D.V. Krishna Murthy Vs. P. Viswanath

.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye......order1. this revision is directed against the order passed by the district munsif, hindupur in i. a. no. 189/89 in o.s. no. 24/ 89. the suit was filed against the firm and its partners. pending disposal of the suit, an application was filed under order 38, rule 5, c.p.c., to attach the properties of one of the partners i.e., the third defendant, who is the petitioner herein. after counter was filed, the lower court ordered attachment before judgment. aggrieved by the said order, the present revision is filed.2. sri r. v. prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in case the partnership firm falls in debts, the properties of the individual partners cannot be attached before judgment. in support of the above contention, he relied upon s. 49 of the indian partnership act, which reads as follows:--'49. payment of firm debts and of separate debts:-- where there are joint debts due from the firm, and also separate debts due from any partner, the property of the firm shall be applied in the first instance in payment of the debts of the firm, and, if there is any surplus, then the share of each partner shall be appliedin payment of his separate debts or paid to him. the separate property of any partner shall be applied first in the payment of his separate debts, and the surplus (if any) in the payment of the debts of the firm.'3. in view of the above provisions, s. 49 cannot come in aid of the petitioner herein, who is 3rd defendant, to contend that before the decree has been passed, the question of attaching the property does not arise.4. section 25 of the indian partnership act reads as follows:--'25. liability of a partner for acts of the firm:-- every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner.'in the case of partnership, each partner is liable. so when each partner is liable, in the event of passing of a decree and in the event of the apprehension of the plaintiff that.....