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Ashraf Ali Vs. State of U.P. and ors.

Ashraf Ali vs State of U.P. and ors.

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided May 05, 2008
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/493467

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Citation
Court
Allahabad High Court
Judge
Decided On
Subject
Service

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 [C.A. No. 1/1894]. Section 4; [Sushil Harkauli, S.K. Singh & Krishna Murari, JJ] Acquisition of land Held, Court cannot issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the State Authorities to acquire a particular land. Land acquisition is not purely ministerial act to be performed by executive No...

Key legal issue
Service

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Ashraf Ali

Advocate Sri. G.K. Singh

Respondent

State of U.P. and ors.

Legal References

Reported In
[2008(117)FLR927]

Excerpt

.....the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. .....the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualifications to be appointed.2. according to learned counsel for the respondents the approval order dated 21.8.1995 itself was conditional and the approval was granted on the ground that if any such fact contrary comes to his notice the approval would automatically stand withdrawn. they therefore state that when the fact that the petitioner was not eligible for appointment came to the knowledge of the authorities the impugned order has been passed. sri jitendra singh states that since the year 1996 sri mahfooz qazi has been complaining relating to appointment of the petitioner illegally and it is only now that the district inspector of schools has considered the complaint and passed the impugned order, therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order has been passed after 13 years of appointment of the petitioner.3. sri g.k. singh contended that the impugned order in any case is liable to be set aside since no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, while directing to proceed with cancellation of his appointment and stopping the salary of the petitioner, lie states that the impugned order has been passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice which is required to be given in accordance with section 16-e(10) of the u.p. intermediate education act.4. having considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order it appears that no notice was given to the petitioner nor any opportunity was extended to him prior to passing the same. for this reason alone the impugned order cannot be said to have been passed in a fair manner since any civil consequences which may be visited upon the petitioner are to be made only after affording an opportunity to him. therefore without going into the merits of the dispute raised by either of the parties the impugned order is liable to be set aside for having been passed in violation of principles of natural.....

Full Judgment

Sanjay Misra, J.

1. Heard Sri G.K. Singh learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for respondent No. 1 and 2 Sri Jitendra Singh on behalf of Sri. Mahfooz Qazi (complainant who has not been made a party in the writ petition).

According to learned Counsel for the petitioner the petitioner was given appointment as Assistant Teacher in Muslim Qudrat Inter College, Seohara, District Bijnor on the vacancy created due to promotion of one Sri Shamim Ahmad Zaidi and by an order dated 21.8.1995 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Bijnor the approval to his appointment was duly given. According to the petitioner upon the complaint of one Sri Mahfooz Qaji who claims to be the member of the committee the District Inspector of Schools has proceeded and passed the impugned order directing for cancelling the appointment of the petitioner and stepping his salary on the ground that at the time of appointment in the year 1995 the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualifications to be appointed.

2. According to learned Counsel for the respondents the approval order dated 21.8.1995 itself was conditional and the approval was granted on the ground that if any such fact contrary comes to his notice the approval would automatically stand withdrawn. They therefore state that when the fact that the petitioner was not eligible for appointment came to the knowledge of the authorities the impugned order has been passed. Sri Jitendra Singh states that since the year 1996 Sri Mahfooz Qazi has been complaining relating to appointment of the petitioner illegally and it is only now that the District Inspector of Schools has considered the complaint and passed the impugned order, therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order has been passed after 13 years of appointment of the petitioner.

3. Sri G.K. Singh contended that the impugned order in any case is liable to be set aside since no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, while directing to proceed with cancellation of his appointment and stopping the salary of the petitioner, lie states that the impugned order has been passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice which is required to be given in accordance with Section 16-E(10) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act.

4. Having considered the submission of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order it appears that no notice was given to the petitioner nor any opportunity was extended to him prior to passing the same. For this reason alone the impugned order cannot be said to have been passed in a fair manner since any civil consequences which may be visited upon the petitioner are to be made only after affording an opportunity to him. Therefore without going into the merits of the dispute raised by either of the parties the impugned order is liable to be set aside for having been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. For the aforesaid reasons the impugned order dated 16.4.2008 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition) stands set aide and the competent authority is required to consider the complaint of Sri Mahfooz Qazi in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the petitioner and any other person who would be otherwise interested in the same preferably within two months.

The writ petition stands allowed to the above extent. No order is passed as to costs.

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