Chhanga Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

Chhanga vs State of Madhya Pradesh

Disposition Revision dismissed Court Madhya Pradesh Decided Jan 29, 2003

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Citation: sooperkanoon.com/510839
Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Judge: S.L. Jain, J.
Decided On: Jan 29, 2003
Case Number: Cr. R. No. 1066 of 2002
Subject: Criminal
Disposition: Revision dismissed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Criminal - Revisional Power - Section 304 A of Indian Penal Code, 1860(IPC) - Appellant convicted for offence under Section 304A of IPC - Appellant filed appeal before first appellate court - Dismissed - Hence, present revision - Held, on careful perusal of judgments of both Courts below, not find any defect or erro...

Key legal issue: Criminal
Outcome / disposition: Revision dismissed
Acts & sections: Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 304A

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Chhanga

Advocate N.C. Beohar, Adv.

Respondent

State of Madhya Pradesh

Advocate Arup K. Das, P.L.

Legal References

Acts: Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 304A
Cases Referred: Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab
Reported In: 2003CriLJ4306

Excerpt

.....interferes only when substantial question arises or where material error affects decision or when order is without jurisdiction - however, in present case, both courts below have assessed evidence properly and concluded that appellant was driving truck rashly and negligently and causing death of deceased - therefore, order of conviction confirmed - revision dismissed - section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the..........after due investigation, a challan was filed against the petitioner in the court of judicial magistrate first class, rewa.3. a charge for offence punishable under section 304a of indian penal code was framed by the trial magistrate against the petitioner. the petitioner abjured the guilt. his defence is that the accident occurred due to mechanical failure. when he was going towards govindgarh, near village amiliki, the steering system of the vehicle failed, therefore, the control on the vehicle was lost.4. the learned trial magistrate, after concluding the trial, believed the prosecution case and convicted the petitioner for the offence punishable under section 304a of indian penal code and sentenced him to the extent as indicated above. on appeal being filed against the judgment and order of trial magistrate, the learned additional sessions judge, rewa, by the impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal and maintained the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial magistrate against the petitioner. the petitioner, thereafter, challenging the judgment and order of the courts below came up before this court in this revision.5. i have heard shri n. c. beohar, learned counsel, appearing for petitioner and shri arup k. das, learned panel lawyer, appearing for the state/respondent; and perused the record.6. ramdeen (p.w. 3) has stated that on the relevant date he was sitting by the side of the main road to see of his relations. his son avaneesh was also present there. they were sitting by the side of the road at a distance of 3 feet from the road. the accused was driving his truck rashly and negligently. the truckman over avaneesh. the petitioner was driving the vehicle so rashly and negligently that he could not apply the brakes. even after crushing the child, the petitioner did not stop the vehicle and carried it to a distance of 3 k.ms. and, thereafter, ran away. this witness is supported by the evidence of ramlal (p.w. 1) and babulal (p.w. 2). these.....

Full Judgment

ORDER

S.L. Jain, J.

1. Petitioner Chhanga stands convicted for the offences punishable under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to R.I. for one year and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to undergo further R.I. for one month vide Impugned judgment dated 27-8-2002, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa, in Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 2002 arising out of the judgment and order dated 26-4-2002, passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rewa, in Criminal Case No. 194 of 1997.

2. The facts of the case which lead to conviction are that on the relevant date, Ramdeen Vishwakarma, along with his son aged 8 years, came on the road to see his relations. He was standing by the side of the road near the shop of Chhotelal and was talking to Jagdish Patel. His son Avaneesh Vishwakarma was also standing on the side of the road. Truck No. MP-27-G/2205. being driven by the petitioner hit Avaneesh Vishwakarma consequently. Avaneesh fell down and died instantaneously. According to the prosecution, the petitioner was driving the truck rashly and negligently. After the accident, the petitioner ran away from the place of occurrence leaving the truck there. Ramdeen asked his cousin Babulal to lodge the report. Babulal lodged report Ex. P-1 at P. S. Govindgarh. After due investigation, a challan was filed against the petitioner in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rewa.

3. A charge for offence punishable under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code was framed by the trial Magistrate against the petitioner. The petitioner abjured the guilt. His defence is that the accident occurred due to mechanical failure. When he was going towards Govindgarh, near village Amiliki, the steering system of the vehicle failed, therefore, the control on the vehicle was lost.

4. The learned trial Magistrate, after concluding the trial, believed the prosecution case and convicted the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to the extent as Indicated above. On appeal being filed against the Judgment and order of trial Magistrate, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa, by the impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal and maintained the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Magistrate against the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, challenging the judgment and order of the Courts below came up before this Court in this revision.

5. I have heard Shri N. C. Beohar, learned counsel, appearing for petitioner and Shri Arup K. Das, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the State/respondent; and perused the record.

6. Ramdeen (P.W. 3) has stated that on the relevant date he was sitting by the side of the main road to see of his relations. His son Avaneesh was also present there. They were sitting by the side of the road at a distance of 3 feet from the road. The accused was driving his truck rashly and negligently. The truckman over Avaneesh. The petitioner was driving the vehicle so rashly and negligently that he could not apply the brakes. Even after crushing the child, the petitioner did not stop the vehicle and carried it to a distance of 3 K.Ms. and, thereafter, ran away. This witness is supported by the evidence of Ramlal (P.W. 1) and Babulal (P.W. 2). These witnesses have also stated that the petitioner was driving the offending truck rashly and negligently. He knocked down the said Avaneesh who was crushed to death. Both the Courts-below relied on the evidence of these witnesses.

7. The learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner, argued that the accident occurred due to the failure of steering system of the offending vehicle, but this plea was repelled by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. The accident happened within a residential area hence, it was necessary for the petitioner to be greatly circumspect while driving the motor vehicle, but the same was not adhered to by the petitioner and his carelessness resulted in the Instantaneous death of a young boy who was crushed under the wheels of the vehicle.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that Ata Mohammad Khan (P.W. 7), who examined the offending truck-has stated that steering system of the vehicle was out of order, light system was also broken by the crowd, but it cannot be ignored that the accident occurred on 26-6-97 and the witness examined the vehicle on 28-6-97, therefore, the possibility of causing damage to the steering system by the petitioner himself with a view to create a defence cannot be ruled out. It is also possible that the steering system was damaged by the crowd which was responsible for breaking the light system. Ramdeen (P,W, 3) has unequivocally stated that after knocking down Avaneesh, petitioner stopped the truck at a distance of 3 Kms and ran away. If the steering system of the vehicle was out of order, it would not have been possible of the petitioner to drive the vehicle up to a distance of 3 Kms. Jagdish (P.W. 4) has also stated that after crushing the child the truck moved ahead.

9. Ramlal (P.W. 1), Babulal (P.W, 2), Ramdeen (P.W. 3) and Jagdish (P.W. 4) have stated that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed. Had there been a failure in the steering system, the natural conduct of the petitioner would have been to immediately stop the vehicle by applying the brakes. Therefore, the defence of the petitioner that the accident occurred due to mechanical failure cannot be accepted.

10. Relying on Badri Prasad Tiwari v. The State, 1994 Cr LJ 389 (Orissa) and Guru Charan Singh v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, 1991 Cr LJ 771 (Him Pra). Shri Beohar submitted that mere statements of witnesses that the truck was being driven in high speed does not indicate rashness of the driver. But, in this case witnesses have clearly stated that the truck was waiving while going in high speed.

11. On careful perusal of the record and judgments of both the Courts below, I do not find any glaring defect or error in the procedure or in the view of law or evidence taken leading to flagrant miscarriage of justice. It is true that the revisional power of this Court are very wide but they are purely discretionary and they must be exercised not as a matter of course but only to meet the ends of justice. This Court ordinarily interferes only when substantial question arises or where a material error affects the decision or when the order is without jurisdiction.

12. Both the Courts below have assessed the evidence properly and concluded that, the petitioner was driving the truck rashly and negligently and causing the death of Avaneesh. The concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below on an appreciation of evidence does not call for any interference in this revision. I therefore, confirm the order of conviction.

13. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the accident occurred in the year 1997 and more than five years have elapsed, therefore, in this circumstance of the case the sentence awarded to the petitioner is harsh. Accused had already been in jail for a sufficient period and as such it would meet the ends of justice if the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon the petitioner is reduced to that already undergone by him. In this connection, he relied on Sukhdev Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 2 SCC 439.

14. Because of rash and negligent driving by the petitioner a young boy of 8 years was crushed under the wheel. In these circumstances, it will not be proper and suitable to take a lenient view while awarding the sentence. The Courts must bear in mind that road accidents have proliferated to alarming extent and toll is galloping up day by day. More people die of road accidents than by most diseases. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code one of the prime consideration should be deterrence. A driver of a heavy vehicle must know that he cannot afford a single moment of laxity. He must always keep in mind a fear that if he is convicted for callous driving, he cannot escape from jail sentence.

15. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the case, where the driver is guilty of callous driving in the residential area and knocking down a young boy of 8 years and crushing him under the wheels of the vehicles, no leniency in the matter of imposing sentence can be shown. The punishment must be commensurate with the offence. The sentence of R.I. for one year and a fine of Rs. 500/- imposed by the Courts below cannot be said to be unreasonable.

16. In view of the aforesaid, there is no justification for any interference in this revision. The revision fails and is dismissed accordingly. The petitioner, who is on bail, is directed to surrender himself before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rewa on or before 18-2-2003 on which date the CJM shall send the petitioner to jail to undergo the remaining part of the sentence as imposed upon him by the Courts below and his bail bonds and surety bonds shall be discharged. In case the petitioner does not appear before C.J.M. Rawa as directed above, the C.J.M. shall take necessary steps to ensure his presence. A copy of this order be sent to C.J.M. Rewa.

Same Court & Year Madhya Pradesh · 2003 Same Parties Chhanga vs State of Madhya Pradesh Same Subject Criminal Same Judge S.L. Jain, J. Acts & Sections Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 304A

Criminal