Full Judgment
N.K. Jain, J.
1. This revision is directed against the order dated 22-9-2001 passed by the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Neemuch in S.T. No. 204/2000 framing charges under Sections 27 and 29 of the M.P. Vinirdishta Bhrastha Acharan Nivaran Adhiniyam, 1982 and overruling the objection raised by the accused-applicants as to the tenability of the prosecution.
2. The offences in question are said to have been committed in between 17-1-1989 and 20-2-1995. Initially the charge-sheet was filed directly in the Sessions Court in the year 1997. However, the charge-sheet was returned to the prosecution on 31-8-2000 for being presented before the Magistrate for committing the case to the Court of Sessions. The charge-sheet was accordingly represented before the CJM, Neemuch on 31-8-2000 who in turn committed the case to the Sessions Court and which ultimately led to passing of the impugned order giving rise to this revision.
3. It is a common ground that both the aforesaid provisions i.e.,Sections 27 and 29 of the M.P. Adhiniyam, 1982 have been omitted w.e.f. 13-5-1998. It will be, thus, seen that these penal provisions were not inexistence on the book of statute on the date when the charge-sheet was filed and when the charges were framed against the applicants.
4. This Court relying on a Supreme Court decision in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. (AIR 2000 SC 811) on more than one occasions has held that in view of the omission of the said penal provisions and in absence of any saving clause no prosecution under those provisions would survive. In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd.'s case (supra) it was clearly held :--
'The position is well-known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to be obliterate it from the statute book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6 (1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 or in special acts may modify the position. Thus, the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case where a particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the Legislature is that the pending proceedings shall not continued but a fresh proceeding for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision.'
5. In the instant case also the Legislature while omitting Sections 27 and 29 from the M.P. Adhiniyam, 1982, did not provide for any saving clause to save the pending prosecutions. That being so, no prosecution under the aforesaid provisions could be launched or continued after 13-5-1998. The impugned order as also the entire prosecution against the accused applicants, thus, deserve to be quashed.
6. Accordingly this revision succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order as also the subsequent proceedings initiated against the petitioners are quashed.
7. In order to avoid recurrence of such litigations it is directed that the copy of this order be circulated to all the Sessions Courts in the Stale for future guidance.
8. C.C. to both the parties.