Full Judgment
S.C. Pratap, C.J.
1. Question here involved is squarely covered by Division Bench ruling of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 36/1992 dated March 9, 1992. Learned Counsel, however, submits that the said decision needs to be reconsidered.
2. Hearing Counsel on either side at some length and going through the Supreme Court ruling in Union of India v. N. Hargopal (1987-I-LLJ-545) (SC), we see justification for considering the aforesaid Division Bench ruling of this Court. In fact, this very Supreme Court ruling has been referred to in the above judgment and constitutes one of the bases of the said judgment.
3. Respondent-Devasthanam was perfectly within its right while recruiting attenders to state that only those sponsored by the Employment Exchange will be considered. This in a way regulates the mode of recruitment and eliminates to the extent reasonably possible element of arbitrariness in the matter of recruitment and appointment. As observed by this Court in, the Division Bench ruling supra,--
'...The stand of the Devasthanam has been that, as and when it becomes necessary to appoint Attenders in Class-IV category, the procedure followed is to notify the vacancies of the posts and consider only those who are sponsored by the Employment Exchange. We see nothing illegal or invalid therein. On the contrary, it regulates the process of recruitment and reduces to the minimum, if not extinguishes, the scope for any arbitrariness in the matter of such appointments.'
4. As further observed in the said judgment:
'Thus, while the Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (Act 31 of 1959), does not, in express terms, apply to the Devasthanam herein, nothing prevents the Devasthanam from considering, as and when occasion so. arises, only candidates sponsored by or through the Employment Exchange. If the Devasthanam decides otherwise, a writ may not lie to compel it to do so.
But if it decides to consider candidates sponsored only by or through the Employment Exchange, writ or direction to the contrary cannot be issued against it.....'
5. Moreover, in the present case, the petitioner-appellant was, in fact registered with theEmployment Exchange. His name was notsponsored for reasons not necessary, for thepurpose of this judgment. Several cases come tolight where a number of Class-IV posts are filledup without any guidelines and rather arbitrarily,ignoring claims of those regularly registered withthe Employment Exchange. Selection, recruitmentand appointment of candidates not registered withEmployment Exchange or not sponsored by theEmployment Exchange thus result in giving scopefor arbitrariness and favouritism in the matter ofrecruitment and appointment. There is someguarantee when only candidates sponsored throughEmployment Exchange are considered. It controlsarbitrariness. It also provides element of justnessand fairness.
6. As observed by the Supreme Court in its ruling supra:
'......it is necessary to eliminate arbitrariness and favouritism and introduce uniformity of standards and orderliness in the matter of employment. There has to be an element of procedural fairness in recruitment. If a public employer chooses to receive applications for employment where and when he pleases, and chooses to make appointment as he likes, a grave element of arbitrariness is certainly introduced. This must necessarily be avoided if Articles 14 and 16 and 16 have to be given any meaning. We, therefore, consider that insistence ofrecruitment through employment exchangesadvances rather than restricts the rightsguaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of theConstitution.'
7. In the result, we see no good reason to differfrom what has already been settled and held in theaforesaid Division Bench ruling of this Court.Learned single Judge from whose order thepresent appeal is filed was, in the circumstances,well justified in passing the impugned order. Thisappeal therefore fails and is dismissed. No orderas to costs.