State of Rajasthan Vs. Sant Kumar

penal code - sections 304-b, 306 & 498-a and dowry prohibition act, 1961--section 4 and constitution of india--leave to appeal to supreme court--testimony tainted--held, there is no ground to grant leave appeal to supreme court.;their testimony also could have, been said to be not tainted. considering the arguments and the grounds taken in the application for leave to appeal in the back-ground of law laid down by their lordships of the supreme court in appeal against acquittal we are not inclined to interfere with the order of acquittal.;the application for leave to appeal is rejected.;appeal rejected. - section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. .....some substance but it they are analyzed & tested in light of the other evidence available on record, it cannot be said that the view taken by learned sessions judge is. totally perverse. may be that, another view of the evidence could have been taken but that is not a ground for interference in the order of acquittal. there is one important factor in the case and that is there was no intervening factor to stop the accused-respondents from letting the deceased completely burn before raising an alarm. their action of putting off fire and taking her immediately to the hospital and her statement given to the doctors where she has stated that the fire was accidental is in consonance with other circumstances available on the record in as much as the site inspection memo shows that even the bottle of kerosene was found duly filled in and was still lying there and there were no signs of extensive burns in the room, which fact also corroborates the defense version. besides this there is one more factor that in the earlier dying declaration, according to the investigation, she implicated only her mother-in-law and when the father and the brother of deceased came it was thereafter that the son-in-law is also introduced as an accused in the case. thus there are three dying declarations and each one gives different story. another evidence produced to establish the prosecution story is that of the parents of the earlier wife of accused respondent santram who had taken divorce on the ground that he had assaulted her mother. in these circumstances their testimony also could not have been said to be not tainted. considering the arguments and the application for leave to appeal in the back-ground of law laid down by their lordships of the supreme court in appeal against acquittal we are not inclined to interfere with the order of acquittal.2. the application for leave to appeal is rejected.