Smt. Jora Vs. Prabhu Narain

Smt. Jora vs Prabhu Narain

Disposition Revision dismissed Court Rajasthan Decided May 06, 1957

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/755872
Court: Rajasthan High Court
Judge: K.L. Bapna, J.
Decided On: May 06, 1957
Case Number: Civil Revn. No. 132 of 1957
Subject: Limitation
Disposition: Revision dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- Section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, Rule 12 & 98 & Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, Section 2(h): [Altamas Kabir & Cyriac Joseph, JJ] Determination as to Juvenile - Appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged oc...

Key legal issue: Limitation
Outcome / disposition: Revision dismissed
Acts & sections: Limitation Act, 1908 - Schedule - Article 66; Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 68

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Smt. Jora

Advocate Panna Lal, Adv.

Respondent

Prabhu Narain

Legal References

Acts: Limitation Act, 1908 - Schedule - Article 66; Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 68
Cases Referred: Shiva Narain v. Badal
Reported In: AIR1958Raj310

Excerpt

- section 2(k), 2(1), 7 & 40 & juvenile justice (care and protection of children) rules, 2007, rule 12 & 98 & juvenile justice act, 1986, section 2(h): [altamas kabir & cyriac joseph, jj] determination as to juvenile - appellant was found to have completed the age of 16 years and 13 days on the date of alleged occurrence - appellant was arrested on 30.11.1998 when the 1986 act was in force and under clause (h) of section 2 a juvenile was described to mean a child who had not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who had not attained the age of eighteen years - it is with the enactment of the juvenile justice act, 2000, that in section 2(k) a juvenile or child was defined to mean a child who had not completed eighteen years of a ge which was given prospective prospect - appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age when the juvenile justice act, 2000, came into force - juvenile act, of 2000 has been given retrospective effect by rule 12 of juvenile justice rule, 2007 - as such, accused has to be treated as juvenile under the said act. .....present case the period is specified, the day is not so specified. the contention has no force, for by taking into consideration the period specified, the day of repayment also becomes specified. the oudh authority is not relevant, because in that case there was a further stipulation that in case of default of payment of interest, which was agreed to be paid every month, the creditor will have the right to sue for the entire loan.limitation in that case was counted from the date of default in the payment of interest as stipulated, and article 66 was not held to be applicable. the present is not a case of that nature. the court has rightly held limitation to start in the present case from 1-1-1954. from that date the suit was obviously within time under article 66 of the limitation act.6. it was next contended that the plaintiff had not produced any of the attesting witnesses. the production of attesting witnesses is only necessary in case where a document is required by law to be attested. there was explanation on behalf of the plaintiff that the attesting witnesses were near relations or under the influence of the defendant. the lower court, after taking into consideration the evidence on record and the explanation given, has thought fit to rely on the plaintiffs evidence. there is no question of law involved in this argument.7. there is no force in this revision and it is accordingly dismissed. the stay application automatically fails and is dismissed.

Full Judgment

ORDER

K.L. Bapna, J.

1. This is a revision against the decision of the Judge, Small Cause Court Jaipur City, dated 20th December, 1956.

2. The respondent had sued the petitioner on a bond dated 1st January, 1953. The defendant denied the execution or the consideration. The court, on evidence, found for the plaintiff and decreed the suit.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges that the suit was beyond limitation, if the limitation was taken to have started from the date of the bond. The judgment mentioned that the stipulation of repayment was that the debtor would repay the loan in 12 months. If the limitation were to be reckoned from 1-1-1954, it was conceded that it was within time. Learned counsel urged that in a case of stipulation of that nature, the time runs from the date of the bond, and relied on Shiva Narain v. Badal, AIR 1936 Oudh 279 (A).

4. The relevant Article is 66 of the Limitation Act, which runs as follows :

Description of suit

Period of limitation

Timefrom which pe-riod begins to run.

66. On asingle bond where a day is specified for payment

Threeyears.

The dayso specified.

5. The contention is that while in the present case the period is specified, the day is not so specified. The contention has no force, for by taking into consideration the period specified, the day of repayment also becomes specified. The Oudh authority is not relevant, because in that case there was a further stipulation that in case of default of payment of interest, which was agreed to be paid every month, the creditor will have the right to sue for the entire loan.

Limitation in that case was counted from the date of default in the payment of interest as stipulated, and Article 66 was not held to be applicable. The present is not a case of that nature. The court has rightly held limitation to start in the present case from 1-1-1954. From that date the suit was obviously within time under Article 66 of the Limitation Act.

6. It was next contended that the plaintiff had not produced any of the attesting witnesses. The production of attesting witnesses is only necessary in case where a document is required by law to be attested. There was explanation on behalf of the plaintiff that the attesting witnesses were near relations or under the influence of the defendant. The lower court, after taking into consideration the evidence on record and the explanation given, has thought fit to rely on the plaintiffs evidence. There is no question of law involved in this argument.

7. There is no force in this revision and it is accordingly dismissed. The Stay Application automatically fails and is dismissed.

Same Parties Smt. Jora vs Prabhu Narain Same Subject Limitation Same Judge K.L. Bapna, J. Acts & Sections Limitation Act, 1908 - Schedule - Article 66; Evidence Act, 1...

Limitation