Govind Singh Vs. Sunita Devi

- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture..........about 3 years, she renewed her prayer alleging that the husband has again neglected to maintain her and minor child. the only objection raised by the applicant is that in view of the first order of maintenance, the second application did not lie in law. he has placed reliance on a supreme court decision in mahua v. biswas, 1998 (1) mpwn 186.3. the apex court in the aforesaid decision held :'the matter can be viewed from either angle. it can be viewed that there was a genuine effort by wife to rehabilitate herself in her matrimonial home but in vain. the previous orders of maintenance in a manner of speaking could at best be taken to have been suspended but not wiped out altogether. the other view can be that the maintenance order stood exhausted and thus she be left to fight a new litigation on a fresh cause of action. out of the two courses, we would prefer to adopt the first one, for if we were to resort to the second option, it would lead to injustice.'4. it will be thus seen that the second application by the wife was not barred. in any case either the earlier order of maintenance stood revived and could also be modified by the magistrate to suit the present needs of the wife and the child. in alternative, the wife could renew her prayer on fresh cause of action and make fresh application for maintenance. the orders impugned, therefore, do not suffer with any illegality calling for any interference by this court under section 482, cr.p.c.5. this petition thus fails and is dismissed.