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Sanjay Kumar Vs. U.P. State and ors.

Sanjay Kumar vs U.P. State and ors.

Disposition Petition allowed Court Allahabad Decided Jul 07, 2003
~3 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/490824

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Citation
Court
Allahabad High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1772 (S/S) of 1997
Subject
Service
Disposition
Petition allowed

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

- LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 [C.A. No. 1/1894]. Section 4; [Sushil Harkauli, S.K. Singh & Krishna Murari, JJ] Acquisition of land Held, Court cannot issue a Writ of Mandamus directing the State Authorities to acquire a particular land. Land acquisition is not purely ministerial act to be performed by executive No...

Key legal issue
Service
Outcome / disposition
Petition allowed
Acts & sections
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 147, 323, 504 and 506

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Sanjay Kumar

Advocate H.G.S. Parihar, Adv.

Respondent

U.P. State and ors.

Legal References

Acts
Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 147, 323, 504 and 506
Reported In
(2003)3UPLBEC2193

Excerpt

.....acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. - but has been released on probation of good conduct......of which goes to show that though the petitioner has been held guilty of the offence under section 323 i.p.c. but has been released on probation of good conduct. section 12 of the probation of offenders act, 1958, which is applicable in the state and to the district of raebareli to which the case pertains, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law, provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence. in view of the said provision, the conviction of the petitioner under section 323 i.p.c., shall not entail any disqualification to the petitioner for being appointed on the post of constable. it is admitted to the parties that all candidates selected, except the petitioner, have been given appointment and the petitioner has been denied appointment only on the ground of the aforesaid f.i.r., having been lodged against him. i am afraid if on this ground alone the appointment of the petitioner could have been refused. i, therefore, find that the communication,annexure-2 to the petitioner, sent by the opposite party no. 3 to the petitioner is not legally sustainable and is liable to be quashed.5. the writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order. annexure-2 to the petition, is hereby quashed. the opposite party no. 3 is directed to appoint the petitioner on the post of constable if there is no other reason or ground on which the appointment of the petitioner can be refused.6. in the circumstances of the case, i make no order as to costs.

Full Judgment

Y.R. Tripathi, J.

1. This petition has been filed for quashing the letter dated December 1, 1996 (Anncxurc-2) sent by the opposite party No. 3 to the petitioner informing him that he was not found fit for appointment.

2. It appears that the petitioner had applied for being appointed as Constable in P.A.C. and he alongwith certain other candidates was ultimately selected for appointment. Thereafter papers were sent for Police verification, in which it was found that an F.I.R. at Crime No. 40/96 under Sections 147, 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. was registered against the petitioner. The opposite party No. 3, on the basis of this information, held that the petitioner was not fit to be appointed and he accordingly issued the impugned letter which was served on the petitioner through the local Police. The petitioner has assailed the impugned Setter on the ground that mere lodging of the F.I.R, was not sufficient to hold him unfit for being appointed as Constable. The opposite parties have, in their counter-affidavit, sought to justify the impugned latter.

3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the materials on record.

4. It was conceded before me that the selection process had been completed before 20.3.1996 and the F.I.R. on the basis of which the petitioner was held unfit for appointment, was lodged on 16.5.1996. I am afraid if lodging of the F.I.R. alone is sufficient to disentitle one to appointment to a post in a Government Office. The petitioner has also filed a copy of the judgment in Crime No. 40/96 as Annexure RA-3 to the rejoinder-affidavit, a perusal of which goes to show that though the petitioner has been held guilty of the offence under Section 323 I.P.C. but has been released on probation of good conduct. Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which is applicable in the State and to the District of Raebareli to which the case pertains, provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law, provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under Section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence. In view of the said provision, the conviction of the petitioner under Section 323 I.P.C., shall not entail any disqualification to the petitioner for being appointed on the post of Constable. It is admitted to the parties that all candidates selected, except the petitioner, have been given appointment and the petitioner has been denied appointment only on the ground of the aforesaid F.I.R., having been lodged against him. I am afraid if on this ground alone the appointment of the petitioner could have been refused. I, therefore, find that the communication,Annexure-2 to the petitioner, sent by the opposite party No. 3 to the petitioner is not legally sustainable and is liable to be quashed.

5. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order. Annexure-2 to the petition, is hereby quashed. The opposite party No. 3 is directed to appoint the petitioner on the post of Constable if there is no other reason or ground on which the appointment of the petitioner can be refused.

6. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.

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