Deep Chandra Vs. State of U.P. and anr.

.....not only on nature of action initiated but also on purport and object of statute. -- section 56; register of trade marks application for rectification delay condonation of held, the power of the registrar in terms of section 56 is wide. sub-section (2) of section 56 use the word may at two places. it enables a person aggrieved to file an application. it enable the tribunal to it make such order a s it may think it. it may not, therefore, be correct to contend that under no circumstances the delay or acquiescence or waiver or any other principle analogous thereto would apply. purity of register as also the public interest would indisputably be relevant consideration. but, when a discretionary jurisdiction has been conferred on a statutory authority, the same although would be required to be considered on objective criteria but as a legal principle it cannot be said that the delay leading to acquiescence or waiver or abandonment will have no role to play. -- section 56; register of trade marks -rectification delay respondent-applicant taking action against every party throughout world using trade mark evocating scotland no action, however, taken against appellant for years even though a notice was issued - explanation that they waited for decision of supreme court on same issue held, since action was initiated even before decision of supreme court, application is liable to be dismissed on principles of acquiescence, waiver. -- section 46; register of trade marks rectification -ground deceptive similarity-tests to be applied to decide deception held, the tests which are required to be applied to decide question of deceptive similarity in trade marks in each case would be different. each word must be taken separately. they should be judged by their look and by their sound. must consider the goods to which they are to be applied. nature and kind of customers who would likely to buy goods must also be considered. surrounding circumstances play an important.....orders. rajendra babu and s.n. variava, jj.1. this appeal is directed against an order made by the high court quashing the award made by the labour court. a dispute was raised by the appellant on the ground that though he had put in more than 240 days in each year of service from the year 1982 to 1988, he had been retrenched without following the procedure prescribed under section 25f of the industrial disputes act. the tribunal, therefore, on adjudication came to the conclusion that termination of service of the appellant is bad and in particular noticed that persons who had been employed subsequent to the appellant have been continuing in service, whereas the services of the appellant had been put to an end to. in the circumstances the labour court made an award granting the reinstatement with back-wages and other consequential benefits that may flow from it. writ petition was filed against the order before the high court.2. the high court approached the matter rather strangely as it went at a tangent to consider not only whether the casual worker's services can be put to an end to but if the award made by the labour court would make him permanent employee, so on and so forth. the high court lost sight of the point in issue that is, when an employee had put in service for more than 240 days in each year for several years whether his services can be put to an end to without following the procedure prescribed under section 25f of the industrial disputes act. if there has been violation thereof such an employee will have to be reinstated in his original service on the same terms and conditions in which he was working earlier. if this is the position in law, we fail to understand as to how the high court could have interfered with the award made by the labour court. we set aside the order made by the high court and restore the award made by the labour court. the appeal is allowed accordingly.