Munno and ors. Vs. Gopi Nath

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........said above, that these constructions obstruct the view of their shops from the road. the court below has decreed the claim. it is contended in this appeal that a suit like this is not maintainable. in my judgment the contention is well founded. it is now settled law that no action will lie for the obstruction of the prospect of a house. there is no question in this case of obstruction to or diminution of light and air. the only right claimed is that the plaintiffs are entitled to undisturbed prospect of their shop from the road. in smith v. owen (1866) 35 l.j., ch., 317 it was held that the court will hot restrain the erection of buildings which merely prevent goods displayed in a shop from being seen from places whence they would previously have been seen. in butt v. imperial gas company (1866) l.r., 2 ch., 158, it was held that the erection of a building will not be restrained because it injures the plaintiff by obstructing the view of his place of business. the law on the subject is clearly stated in goddard on easements, sixth edition, pages 116 to 118. the principle laid down in the english cases referred to above equally applies to cases arising in this country. it is admitted that access to the plaintiffs' shops has not been obstructed. all that is complained of is the interruption to the view of the shops from the neighbouring road. this would not entitle the plaintiffs to have the constructions removed. it is said that by reason of these constructions the letting value of the plaintiffs' shops has been diminished. if that is so, the plaintiffs may have a remedy in damages. but as no damages were claimed in this case, that question need not be considered and determined. as the ground upon which the plaintiffs ask for a decree for removal of the shed and screens is untenable, the suit must fail. i accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the courts below, and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs in all courts.