Sudhansu Kumar and anr. Vs. Vice Chairman, Varanasi Development Authority and ors.

.....the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. ravi s. dhavan and v.p. goel, jj.1. this matter had been heard on 16.2.1999. a final order had been passed relegating the petitioners to an alternative remedy. but learned counsel for petitioners mr. ashok bhushan made a request to the court that perhaps the alternative remedy relegated is not an alternative remedy, and he may be permitted to submit further, notwithstanding the order of 16.2.1999. suffice it to say that the order of 16.2.1999 was virtually an order by consent to enable the petitioner to an alternative remedy under section 41, as suggested.2. permission to submit further was granted and, in the circumstances, the matter has been put up today.3. now it has been urged, regard being had to the circumstances, that section 15 has been an amendment by insertion of clause (9), there is no recourse the petitioner can take to, and the order impugned is a final order. thus, the contention is that even the remedy under sub-section (3) of section 41 is not available. the court has considered the submissions as have been made today.4. the court has seen the amendment which has been brought into the act. the amendment is by insertion of sub-section (9) to section 15. the proviso to sub-section (9) is not alien to sub-section (5) of section 15. therefore, any action which has been taken under sub-section (9) of any permission which may have been granted under section 15, an appeal as provided in sub-section (5), will also lie in matters of sub-section (9).5. the petitioners may take recourse to an alternative remedy provided under sub-section (5) of section 15, for which 30 days time is already provided under the act. as the court has already placed on record that the petitioner would have three weeks as prayed from 16.2.1999, this period will still be available to the petitioner as from today. petition decided accordingly.