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Hari Panda Vs. Gini Kambu and anr.

Hari Panda vs Gini Kambu and anr.

Disposition Revision dismissed Court Orissa Decided Aug 11, 1959
~5 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/524136

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Citation
Court
Orissa High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Civil Revn. No. 1 of 1958
Subject
Commercial
Disposition
Revision dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988 [C.A. No. 59/1988]Section 173(1) Proviso; [D. Biswas, Amitava Roy & I.A.Ansari, JJ] Appeal without statutory deposit but within limitation/or extended period of limitation Maintainability - Held, If the provision of a statute speaks of entertainment of appeal, it denotes that the appeal ...

Key legal issue
Commercial
Outcome / disposition
Revision dismissed
Acts & sections
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 118

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Hari Panda

Advocate H.G. Panda, Adv.

Respondent

Gini Kambu and anr.

Advocate S.N. Das Gupta, Adv.

Legal References

Acts
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 118
Cases Referred
Tarmahommed Haji Abdul Rehman v. Tyeb Ebrahim Bharamchari
Reported In
AIR1961Ori8

Excerpt

.....of limitation or within the extended period of limitation, cannot be admitted for hearing on merit unless the statutory deposit is made either with the memo of appeal or on such date as may be permitted by the court. no specific order condoning any delay for the purpose of deposit under first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 is necessary. [new india assurance co. ltd. v md. makubur rahman, 1993 (2) glr 430 and new india assurance co. ltd. v smt rita devi, 1997(2) glt 406, approved. new india assurance co. ltd. v birendra mohan de, 1995 (2) gau lt 218 (db) and union of india v smt gita banik, 1996 (2) glt 246, are not good law]. - the bombay high court made it perfectly clear that if a particular consideration is mentioned in the negotiable instrument and that consideration is found to be false and some other consideration is set up, that is a factor which the court would take into consideration in deciding whether the defendant has discharged the burden cast upon him by section 118. it is one thing to say that the plaintiff has failed to prove a particular consideration for a certain promissory note;.....there was no consideration at all for the promissory note. in the present case the learned small cause court judge, on appreciation of evidence, was right in granting a decree for the amount of consideration proved to have been actually paid as consideration for the promissory note. there is no dispute as to the position in law thatthe plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of such presumption under section 118 of the negotiable instrument act. the presumption that is raised under section 118 is not in respect of the consideration mentioned in the negotiable instrument.the presumption is in favour of there being a consideration for the negotiable instrument, any consideration that is a valid consideration in law. the question is whether on the evidence, the learned small cause court judge was justified -- and i think, he was justified -- in accepting the defence case that only rs. 60- and not rs. 180/- as mentioned in the promissory note was actually paid. the bombay decision cited above is no authority for the proposition, -- sought to be urged on behalf of the plaintiff, -- that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration mentioned in the negotiable instrument. there is no warrant for importing into section 118 words which the legislature did not think fit to incorporate in that section. with great respect, i agree with the principles underlying the bombay high court decision.4. in this view of the matter, i uphold the decision of the learned small cause court judge and accordingly this revision is dismissed, but withoutcosts.

Full Judgment

ORDER

S. Barman, J.

1. The plaintiff is the petitioner in this Civil Revision directed against an order of the learned Small Cause Court Judge, Berhampur, who passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 72/- plus interest but disallowed his claim for Rs. 216-14-0 on the basis of a promissory note D/- 3-11-1955 executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 180/-. Before the suit was filed, the plaintiff had served on the defendants a notice of demand to which however they sent no reply. The suit was accordingly filed in 1957 for recovery of the said sum of Rs. 215-14-0 on the basis of the promissory note as aforesaid. The defendants who are brothers, filed written statement in which they took the defence that while admitting the execution of the said promissory note, they received only Rs. 60/- for consideration and not Rs. 180/- which was mentioned in the said promissory note.

2. At the trial before the learned Small Cause Court Judge, the plaintiff called two witnesses including himself. P.W. 2 who was the scribe of the document deposed that about Rs. 70/- was paid at the time of the execution of the said promissory note and the balance was agreed to be paid later on by the plaintiff. The defendants called three witnesses including defendant No. 1. D.Ws. 2 and 5were the attesting witnesses to the promissory note. The defence case as purported to be established by these witnesses was that the defendants received only Rs. 60/- as consideration and not Rs.180/- as mentioned in the promissory note.

On this evidence the learned Small Cause Court Judge disallowed the plaintiffs claim for Rs. 215-14-0 as claimed by him in the plaint, the said sum being inclusive of the alleged principal amount of Rs. 180/- and interest. The learned Small Cause Court Judge instead granted, in favour of the plaintiff, a decree for Rs. 72/- including interest on the basis that the defendants received only Rs. 60/- and not Rs. 180/- as aforesaid.

3. Mr. H. G. Panda, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner contended that it was not normal human conduct to silently wait for two years since the execution of the promissory note, for the alleged balance of the consideration money for the said promissory note which, according to the defendants, was never paid by the plaintiff. The other circumstance, on which the learned Counsel relied, was that even after notice before the suit, the defendants did not care to reply and take the defence which they subsequently took in the written statement after the suit was filed. This, indeed, shows that the subsequent defence taken by them was a mere after-thought and therefore this defence should not have been accepted by the learned Small Cause Court Judge. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the provisions of Section 113 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which provides that until the contrary is proved, the presumption shall be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration.

Even so, it was open to the learned Small Cause Court Judge to accept the evidence of the defence witnesses and grant a decree only for the amount proved to have been actually paid by the plaintiff to the defendants as consideration for the promissory note in suit. It appears that the learned Small Cause Court Judge took the view that the defendants had succeeded in rebutting the presumption which the plaintiff claimed in his favour under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, The learned Counsel for the plaintiff also cited a decision of the Bombay High Court in Tarmahommed Haji Abdul Rehman v. Tyeb Ebrahim Bharamchari, AIR 1949 Bom 257 where it was held that Section 118 raises a statutory presumption in favour of there being consideration for every negotiable instrument. The Bombay High Court made it perfectly clear that if a particular consideration is mentioned in the negotiable instrument and that consideration is found to be false and some other consideration is set up, that is a factor which the Court would take into consideration in deciding whether the defendant has discharged the burden cast upon him by Section 118.

It is one thing to say that the plaintiff has failed to prove a particular consideration for a certain promissory note; it is entirely different thing to say that it was proved that there was no consideration at all for the promissory note. In the present case the learned Small Cause Court Judge, on appreciation of evidence, was right in granting a decree for the amount of consideration proved to have been actually paid as consideration for the promissory note. There is no dispute as to the position in law thatthe plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of such presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The presumption that is raised under Section 118 is not in respect of the consideration mentioned in the negotiable instrument.

The presumption is in favour of there being a consideration for the negotiable instrument, any consideration that is a valid consideration in law. The question is whether on the evidence, the learned Small Cause Court Judge was justified -- and I think, he was justified -- in accepting the defence case that only Rs. 60- and not Rs. 180/- as mentioned in the promissory note was actually paid. The Bombay decision cited above is no authority for the proposition, -- sought to be urged on behalf of the plaintiff, -- that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration mentioned in the negotiable instrument. There is no warrant for importing into Section 118 words which the legislature did not think fit to incorporate in that section. With great respect, I agree with the principles underlying the Bombay High Court decision.

4. In this view of the matter, I uphold the decision of the learned Small Cause Court Judge and accordingly this revision is dismissed, but withoutcosts.

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