Sunil Kumar Vs. Yog Raj

.....statutory provisions or public duty, judicial review of such state action is inevitable. likewise, if state enters into a contract in consonance with article 299 rights of the parties shall be determined by terms of such contract irrespective of fact that one of the parties to it is a state or a statutory authority. for these precise reasons the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel has been made applicable against the government, as against any other private individual, even in cases where no valid contract in terms of article 299 was entered into between the parties. hence, if government makes a representation or a promise and an individual alters his position by acting upon such promise, the government may be required to make good that promise and shall not be allowed to fall back upon the formal defect in the contract, though subject to well known limitations like larger public interest. the state, thus, has no dominus status to dictate unilateral terms and conditions when it enters into contract and its actions must be reasonable, fair and just and in consonance with rule of law. as a necessary corollary thereto state cannot refuse to confirm highest bid without assigning any valid reason and/or by giving erratic, irrational or irrelevant reasons. -- consumer protection act, 1986 [c.a. no. 68/1986]. articles 14 & 300a: government contract noon-acceptance of highest bid held, it does not result in taking away right to property of highest bidder highest bid, per se, unless it is accepted by competent authority, and consequential sale certificate is issued, does not grant the highest bidder right to property of type which is protected under article 300a right to property is limited to confer highest bidder the right to challenge action of appropriate authority in refusing to accept highest or other bids. [air 1984 p&h 282 (fb) explained] articles 14 & 226: government contract rejection of highest bid held, highest bidder has locus standi to..........das tapadia v. goverdhan das partani and anr., i(2001)bc 113 (sc)=vi (2000) slt 523=2000(7) scc 183, it was held that a complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground that the same was filed before expiry of a period of 30 days, as laid down under section 140(2) of the negotiable instruments act, 1881. at best, the complaint can be adjourned and further proceedings commenced after expiry of period of 30 days.3. counsel for the petitioner relied on a judgment of kerala high court in viswandhan v. surendran, 1998(2) civil court cases 589. in view of the judgment of the supreme court, the judgment of the kerala high court cannot be relied on. similarly, the judgment of the madras high court in p. v.r.s. manikumar v. krishna reddy, ii (1999) bc 353=iv (1999) ccr 37= 1999(3) civil court cases 322, can also not be followed for the same reason. the judgment of the supreme court in sadanandan bhadran v. madhavan sunil kumar, i (1999) bc 691 (sc)=vii (1998) slt 157=111 (1998) ccr 238 (sc)=1998(4) rcr (criminal) 90 relied on by counsel for the petitioner is on the question that after cause of action has arisen as a result of first dishonour, the period of limitation will not be extended by second dishonour. in any case, the said-judgmentdoes not lay down the law contrary to the judgment of the supreme court in narsingh das tapadia's case (supra).4. counsel for the petitioner has also referred to judgments reported in jaya chandran v. baburaj. i (1999) bc 250 =1998(3) civil court cases 455 and tomy jacob kattikkaran v. dr. thomas manjaly and anr., iii (1997). ccr 99 (sc)=jt 1997(7) sc 344, for submitting that the return of notice on account of addressee not being available did not amount to service as the complainant had failed to examine the postman or the neighbour and that service of notice was a condition precedent. there is no dispute with this proposition of law, but the question is yet to be examined by the trial court. in the complaint, it has been stated that.....