Skip to content
How to use Judgment tools
  1. Click Tools to open PDF, Print, Tag, Note, Favourite, and CiteSignal.
  2. Use Brief & Ask in the toolbar for the AI Brief and case chat.
  3. Jump to sections with the pills below the help bar.

State of Rajasthan Vs. Choudhary Constructions

State of Rajasthan vs Choudhary Constructions

Disposition Application dismissed Court Rajasthan Decided Feb 10, 1998
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/759650

For advocates & juniors · 7-day free trial

Brief this judgment before chambers

Stop skimming 50 pages - get an 18-section AI Brief on this case, ask scoped follow-ups, and find related precedents with Semantic Search. Full trial, no card required.

  • 18-section brief - facts, issues, ratio, relief
  • Ask this case - answers cite the judgment
  • Semantic search - find precedents by meaning
  • Research drawer - sections, cites, related cases

No card required · credentials emailed · Log in if you already have an account

Citation
Court
Rajasthan High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Civil Misc. Appeal (Def.) No. 2524 of 1996
Subject
Limitation
Disposition
Application dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 & 98 & Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, Section 2(h): [Altamas Kabir & Cyriac Joseph, JJ] Determination as to Juvenile - Appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged oc...

Key legal issue
Limitation
Outcome / disposition
Application dismissed
Acts & sections
Limitation Act, 1963 - Sections 5

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

State of Rajasthan

Advocate L.M. Lodha, Adv.

Respondent

Choudhary Constructions

Advocate Dinesh Maheshwari, Adv.

Legal References

Acts
Limitation Act, 1963 - Sections 5
Cases Referred
State of Rajasthan v. Sukhdeo
Reported In
AIR1998Raj123

Excerpt

- section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. orderp.c. jain, j.1. the plaintiff has filed this appeal under section 39 of the arbitration act, 1940 (for short the act') against the order and decree passed by the learned district judge, bikaner in civil misc. case no. 40/94 modifying the award passed by the sole arbitrator on 15-1-1994.2. the officer, after presentation of this appeal, computed the period of limitation and made a report that the appeal was barred by time by 79-days.3. faced with this dilemma the appellant filed an application under section 5 of the limitation act praying for condonation of delay. it was stated in the application that the delay caused in filing the appeal with delay is neither deliberate nor intentional. it was averred that much procedure is involved for taking sanction from the state government and the matter is routed through many levels and the papers pass in the hands of many officers. the procedure involved has resulted into delay. since a heavy stakes of the government are involved, this appeal could not be thrown out merely on the ground that it is barred by time. it would in the fitness of things to impart substantial justice on the merits of the case. learned counsel for the appellant has cited collector, land acquisition, anantnag v. mst. katiji, air 1987 sc 1353 for the observations made therein in order to substantiate his averments.4. learned counsel for the respondent very vehemently contested the application and opposed teeth and nail condonation of delay sought by the appellant. learned counsel has submitted that the appellant has not furnished a reasonable explanation for delay in filing the appeal. merely making bald allegations that for obtaining sanction of the government for filing an appeal, in suchcases since the papers pass through various routes and many officers deal with such papers, delay is caused learned counsel has relied on state of rajasthan v. sukhdeo singh, (1996) 2 raj lw 598. in this case also similar arguments were advanced and the court.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

P.C. Jain, J.

1. The plaintiff has filed this appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short the Act') against the order and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Bikaner in civil misc. case No. 40/94 modifying the award passed by the sole Arbitrator on 15-1-1994.

2. The officer, after presentation of this appeal, computed the period of limitation and made a report that the appeal was barred by time by 79-days.

3. Faced with this dilemma the appellant filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of delay. It was stated in the application that the delay caused in filing the appeal with delay is neither deliberate nor intentional. It was averred that much procedure is involved for taking sanction from the State Government and the matter is routed through many levels and the papers pass in the hands of many officers. The procedure involved has resulted into delay. Since a heavy stakes of the Government are involved, this appeal could not be thrown out merely on the ground that it is barred by time. It would in the fitness of things to impart substantial justice on the merits of the case. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 for the observations made therein in order to substantiate his averments.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent very vehemently contested the application and opposed teeth and nail condonation of delay sought by the appellant. Learned counsel has submitted that the appellant has not furnished a reasonable explanation for delay in filing the appeal. Merely making bald allegations that for obtaining sanction of the Government for filing an appeal, in suchcases since the papers pass through various routes and many officers deal with such papers, delay is caused Learned counsel has relied on State of Rajasthan v. Sukhdeo Singh, (1996) 2 Raj LW 598. In this case also similar arguments were advanced and the Court repealed the same by observing as follows :--

'There is nothing on record as to when the certified copies obtained were sent to the Department and as to why the sanction could not be accorded within a reasonable time. There is also nothing on record to indicate as to when the sanction was granted and when the papers were sent to the concerned Department for filing an appeal and as to why the papers were not immediately processed after sanction was granted. It is not shown to this Court that the appeal could not be presented within the period of limitation in spite of due reasonable steps were taken in the matter. The counsel for the appellant has relied upon a decision reported in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 JT (SC) 371: (AIR 1996 SC 1623) and has contended that a pragmatic approach may be taken in the matter while considering the procedural delay caused in the Govt. Department as a usual feature.

Considering the variety of activities Govt. is engaged and the ultimate sufferer on account of dismissal of appeal being public, there may be difference of degree of proof required by the Govt. and the private party to establish sufficient cause but that would not or cannot relieve the Govt. from alleging and proving sufficient cause for delay. The Govt. is not required to give reasons for each day's delay but has to allege and prove overall cause for the entire period. The Govt. cannot get over the delay simply because it is Govt.

5. The observations made in State of Rajasthan v. Sukhdeo (1996 (2) Raj LW 598) (supra) aptly covers the field and no case is made out for pondonation of delay. The appellant is guilty of not furnishing material particulars as to why the delay has beer, caused. Making sweeping averments as above would not suffice.

6. I therefore, dismiss the application filed by the appellant and hold that the appeal filed by the appellant is hopelessly barred by time and the same is dismissed.

Continue Your Research


AI Briefs · Semantic Search · Save & annotate judgments

Start your 7-day free trial