Onkar Mal Vs. Ashiq Ali

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........and onkar mal offered the inducement of withdrawing that complaint. it is a fact that a criminal prosecution on some petty theft was pending in the criminal court and the case was withdrawn on the day that the compromise was entered into. the fact that the case was withdrawn indicates that the charge of theft must be of a trifling nature. the only relevant matter in the judgment of the lower appellate court is the last para, printed at page 18 of the printed record. it held that undue influence was not proved. it, however, thought out a new case for the plaintiff and held that the compromise failed because it was void. it held it to be void, because it was a stifling of a criminal prosecution.3. the compromise as held by the trial court was a very fair one. onkar mal was in possession of three bighas in excess of his one anna share. the plaintiff was the owner of the seven anna share. this seven anna share had been leased to another person by the plaintiff's vendor prior to the sale in favour of the plaintiff. under the compromise the lessee gave up possession, though it was arranged that for the period of the lease he was to receive the profits of the seven anna share of the property. as to the three bighas in possession of onkar mal in excess of his share, he promised under the compromise to pay rent for it to the plaintiff. one of the motives for that compromise may have been the withdrawal of the criminal case, but it cannot be said to be the only motive. there was no unfairness in the agreement between the parties. when a withdrawal of a criminal case of a trifling nature like the one pending against the plaintiff's servants is one of the motives for a compromise, it would not follow that the compromise would for that reason be void. in dwijendra nath mullick v. gopi ram gobindaram a.i.r. 1926 cal. 59, a bench of the calcutta high court held that where the withdrawal of a prosecution was the motive but not the object or the consideration of the.....