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Maheswar Rao and ors. Vs. State of Orissa and ors.

Maheswar Rao and ors. vs State of Orissa and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Orissa Decided Mar 25, 1974
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/530821

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Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Labour and Industrial

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56 Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the ...

Key legal issue
Labour and Industrial

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Maheswar Rao and ors.

Respondent

State of Orissa and ors.

Legal References

Cases Referred
Act. In Motipur Zamindari Co. v. Bihar State
Reported In
40(1974)CLT593; (1974)IILLJ127Ori

Excerpt

- state financial corporations act, 1951 [63/1951]. section 29; [p.k. tripathy, a.k. parichha & n.prusty, jj] discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. on the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. apart from that, the claim of the orissa state financial corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the state financial corporation act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. procedure is provided in the act, 1951 and the rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. if such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. the financial corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. thus, a vehicle,..........employees' union represented by its secretary (opposite party no. 3) raised a dispute which was conciliated by the district labour officer, rayagada. he submitted a failure report as per annexure 1. the state government, in exercise of their powers under section 12(5) read with section 10(1)(b) of the industrial disputes act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the act) referred the following dispute for determination by the industrial tribunal by their order dated 13-6-72 (annexure 3):whether the existing wage rates for the heavy vehicle drivers, tractor drivers, cleaners, mechanics, conductors, and checkers employed in the vehicles of the following employers need any revision. if so, what should be the details and from which date the revised rates of wages in respect of the said workmen should be given effect ?in the order of reference thereafter followed a list, under annexure 'b', of 63 employers with the particulars of their vehicles noted against each of them. the two other questions that were referred are:(2) whether the above-said workmen are entitled to payment of bonus if so, what should be the quantum of payment ?(3) whether the above-said workmen are entitled to house rent allowance, medical aid, and whether they should be supplied with dress and shoes if so, what are the details ?this reference is assailed before us at the instance of four of the persons shown under annexure-b to the order of reference as perverse, an act without application of mind and also as being without jurisdiction. the petitioners contend that what has been referred is not an industrial dispute.2. the petitioner no. 1 is an advocate by profession and is the owner of a private car bearing registration no. a.p.w. 2500 (serial no. 39 of annexure-b). the petitioners nos. 2 to 4 (serial nos. 50, 52 and 57 respectively of annexure-b) are agriculturists by occupation and own tractors for their private purposes. their stand is that they do not carry on any industry and the employees under.....

Full Judgment

R.N. Misra, J.

1. The Rayagada Motor Employees' Union represented by its secretary (opposite party No. 3) raised a dispute which was conciliated by the District Labour Officer, Rayagada. He submitted a failure report as per annexure 1. The State Government, in exercise of their powers under Section 12(5) read with Section 10(1)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) referred the following dispute for determination by the Industrial Tribunal by their order dated 13-6-72 (annexure 3):

Whether the existing wage rates for the heavy vehicle drivers, tractor drivers, cleaners, mechanics, conductors, and checkers employed in the vehicles of the following employers need any revision. If so, what should be the details and from which date the revised rates of wages in respect of the said workmen should be given effect ?

In the order of reference thereafter followed a list, under annexure 'B', of 63 employers with the particulars of their vehicles noted against each of them. The two other questions that were referred are:

(2) Whether the above-said workmen are entitled to payment of bonus If so, what should be the quantum of payment ?

(3) Whether the above-said workmen are entitled to house rent allowance, medical aid, and whether they should be supplied with dress and shoes If so, what are the details ?

This reference is assailed before us at the instance of four of the persons shown under annexure-B to the order of reference as perverse, an act without application of mind and also as being without jurisdiction. The petitioners contend that what has been referred is not an industrial dispute.

2. The petitioner No. 1 is an advocate by profession and is the owner of a private car bearing Registration No. A.P.W. 2500 (serial No. 39 of annexure-B). The petitioners Nos. 2 to 4 (serial Nos. 50, 52 and 57 respectively of annexure-B) are agriculturists by occupation and own tractors for their private purposes. Their stand is that they do not carry on any industry and the employees under them are private employees not in any industry and, therefore, demand, if any, of such employees does not constitute an industrial dispute. The Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947) has, therefore, no application in respect of any dispute arising out of their demands for higher wages or better conditions of service. As the Act has no application, the reference is without jurisdiction,

3. 'Industrial dispute' has been defined under Section 2(k) of the Act to mean 'any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person'. Section 2(j) defines 'industry' to mean ''any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen'. It is conceded that unless the employer is an industry within the definition of the Act there would be no scope for exercise of jurisdiction under the Act.

4. This Court in Harihar v. State of Orissa : AIR1966 Ori35 , laid down the test of an industry under Section 2(j) of the Act to be,

The two essential requirements to constitute an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act are : (1) that there should be an organised operation, as in business or trade, in which capital and labour co-operate, and (2) that such operation should be for the satisfaction of material human wants or desires.

Before the work engaged in, can be described as industry, it must bear the definite character of trade or business or manufacture or calling or must be capable of being described as an undertaking resulting in material goods or material services, see S. J. Hospital. New Delhi v. K.S. Sethi : (1970)IILLJ266SC . It has also been settled that for determining whether an organisation is an industry or nor, it must be ascertained as to whether its activity partakes the nature of a business or trade or is an undertaking or manufacture or calling of employers. It it is that and there is co-operation of the employer and the employee resulting in the production of material services, it is an industry, see F.I.C. Commerce v. R.C. Mittal A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 763. In Harinagar (one Farm v. State of Bihar : (1963)ILLJ692SC , the learned Judges observed that agricultural operations carried on by a company may fall, in special circumstances, within the meaning of 'industry' in Section 2(j) of the Act. In Motipur Zamindari Co. v. Bihar State : (1960)ILLJ634Pat , it has been observed that agricultural operations carried on by a limited company formed for that purpose constitute an industry. From these decisions it would appear that unless agriculture is adopted as a business or calling, the operations in the hands of the petitioners 2, 3 and 4 cannot partake the character of industry. Similarly the petitioner No. 1 who is an advocate by profession cannot be said to be carrying on an industry. The Supreme Court has already categorically said that the calling of solicitors is not an industry. The allegations in support of these facts raised in the writ application have not at all been denied in the counter, affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 3. The referring authority (opposite party No. 1) has made no return to the Rule nisi from this Court. It would, therefore, follow that the petitioners do not run any industry and any dispute in regard to employment under them would not constitute 'industrial dispute ' within the definition of that term under the Industrial Disputes Act. The referring authority without application of mind and without examining the facts of the case suddenly proceeded to make the reference in exercise of powers vested in it under the Act. Exercise of such jurisdiction is manifestly erroneous and the combined order of reference must stand annulled. The petitioner's writ application is allowed with costs to be paid by the opposite party No. 1 alone. Hearing fee Rs. 100 (one hundred).

B.K. Ray, J.

5. I agree.

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