.89 he submittedanother application requesting the management to permit him tojoin duty. On the same day the management wrote a letterinforming him that his resignation has been accepted and he has been relieved with effect from19.5.89 itself. Then he stated that the management has failedto understand the involuntary nature of resignation. It wasmade under coercion and due to compulsion. Further he hasstated that he sent a lawyer's notice on 5.3.90. He alsostated that at the time of joining duty the management tookresignation letter from him without date and now the facts aretwisted. After recording the evidence of workman and themanagement witness the Labour Court dismissed the industrialdispute holding that the petitioner even earlier, twice, gaveresignation letters and they were withdrawn subsequently andthe management gave him employment on humanitarian grounds.The workman cannot expect the management to act in the samemanner for the third time. It was also held that theresignation letter was accepted on the very same day in hispresence and he was immediately relieved from duties.Therefore, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion thatthe petitioner is not entitled for employment. Aggrievedagainst this order the present writ petition has been filed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner arguedthat this is a contract of employment and according to thecontract of employment, resignation brings the employment toan end and therefore, such a termination of employment can bedone only in accordance with the rules and as per the rulesapplicable to him, 15 days notice is necessary for eitherparty to bring the contract to an end. Therefore, the letterof resignation will come into effect only on the completion of15 days. Therefore, the counsel submitted that when theletter of resignation was given on 19.5.89, it can come intoeffect after the completion of 1 4 days and that even beforethe completion of 14 days. On 29.5.89 itself the petitionersent a letter withdrawing his letter of resignation.Therefore, there cannot be a termination of service before theexpiry of 14 days. Therefore, the petitioner is deemed not tohave resigned and he is deemed to be continuing in service.Therefore, the order of the Labour Court is illegal and it isliable to be set aside. In support of his argument thelearned counsel relied upon the decision of the Andhra PradeshHigh Court in Sudha Nagaraj, K. v. Chief Manager, AndhraBank 1997 III LLJ 301 and G.M., B.H.E.L. Ltd. v. RajitaSuryakanta where the Andhra Pradesh HighCourt has held that when the resignation letter was tenderedin writing, it has to be accepted only in writing and theacceptance of resignation cannot be communicated orally. Inthe present case there was no letter of acceptance ofresignation and therefore, the learned counsel submitted thatthe resignation of the workman has not become effective and heis deemed to be continuing the service. He further reliedupon the decision of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bankv. Shri P.K. Mittal wherein the SupremeCourt held that acceptance of resignation before the expiry ofthe notice period will not be effective and the resignationalleged to have been accepted immediately is not valid. Thejudgment of the Supreme Court is based on the facts of theparticular case. In that case the resignation letter itselfcontained a condition. In that letter of resignation theemployee had added that the date of receipt of letter shouldbe treated as the date of commencement of notice period sothat inclusive of the same his resignation will be effectivefrom 30.6.86. In that case since the resignation was acceptedon 7.2.86, the Supreme Court held that it was withoutjurisdiction. Therefore, it is the case where acceptance wasagainst the terms contained in the very letter of resignation.In the same case, the Supreme Court in paragraph 6 holds thatthe employee may choose to resign with immediate effect orwith a notice of less than three months if the bank agrees tothe same. Therefore, the preposition that was laid down inthat case by the Supreme Court is that when the letter ofresignation fixes the date from which it has to come intoforce, any acceptance prior to that date is not valid. At thesame time the notice period can be waived by either of theparties if both of them agrees for the same. Therefore, thisdecision of the Supreme Court is not of any help to thepetitioner.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner reliedupon another decision of the Patna High Court in ManagingCommittee, S.G.A.S.High School v. State where the Patna High Court held that under section 5 of theIndian Contract Act which provides that a proposal may berevoked at any time before the communication of its acceptanceis complete as against the proposer, and as provided undersection 4, the communication of acceptance of the proposal iscomplete as against the proposer when it is put in course oftransmission to him so as to be out of the power of theacceptor. Therefore, relying upon this decision, the learnedcounsel contended that the acceptance shall be in writing.The counsel also relied upon the decision in Janardan Misra v.State for the same preposition inparagraph 9 of that judgment. This only holds thatresignation can be withdrawn before it was accepted. The word'communicate' does not mean communication in writing. Thisjudgment cannot be understood merely because a letter ofacceptance is transmitted before acceptance, to mean thatacceptance shall only be in writing and that acceptance shouldbe communicated in writing. The learned counsel also reliedupon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Power Finance Corpn.Ltd. v. P. K.Bhatia 1997 (2) LLN 5 wherein the SupremeCourt has held that the conditional letter of resignation willnot be effective unless the condition is fulfilled. In thatcase in the letter of resignation itself there was a conditionthat the relieving order should be handed over to himimmediately and the ex gratia payable be informed to him andhis dues be paid immediately. Since the order accepting thevoluntary retirement was a conditional one, the conditionsought to have been complied with. Before the conditions couldbe complied with, the appellant withdrew the scheme.Consequently, the order accepting voluntary retirement did notbecome effective. Therefore, this decision also cannot applyto the facts of the present case. Learned counsel also reliedupon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bank ofIndia v. J.N.Nagpal 2001(6) Sca 381. In that case theemployee tendered his resignation on 2.4.88 but it was dated1.7.88, to be effective from 1.10.88. The employee withdrewhis resignation on 2.7.88, but the employer accepted theresignation on 6.9.88 itself. On the facts of the case theSupreme Court held that acceptance of resignation is not validbecause the resignation was to take effect only from 1.1 0.88.Since the resignation was withdrawn on 2.7.88 itself, theacceptance of resignation on 6.9.88 was held invalid. Thoughthe counsel for the petitioner strenuously argued relying uponthese judgments, these decisions do not come to the help ofthe petitioner in any manner since the facts of the case aredifferent.
4. Learned counsel for the respondentreferred to the evidence adduced before the lower court bothby the petitioner as well as the management. The petitionerhimself has admitted that on 19.5.89 he gave the resignationletter. He has not stated under what circumstances theresignation letter was given. That letter was givenvoluntarily without coercion by any person. It was given tothe Secretary of the society. The Secretary of the societyaccepted it relieving him from the duties. He does not knownwhen the endorsement was made in that letter. He did not cometo work after the resignation letter was handed over. Furtherhe states that once the employee was relieved it means thatresignation letter has been accepted. But he says that itcannot be said that it is an official acceptance. Themanagement witness also says that immediately on receipt ofthe letter of resignation he made an endorsement on the letteritself accepting the resignation and he was relieved and inhis place another person was put in charge. Since that personalso did not attend he performed that work. He also says thatthere is no rule in the bye-laws of the society prescribingthe number of days required for accepting any resignationletter. From his evidence it is seen that the employee gavethe letter of resignation voluntarily and it was acceptedimmediately and the acceptance was communicated to him orallyon the same day and the employee also understood it that hisresignation has been accepted and therefore, he did not turnto duty from that date onwards. Only after ten days he sent aletter withdrawing the resignation. Though the letter ofaccepting resignation was not communicated to him earlier, theemployee was made to understand immediately that hisresignation has been accepted and he was relieved. Therefore,the communication that is required is the communication to theperson concerned in the manner in which the employeeunderstands that communication. The communication need not bein writing.
5. Counsel for the petitioner strenuouslycontended that in the case of employer and employeerelationship, the master and servant relationship exists andin such a situation acceptance can only be in writing to bringthe termination of contract valid. In other words, theargument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is thecontract cannot be brought into existence or terminated exceptin writing. This argument is not accepted because thecontract under the Indian Contract Act can be brought intoexistence orally. Offer can be made orally and acceptancealso can be made orally. Once the offer is accepted, there isa contract. Similarly, once the offer of resignation has beenaccepted, then also the termination of service is complete.Therefore, the Labour Court has rightly concluded that theresignation was accepted and that was valid and therefore,dismissed the industrial dispute. The award of Labour Courtis perfectly valid and I find no reason to interfere with thatorder. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs.