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Subhash Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Another

Subhash Singh vs State of U.P. and Another

Type Court Judgment Court Allahabad Decided Jul 22, 1997
~4 min read
https://sooperkanoon.com/case/447580

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Citation
Court
Allahabad High Court
Judge
Decided On
Case Number
C.M.W.P. No. 8147 of 1994
Subject
Service

Case Summary

AI-generated summary - not the official court judgment text.

Service - termination - U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 -petitioner had suffered petty punishment and two adverse entries - on that basis terminated from service - such termination affected after five years of commission of such punishment - Order of termination does not put ...

Key legal issue
Service
Acts & sections
Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 - Rule 2; Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 21

Parties & Advocates

Appellant / Petitioner

Subhash Singh

Advocate Ashok Kumar Srivastava and ;R.H. Srivastava, Advs.

Respondent

State of U.P. and Another

Advocate S.C. and ;Sabhajit Yadav, Adv.

Legal References

Acts
Uttar Pradesh Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 - Rule 2; Constitution of India - Articles 14 and 21
Reported In
1998(1)AWC39

Excerpt

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........more is required for dispensing with his services except payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice or one month's notice. thus, it appears that the said decision goes against the petitioner's case. but simply because the termination was affected after 18 years of the said case, compensation was paid without interfering with the order of termination.5. learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon a decision in the case of om prakash goel v. state of u. p. and others, 1991 (2) uplbec 967, wherein it has been held that the termination of service of a temporary employee on the ground that his service was no longer required on the face of fact that the juniors were retained itself shows discrimination, so far as the petitioner is concerned. in the present case, the petitioner has not disclosed as to who are the juniors, who have been retained in service except mentioning that some of the juniors to the petitioner have been retained in service and thereby acted-contrary to article 14 of the constitution.6. in the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, following the ratio and principles laid down in the case of triveni shanker saxena (supra), i do not find any reason to interfere with the order except directing for payment of compensation to the petitioner which i assessed at rs. 20,000 which is to be paid within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the concerned respondents.7. let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week.

Full Judgment

D.K. Seth, J.

1. The petitioner's services was terminated by an order dated 6.12.1993, Annexure 2 to the writ petition, on the ground that his services were no longer required under the provisions of U. P. Temporary Government Servant (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the said order on the ground that the said order has been issued by way of camouflage with ulterior design. After the respondents had failed to get the petitioner's removed, pursuant to a disciplinary proceeding in which he was found not guilty and was exonerated without any adverse effect. The said order was passed on 24.10.1993, Annexure 1 to the writ petition. It appears that there is 42 days gap between the order by which the petitioner was exonerated in a disciplinary proceeding and the order of termination and it pre-supposes the nexus with the order by which the petitioner was exonerated. Learned counsel forthe petitioner also alleges that the petitioner was not a temporary Government servant within the meaning of the definition 'temporary service' as contained in Rule 2 of the said Rules. Inasmuch as according to him the petitioner was neither on officiating basis nor rendering substantive service on a temporary post. On the contrary he was serving on temporary basis against a substantive post. According to him, he was not officiating on a permanent post. On the other hand, he was appointed temporarily on substantive basis. Therefore, according to him, he does not come within the purview of the said Rule.

2. Sri Sabhajit Yadav, learned standing counsel, on the other hand. contends that there is no distinction between temporary service or 'officiating service' on permanent basis. It is two different coinage with the same nomenclature. According to him, the petitioner was in temporary service, therefore, his services were rightly terminated under the said Rules.

3. In the counter-affidavit, a case has been made out that the petitioner had suffered petty punishment and there were two adverse entries and, therefore, he was unfit for being retained in service. Admittedly, the petitioner was recruited in 1988 and that his services were terminated in 1993, namely, after five years. The petitioner services could be terminated immediately after the petty offence or the two adverse entries. Instead he was allowed to continue for long five years. The respondents considered the situation and decided not to retain him in service on account of his unsuitability. But the order of termination does not put any stigma on the petitioner. The said Rules postulates termination of temporary service without any reason. The only embargo imposed is that of giving one month's notice or notice pay in lieu thereof. In the present case since notice has been given, the distinction sought to be made by the learned counsel does not appear to be of any substance.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision in the case of Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U. P. and others, (1992) 1 UPLBEC 41, but the said decision does not help him inasmuch as in the said decision, it was held that if the services of temporary employee without casting any stigma is dispensed with, having no panel consequences, in that event nothing more is required for dispensing with his services except payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice or one month's notice. Thus, it appears that the said decision goes against the petitioner's case. But simply because the termination was affected after 18 years of the said case, compensation was paid without interfering with the order of termination.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon a decision in the case of Om Prakash Goel v. State of U. P. and others, 1991 (2) UPLBEC 967, wherein it has been held that the termination of service of a temporary employee on the ground that his service was no longer required on the face of fact that the juniors were retained itself shows discrimination, so far as the petitioner is concerned. In the present case, the petitioner has not disclosed as to who are the juniors, who have been retained in service except mentioning that some of the juniors to the petitioner have been retained in service and thereby acted-contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution.

6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, following the ratio and principles laid down in the case of Triveni Shanker Saxena (supra), I do not find any reason to interfere with the order except directing for payment of compensation to the petitioner which I assessed at Rs. 20,000 which is to be paid within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before the concerned respondents.

7. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week.

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