A. Devi Vs. Ch. Janaki and ors.

.....schools (conditions of service) regulations act, 1978 [act no. 3/1978]. sections 9 & 2(21): jurisdiction of school tribunal whether a school run by cantonment board is not a recognised school within the meaning of section 2(21)? - held, the act is enacted to regulate recruitments and conditions of employees in certain private schools and provisions of the act shall apply to all private schools in the state whether receiving any grant-in-aid from the state government or not. private school is defined in section 2(2) of the act as a recognised school established or administered by a management other than the government or a local authority. recognised means recognised by director, the divisional board or state board. thus as far as the first part of the definition of being recognised is concerned, it includes, as stated above, four directors, the divisional boards and four state boards. the second part of this definition which comes after the comma refers to any officer authorised by director or by any of such boards. the question to be examined is whether school run by the cantonment board could be said to be one run by any such boards. a private school has to be recognised by the state or the divisional board or by any officer authorised in that behalf. when this phrase namely: recognised by any officer authorised by the director or by any such boards, is included in the latter part of section 2(21), such boards will be of the level of the state board or the divisional board. the boards referred to in the definition of the word recognised means the boards which deal with education at levels other than that of the level at which primary schools are operating. thus for being recognised, the school has to be recognised by the board and therefore, it has to be operating at a higher level i.e., secondary level. section 2(21) of the act defines the term recognised. the last clause therein is by any of such boards. the term such is defined in oxford dictionary as..........accordingly dismissed the said application. aggrieved by the said order, this revision is preferred.3. learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the motor vehicles act itself is a beneficial legislation, and therefore the petition filed for condoning the delay in filing the petition for setting aside the default order ought to have been considered liberally.4. however, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that there was inordinate delay and the said delay was not properly explained and therefore the court below exercising the discretion vested in it has rightly declined to entertain the application.5. having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, i am of the considered view that as it is a case of death of the husband of the petitioner and as m.v. act is a beneficial legislation, the court below should have liberally construed the matter and condoned the delay. instead, the trial court dismissed the application merely on the ground that the delay has not been properly explained.6. considering the facts and circumstances, the delay is condoned and the order passed by the lower court dismissing the m.v.o.p. for default is set aside and the said o.p. is restored to file. the court below is directed to dispose of the o.p. expeditiously within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order by determining the compensation in accordance with law.7. the c.r.p. is allowed accordingly.