Ramdhari Vs. Jodhan and ors.

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........seeking a relief for cancellation in effect and in reality was a suit for declaration of title, thus cognizable by a revenue court does not appear to be legally sound. the plaintiff opted for the relief of cancellation of the said sale-deed, the mere fact that he could have filed a suit for declaration of his rights before the revenue court will not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court in trying the suit as framed by the plaintiff which is cognizable only by it and not by the revenue court. i am not concerned whether on merits the plaintiff will succeed or deserves to obtain the specific relief claimed; that would be a question for consideration in the suit. the court be-low seems to have confused the two concepts. the jurisdiction of a court is always determined by allegations in the plaint. it may be that under the same set of circumstances a plaintiff is entitled to two different kinds of remedies. if he chooses one kind of remedy which can be granted only by the civil court, his plaint ought not to be returned by the civil court for the reason that he ought to have chosen the second kind of remedy which could only be granted by the revenue court.3. learned counsel for the defendants-respondents referred to the full bench case of ram awalamb v. jata shankar, 1968 all li 1108 = (air 1969 all 526), mewa v. baldeo, 1966 all lj 1084 = (air 1967 all 358) and rasool ahmad v. beni prasad, 1965 all lj 70 = (air 1965 all 514). i do not find any thing laid down in the three cases cited which goes against the view i have taken above; rather the observations in the case of mewa v. baldeo (supra) which has been approved by the full bench of ram awalamb v. jata shankar (supra) support my view.4. for the reasons given above, i allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and remand the case to the court of first instance for trial and decision in accordance with law. the plaintiff appellant shall be entitled to his costs of this appeal.