Full Judgment
Sudhir Narain, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 22.7.1996 passed by the Prescribed Authority, respondent No. 1 allowing the application filed by the landlord-respondent No. 2 for delivery of possession of the disputed shop.
2. Priya Dutt, respondent No. 2, the landlord of the shop in dispute filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972 (in short the Act) for release of the disputed shop against the petitioner-tenant with the allegations that he requires the disputed shop bona fide. The petitioner entered into compromise on 16.2.1985 wherein he admitted that the landlord-respondent No. 2 bona fide needs the disputed shop for the purpose of business but he stated that he may be permitted to continue to carry on business for life as he was aged about 62 years and was a patient of diabetes and blood pressure. There was a further clausein the compromise that in case the tenant sub-lets it or accepts any person as a partner, it will be open to the landlord to take immediate possession of the shop in question. The Prescribed Authority decided the application in terms of the compromise on 26.7.1985.
3. Respondent No. 2 filed application under Section 23 of the Act on 29.9.1993 with the allegations that the petitioner had sub-let the shop in question to respondent No. 3 and he was entitled to obtain possession from him in terms of the compromise as accepted by the Court vide its order dated 16.2.1985. The petitioner-submitted objection taking the plea that the application was not maintainable. He further denied that he had sub-let the shop in question to respondent No. 3. The application has been allowed by the Prescribed Authority by the impugned order dated 22.7.1996 directing the petitioner to hand over the possession on the finding that the petitioner had passed on possession of the disputed shop to respondent No. 3 exclusively.
4. Sri S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner has made three submissions challenging the said order passed by the Prescribed Authority.
5. His first submission is that the order passed by the Prescribed Authority releasing the disputed accommodation in favour of respondent No. 2 on the basis of the compromise between the parties was invalid and void under law. It is contended that the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act can be allowed only when the Prescribed Authority finds that the need of the landlord is bona fide and genuine. He has placed reliance upon the decision K. N. Bhargava v. District Judge, Kanpur and others. 1984 (2) ARC 588, wherein it was held that it is the duty of the Prescribed Authority to consider the question of bona fide need before deciding the application on the basis of compromise. If the tenant, himself admits in the compromise that the need of the landlord of the premises in questionis bona fide, it shall be taken that the Prescribed Authority has accepted the version of the parties. A fact which is admitted by the parties is not to be proved. Section 58 of the Evidence Act provides that no fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings. The petitioner had admitted that the need of the landlord-respondent No. 2 was bona fide and genuine. In these circumstances, it shall be taken that the Prescribed Authority applied its mind in respect to the pleadings of the parties and allowed the application for release on the ground that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine. The petitioner only wanted time to vacate the premises and that time was granted to him. In Rama Shankar Tewart v. Ram Raghubir Jaiswal and others, 1993 (2) ARC 548, it has been held that if by a compromise a tenant was permitted about two years' time for searching accommodation and thereafter vacating the premises, he cannot turn-round after taking advantage of the compromise and challenge the order of compromise when it was sought to be executed by the landlord on tenant's refusal to vacate. The petitioner having taken advantage under the compromise and continued to occupy the accommodation accepted for about 10 years, now cannot urge that the order passed on the compromise was invalid.
6. It is next contended that the objection raised in the execution proceedings involves disputed questions of fact and the same cannot be decided in an application filed under Section 23 of the Act. An order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act can be enforced by him under Section 23 of the Act. If any person has any objection he can raise objection before the Prescribed Authority and he is to consider it judicially aftergiving opportunity of hearing and to lead evidence in support of the objection. The objection may be by the tenant against whom the order was passed by the Prescribed Authority or by any third person whose right may be affected if the order is enforced against such person. In Chhakki Lal v. IIIrd, Additional District Judge, Mainpuri and others, 1977 (UP) RCC 39, it was held that the Prescribed Authority has Jurisdiction to make enquiry in respect to the objections raised before him before he enforces the order passed by him under Section 23 of the Act.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision Bibekananda Bhowal (dead) by L.Rs. v. Satindra Mohan Deb (dead) by L.Rs., AIR 1996 SC 1985, wherein it was held that where the compromise decree between the parties provided that the defendants would be liable to be evicted from suit land after expiry of 10 years 'by appropriate action in court of law', the plaintiffs can eject the defendants from the suit land in their possession by taking appropriate legal action by filing a suit for ejectment or in any other manner as may be permissible in law but not by applying for execution of the compromise decree. In this case, the compromise itself provided that the eviction can be done by appropriate action in court of law. Secondly, this was a compromise decree in a suit and if there is a dispute on the question of facts, the compromise decree can be decreed only by filing a fresh suit as non-compliance of the terms of decree gives a fresh cause of action and the facts stated by a party is to be decided in the suit. This principle will not be applicable when the parties enforce an order passed by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21 of the Act by filing an application before the said authority under Section 23 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority will have jurisdiction to consider the objections raised by the parties before it.
8. The last submission is that the respondent No. 2 failed to provethat the disputed shop was sub-let by the petitioner to respondent No. 3. The Prescribed Authority, on consideration of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the petitioner has given exclusive possession of the disputed shop to respondent No. 3. Respondent is carrying on business in the name of 'Kaveri Emporium'. It is registered with the authority concerned. It was not proved by the petitioner that it was being run by him. On the other hand, the documentary evidence established that it was run by respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 3 had deposited requisite fee for registration in the name of M/s. Kaveri Emporium before the Labour Commissioner. Secondly, in Suit No. 16 of 1992 (Anand Pal v. Chandra Pal Singh and another). It was held that Jugul Kishore was sub-tenant of the petitioner. Thirdly, the respondent No. 3 filed suit against respondent No. 2 for injunction alleging that he was tenant of the shop in question. The contention of the petitioner was that the said suit was a collusive one but on examining the entire fact, it has been found that the petitioner has transferred possession of the shop in question to respondent No. 3. It is a finding based on assessment of evidence. I do not find that there is any legal infirmity in this finding.
9. In view of the above, there is no merit in the writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
10. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.