Harjas Vs. Kanhya

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........as to the whole of such one-fifth, and the only question is, whether he can do so. the lower courts proceeded on the view that he is not entitled to impeach the sale of the 22nd june 1882, except in its entirety, and they appear to have thought that the converse of the rule laid down by this court in the case already adverted to was necessarily binding on them. this was an error, probably due to misapprehension of the principle upon which a co-sharer who has associated a stranger with him in the purchase of a share, is not allowed to assert his own pre-emptive right to defeat a suit by another co-sharer who impeaches the sale as a whole. the grounds upon which this rule rests are pointed out by mahmood, j., in bhawani prasad v. damrua i.l.r. 5 all. 197. in the present case, the plaintiff-appellant might have attacked the entire sale in respect of all the five vendees, and have treated the four co-sharers as strangers, but there was no obligation on him to do so, for the right of pre-emption which gives a co-sharer the first call, so as to enable him to exclude a stranger from the co-parcenary, does not compel him to exercise his right, and he may relinquish it if he thinks proper. if, however, he does exercise it, then the obligation rests upon him to do so as to all that the stranger has purchased.2. hence, if a co-sharer associates a stranger with him in the purchase of a share, another co-sharer is entitled to pre-empt the whole of the property sold, but it is not obligatory upon him to impeach the sale so far as the co-sharer-vendee is concerned, for it may well be that he has no desire to exclude such co-sharer. we think that the plaintiff-appellant was entitled to prefer his present claim in respect of the one-fifth purchased by kanhya, upon payment of his proportion of the purchase-money. in this view of the case, we decree the appeal, and, reversing the decision of the lower appellate court, remand the case for trial on its merits.