Full Judgment
1. The petitioner has been working as a Switch Board Attender in the Moyar Power House. While he was so working as a Switch Board Attender, the Assistant Divisional Engineer (Operation), Moyar Power House, Moyar Camp P.O. issued Memo No. F.32/R. 3655/81 dated January 5, 1982 calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanation on the complaint made by the Assistant Divisional Electrical/Shift dated December 16, 1981. The charges of the said complaint were that the petitioner did not obtain the permission of the Operator before the petitioner left the Central Floor on December 15, 1981 at 18-25 hours and that secondly, the petitioner did not clause the cooling water system of Power Transformer III to 50% and took bath near the transformer on the same day at the same time, which, according to the Assistant Divisional Engineer, amounts to wilful act of tampering with the safety of Power Transformer, which the petitioner was supposed to safeguard.
2. In reply to the said memorandum, the petitioner submitted his explanation to the Assistant Divisional Engineer through the Junior Engineer on January 13, 1982 denying the averments contained in the memo issued by the Assistant Divisional Engineer dated December 16, 1981. Having not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the writ petitioner, the Assistant Divisional Engineer furnished a questions to the petitioner and called upon the petitioner and the called upon the petitioner to submit his written statement of defence within seven days therefrom.
3. The petitioner, on August 27, 1982, submitted his explanation along with the questionnaire form duly filled up. Thereafter, the Assistant Divisional Engineer held an enquiry on January 11, 1983 and after holding an enquiry after providing opportunities to the petitioner herein, submitted his report holding the charge under Standing Order No. 30 (xxx) was proved and that the other charge under Standing Order No. 30 (xxxii) was not proved.
4. Based on the enquiry report, the Divisional Engineer caused a show notice under Memo No. 5/Con. 14/83 dated March 13, 1983 to be issued as to why two annual increments in pay for two years with cumulative effect inclusive of the periods spent on leave should not be withheld. The petitioner again submitted his explanation to the said second show-cause notice. Having not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the writ petitioner, the Divisional Engineer by memo dated April 20, 1983 imposed a penalty as specified in the second show-cause notice. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal on May 10, 1983 to the Superintending Engineer/Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority, by its memo dated September 1, 1983 confirmed the order of the original authority in Memo No. F5/Con. 33/83 dated April 20, 1983. Under these circumstances, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the aforesaid order of Original Authority dated April 20, 1983 in Memo No. F5/Con. 33/83.
5. Mr. K. Venugopal learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the enquiry was not conducted by providing adequate opportunity to the petitioner. Secondly, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner contended that sub-clause (g) of the Clause 7 of the Standing Order 32 provides that in awarding punishment, the punishing authority shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, previous record of the workmen and of any extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist and that in the instant case, the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority as well as the appellate authority have not bestowed their attention with reference to this particular provision while imposing and confirming the punishment. In support of this contention, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner cited a decision in Management of M/s. P. Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court Madras and another in 1974 I LLJ 517 wherein it was held that the Labour Court had interfered with the punishment on the ground that the defendant's Standing Order 18 had not been complied with and that Standing Order 18 expressly states that in awarding punishment, the management should take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the past record, if any, of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstance that may exist and that in that case, the disciplinary authority, namely the management did not take into account the gravity of the offence as well as the past record before it imposed the punishment and consequently, the Labour Court was of the opinion that the ends of justice would require and would be met if the workman was reinstated with half backwages and that conclusion of the Labour Court was also confirmed in that judgment.
6. On a perusal of the impugned orders, it is not explicitly stated that before imposing the impugned punishment whether the management, and while confirming the order of the disciplinary authority whether the Appellate Authority, considered the factum of gravity of misconduct, the previous record of the workman and of any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that might exist in this case. Having regard to the fact that the authorities had not followed the provisions contained in sub-clause (g) of Clause 7 of Standing Order No. 32, the impugned punishment has to be and is set aside with a direction that the Disciplinary Authority, based on the report of the Enquiry Officer and based on the representation made by the writ petitioner for the second show cause notice, may pass order on merits in accordance with law after following the procedure prescribed under Standing Order applicable to the petitioner.
7. Accordingly, this writ petition is ordered.