.....extended period of limitation maintainability - held, if the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal cannot be admitted to consideration unless other requirements are complied with. the provision of sub-section (1) of section 173 permits filing of an appeal against an award within 90 days with a rider in the first proviso that such appeal filed cannot be entertained unless the statutory deposit is made. the period of limitation is applicable only to the filing of the appeal and not to the deposit to be made. it, therefore, appears that an appeal filed under section 173 cannot be entertained i.e. cannot be admitted for consideration unless the statutory deposit is made and for this purpose the court has the discretion either to grant time to make the deposit or not. no formal order condoning the delay is necessary, an order of adjournment would suffice. the provisions of limitation embodied in the substantive provision of the sub-section (1) of section 173 of the act does not extend to the provision relating to the deposit of statutory amount as embodies in the first proviso. therefore an appeal filed within the period of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. - 12), who had figured as the approver and some other items of circumstantial evidence which could only corroborate the evidence with regard to the commission of the.....b.k. behera, j.1. upon hearing the learned addl. govt. adv. and the learned counsel for the respondents, i find no case for interference in this appeal against acquittal directed against the judgment and order passed by the learned assistant sessions judge, dhenkanal, acquitting the respondents who figured as the accused persons in the trial court being charged under section 395 of the indian penal code for commission of dacoity in the house of rejendramohan naik (p. w. 3) in village ranipal in the district of dhenkanal by causing injuries to the inmates of the house and using deadly weapons in the course of which cash and other articles had been removed, as alleged, from the house, as with regard to the complicity of the respondents, the prosecution had depended only on the evidence of lodha alias nodha raut (p. w. 12), who had figured as the approver and some other items of circumstantial evidence which could only corroborate the evidence with regard to the commission of the crime, but not with regard to the criminals and for good reasons, the learned assistant sessions judge had rejected the evidence of the approver as unworthy of acceptance. and in addition, he had not implicated any of the respondents other than the respondent lingaraj jena in his evidence with regard to an act said to have been committed by this respondent not during the commission of the offence, but thereafter and the evidence of an approver, before acceptance and being acted upon, must be corroborated in material particulars and qua each accused and there was no evidence corroborating his.2. the appeal fails and is dismissed.