Full Judgment
N.M. Kasliwal, J.
1. This revision by the defendent is directed against an order striking out the defence against eviction of the petitioner. The petitioner had submitted an application for condoning the delay but the trial court as well as the Lower Appellate Court took the view that it had no power to condone the delay or to extend the time beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. D.L. Mehta, J. by order dated August 27, 1984 framed the following issues and referred the same for consideration of the larger bench.
[1] Whether, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, can be applied in the matter of depositing of rent under Section 13(4) of the Act, 1950?
[2] Whether, the court has no power even in the interest of justice and equity to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act?
[3] Whether, Section 13(5) of the Act is directory?
The full bench on February 8, 1985 answered the questions in the following manner:
[1] Provisions of Section 6 of the Limitation Act can be applied in the matter of deposit of rent under Section 13(4) of the Rent Control Act;
[2] The court has power, in the interest of justice and equity, to extend time beyond the limit prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Rent Control Act; and
[3] That Section 13(5) of the Rent Control Act is directory and not mandatory.
2. After the decision of the Full Bench the matter has come today for final disposal by this Court. Learned Counsel for both the parties requested that the matter may be disposed of by this Court instead of remanding it back to the lower Appellate Court. The Full Bench has decided that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be applied in the matter of deposit of rent under Section 13(4) of the Act and the Court has power in the interest of justice and equity to extend the time beyond limit prescribed under Section 13(4) of the Act. In the present case the petitioner had submitted that he had given the rent for the months of September, 1985 to February, 1986 to his counsel Shri B.L. Luhadiya for paying to the defendant's counsel. On earlier occasions also the same kind of practice was obseryed.The petitioner has also produced a receipt of Shri Luhadiya to show that the aforesaid amount of rent had been paid to Shri Luhadiya for being paid to the defendant's counsel. The petitioner after having come to know that the amount of rent for the aforesaid period has not been paid by Shri Luhadiya, the petitioner prayed for condoning the delay and also deposited the entire rent in the court on February 7, 1986. Mr. Keshote, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-landlord does not controvert the fact that the petitioner had paid the amount of rent to his counsel Shri Luhadiya and Shri Luhadiya did not deposit the rent or paid the same to the plaintiff's counsel in time. The only submission made by Mr. Keshote is that according to the petitioner's own contention, he had come to know on January 10, 1986 that the amount of rent had not been deposited or paid by Shri Luhadiya and in these circumstances, there is no reason what so ever shown by the petitioner for the delay from January 10, 1986 to February 7, 1986. It is not in dispute between the parties that on January 10, 1986, Shri Luhadiya had appeared and sought time for submitting the reply. The case was then adjourned to February 1, 1986. On February 1, 1986, the petitioner engaged another counsel and thereafter, he submitted an application on February 7, 1986 for condoning the delay and on that very day he also deposited the rent for the period September, 1985 to December, 1985 inspite of the fact that he had already paid the said amount to his counsel Shri Luhadiya and the said rent had not been deposited or paid by Shri Luhadiya in time. The above circumstances clearly show that there was no negligence or malafide intention on the part of the petitioner not to pay the rent in time to the plaintiff-landlord. He had already taken steps of paying the amount of rent well in advance to his counsel and the above fact is not denied even by the counsel for the plaintiff-landlord. In view of the above circumstances, I am fully satisfied that the petitioner has made out a clear case for condoning the delay in depositing the rent for the months of September, 1985 to December, 1985 till February 7, 1986.
3. In the result, this revision is allowed, the orders of the both the lower Courts striking out the defence of the petitioner against eviction are set aside.
4. Mr. Keshote, learned Counsel for the plaintiff-landlord made a submission that the petitioner has not paid the rent even after March, 1986. This controversy cannot be decided in this proceeding. In case the plaintiff-respondent has any grievance with regard to the default of the payment of rent for the months of March, 1986 onwards, he can take appropriate steps in this regard before the trial court.
5. The trial court is now directed to expedite the hearing of the main suit. Parties shall bear their own costs.