Murli Vs. Ghamar and ors.

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........decisions of their lordships of the privy council it is clear that this finding is not in accordance with the law as at present in force. the sale is either wholly valid or invalid, according as it is found to have been made for necessity or the reverse. it is clear from the case of sri krishan das v. nathu ram and the case of gauri shankar v. jiwan singh which had been published when the present suit was before the lower courts that suits of this nature must be considered from a rather different point of view from the one that used to be favoured in this province. considerations that would be of importance in order to decide whether it was necessary to sell the house in suit in order to raise a sum of rs. 967 would be whether the parties concerned had any other property out of which they could meet the necessary expenditure, whether it would not have been possible to raise the sum by mortgage instead of selling the house outright and matters of a like nature. there is not at present material on the file to enable us to decide this question, and we there fore remit the following issue to the lower appellate court:was there no way in which the sum of rs. 967 could have been raised by the joint family except by the sale of the house in suit.3. it may be necessary in order to reply to this question, to find out what the value of the house was in 1917, and if so, or if it is desirable for any other reason, the parties will be allowed to adduce fresh evidence.4. the finding on this issue should be returned by 20th october and ten days thereafter will be allowed to the respondents for filing objections.