Mahadei Vs. Baldeo

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as.....john stanley, c.j. and william burkitt, j.1. the decision of the learned judge of this court against which this appeal is preferred is wholly opposed to the principle laid down in a judgment of a division bench of this court in the case of gobind krishna narain v. khunni lal (1907) i.l.r. 29 all. 487. in that case the court held, following earlier rulings and citing the leading case of stapilton v. stapilton (1739) 1 w. and t. 230, that a compromise made by a person holding a hindu widow's or hindu daughter's estate in the property of a deceased husband or father is not binding on the reversioners, even though it has been followed by a decree of court, and that the reversioners can only be bound by a decree made after a full contest in a bond fide litigation. this case was not reported until the 20th of may 1907, and does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned judge. the fact that the property-involved is of little value is a matter which cannot be taken into consideration in determining the rights of the parties. in view of the ruling above referred to we must allow the appeal. we set aside the decree of the learned judge of this court and restore the decree of the lower appellate court with costs in all courts.