Sanni and ors. Vs. Sada Nand and ors.

Sanni and ors. vs Sada Nand and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Delhi Decided Jan 18, 1973

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/680574
Court: Delhi High Court
Judge: P.N. Khanna, J.
Decided On: Jan 18, 1973
Case Number: S.A.O. No. 2 of 1973, against order of G.C. Jain, Rant Control Tribunal, Delhi. D/- 15-12-1972
Subject: Tenancy

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

The case debated on whether the eviction orders passed under Section 14 and 25 of the Delhi Rent Control act, 1958 could executed on the legal heirs of the tenant where the tenant had died after passing of orders - It was held that the orders could be executed against the legal heirs of the deceased tenant - Sect...

Key legal issue: Tenancy
Acts & sections: Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Sections 14 and 25; Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 - Rule 23; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Sections 50

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Sanni and ors.

Advocate M.L. Sharma, Adv

Respondent

Sada Nand and ors.

Advocate D.K. Makhija, Adv.

Legal References

Acts: Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Sections 14 and 25; Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 - Rule 23; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908 - Sections 50
Cases Referred: Mohd.Idris v. Mehar Illahi
Reported In: AIR1974Delhi99

Excerpt

.....of the husband. a petition seeking protection of minor child was thereupon filed by father of the husband before delhi high court. a direction for handing over custody of child to father of husband was also sought. the high court considering fact that the u.k. court was already in seisin of matter and had passed an interim order and by relying on principle of comity of nations and comity of judgments of the courts of two different countries in deciding the matter directed the wife to take the child of her own to u.k.or hand it over to father of husband to be taken to u.k. as measure of interim custody and that it would be for the u.k. court to decide the question of custody - order was challenged by wife - held, the order of high court was not liable to be interfered with. although, on first impression, it would appear that the interests of the minor child would best be served if she is allowed to remain with the wife, the order of u.k. court cannot be lost sight of., the order of u.k. court except for insisiting that the minor be returned to its jurisdiction, the english court did not intend to separate the child from the mother until a final decision was taken with regard to the custody of the child. the ultimate decision in that regard has to be left to the english court having regard to the nationality of the child and the fact that both the parents had worked for gain in the u.k. and had also acquired permanent resident status in the u.k. english court has not directed that the custody of the child should be handed over to the father but that the child should be returned to the jurisdiction of the courts in the u.k. which would then proceed to determine as to who would be best suited to have the custody of the child. the high court has taken into consideration both the questions relating to the comity of courts as well as the interest of the minor child, which, no doubt, is one of the most important considerations in matters relating to custody of..........parties to a proceeding before the controller, both these arguments are plausible.'the learned judge while making the aforesaid observations it is significant to notice, did not rule out the correctness of the one or the other contention. even on facts, that case was entirely different. eviction order had been passed against the legal representatives themselves. eviction was not being sought of the legal representatives of a tenant, against whom an eviction order had been passed as in this case. this judgment thereforee is of no assistance to the appellants. on the other hand, in shaha mangal chand v. gurbux singh : air1972 delhi56 , v.s.deshpande j. was of the view that the right to execute the order of eviction survives the death of the statutory tenant against his legal representatives on the principle embodied in rule 4 of order 22 of the code of civil procedure.5. there is a judgment of the division bench of our court in mohd.idris v. mehar illahi, : air1971 delhi262 where i sitting with s.n. shankar j., similar circumstances; and had come to the conclusion that the question of dispossession of the legal representatives of a deceased tenant against whom an order of eviction has already been passed, was a question relating to the execution discharge and satisfaction of the earlier order for recovery of possession and thereforee was to be determined by the court (the controller), executing the same and not be a separate suit on the principle of section 47 of the code of civil procedure. in these circumstances, i do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed in liming.6. mr.sharma, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that in these days of difficulty in getting accommodation in delhi, the appellants would find it extremely hard to immediately comply with the eviction order. he prays for time and undertakes to vacate the premises immediately after the expiry of time that i may grant. i accordingly direct that the order of eviction.....

Full Judgment

1. In this case, the only question that has arisen for consideration is whether the landlord after obtaining an order of eviction against his tenant, who dies subsequent to the passing of the said order against him, cannot have it executed against his legal representatives.

2. On behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased, who are the appellants before me, it is contended that they are not the tenants and, thereforee, the Additional Controller had no jurisdiction to execute the eviction order against them, as the Act, according to them, is confined to disputes between landlords and tenants alone.

3. The contention of the appellants is unfounded. Under Section 25 of the Delhi Rent control Act, herein called 'the Act' the Controller has been given specific jurisdiction, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, to execute such an order against all persons, who may be in occupation of the premises and to evict them there from. The executing arm of the Controller has not been restricted up to the tenant or the ex-tenant. Apart from this, under Section 37 of the Act, the Controller is required to follow as far as may be, the practice and procedure of the Court of Small Causes, which, of course, subject to certain exceptions, is laid down in the code of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rule 1959, the Controller is to be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the code a specific provision has been made in Section 50 to the effect that where a judgment-debtors dies before the decree had been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court, which passed it, to execute the same against the legal representatives of the deceased. The controller, thereforee, takes his guidance also from this section and is enabled to execute the eviction order against the legal representatives of the deceased.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to judgment of V.S.Deshpande, J, in Nathu Khan v. Mhod. Ismail, : AIR1973 Delhi213 , (SAO 178 of 1972 decided on 1-9-1972, where it is observed.

'on the other hand, it must have appeared to the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal that a proceeding before them must be against some human being and cannot be in vacuum; it was quite plausible, thereforee, that they should have brought the legal representatives of the deceased Rahim Khan on record; on the other hand, an argument can also be made that the jurisdiction of the Controller is limited to the relationship ;of landlord and tenants and the heirs of a statutory tenant cannot become parties to a proceeding before the Controller, Both these arguments are plausible.'

The learned Judge while making the aforesaid observations it is significant to notice, did not rule out the correctness of the one or the other contention. Even on facts, that case was entirely different. Eviction order had been passed against the legal representatives themselves. Eviction was not being sought of the legal representatives of a tenant, against whom an eviction order had been passed as in this case. This judgment thereforee is of no assistance to the appellants. On the other hand, in Shaha Mangal Chand v. Gurbux Singh : AIR1972 Delhi56 , V.S.Deshpande J. was of the view that the right to execute the order of eviction survives the death of the statutory tenant against his legal representatives on the principle embodied in Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. There is a judgment of the Division Bench of our court in Mohd.Idris v. Mehar Illahi, : AIR1971 Delhi262 where I sitting with S.N. Shankar J., similar circumstances; and had come to the conclusion that the question of dispossession of the legal representatives of a deceased tenant against whom an order of eviction has already been passed, was a question relating to the execution discharge and satisfaction of the earlier order for recovery of possession and thereforee was to be determined by the court (the Controller), executing the same and not be a separate suit on the principle of Section 47 of the Code of Civil procedure. In these circumstances, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed in liming.

6. Mr.Sharma, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that in these days of difficulty in getting accommodation in Delhi, the appellants would find it extremely hard to immediately comply with the eviction order. He prays for time and undertakes to vacate the premises immediately after the expiry of time that I may grant. I accordingly direct that the order of eviction shall not be executable for three months from the date of this order. Mr.Makhija the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, in view of the undertaking by Mr. Sharma has no objection to the grant of this time.

7. Appeal dismissed.

Same Court & Year Delhi · 1973 Same Parties Sanni and ors. vs Sada Nand and ors. Same Subject Tenancy Same Judge P.N. Khanna, J. Acts & Sections Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Sections 14 and 25; Delhi Rent...

Tenancy