Lachho Vs. Maya Ram and ors.

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........plaintiff relies as her ground of action, she is not entitled to recover the property. the clause is as follows:-- 'each sharer is by all means at liberty to transfer his right and share, but first of all the transfer should be effected by him in favour of his own brothers and nephews who may be sharers, and in case of their refusal in favour of the other owners of the thoke: if they refuse to make the purchase, the transfer may be effected in favour of any one.' the plaintiff does not come under the first description of persons named who have a right of preemption, and it only remains to be seen if she is a sharer in the vendor's thoke. it is shown from the record-of-rights, and there is no dispute on this point, that there are three thokes in this mouza, namely, the thoke of ibrahim ali khan, vendor, the thoke of musammat lachho, plaintiff, and the thoke of musammat bhawani. each of these thokes comprised a certain amount of the land of the mouza, which has been divided and formed into separate thokes. thus thoke ibrahim ali khan comprises 316 bighas 5 biswas, that of musammat bhawani 99 bighas 17 biswas, and that of the plaintiff 316 bighas 4 biswas. besides the lands thus divided into thokes, there are some lands in the mouza left undivided and held in common by the sharers of the different thokes in which they have an interest in proportion to their fractional shares, but these lands do not form part of the thokes, but were left undivided when those thokes were formed. that this is the constitution of the mouza is clearly shown by a reference to the record-of-rights, where the total of land divided and comprising each thoke is first given, and then is entered the common land, as something outside the thokes.2. now plaintiff is not a sharer in the vendor's thoke, that is, in the divided land held by him separately, but she is, in common with all the sharers of the different thokes, a sharer of the common lands left undivided, and it is contended that on this.....