.....the act to seek compensation under section 166 of the act resulting in award passed by the tribunal. therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor.
section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the vehicle with mechanical defects, the owner would be the tortfeasor and the claimant can maintain a petition seeking compensation under the provisions of the act, instead of seeking compensation under the workmens compensation act. on facts, held, the material evidence on record, particularly, with regard to the income of the claimant, his age, medical evidence and the evidence relating to pecuniary loss has not been considered by the tribunal in the correct perspective, which has resulted in passing of the impugned award, disproportionate to the pecuniary loss and the loss of future income of the victim. the settled principles governing determination of compensation has been given a go-bye......orderm.s. liberhan, cj.1. this writ appeal arises out of an order of the learned single judge declining to issue a mandamus directing respondent no.3 indian bank to continue the appellants in service as casuals and pay them wages on par with other employees who are similarly placed. 2. briefly stated, the facts of the case are tirumala tirupathi devasthanam initially entrusted the job of distributing prasadam by collecting the requisite amount to bank of baroda. it is contended by the appellants that bank of baroda engaged them for bringing laddu trays from ttd kitchen to the distribution counter at the rate of rs.0-75 ps. per tray. later, the job of distributing the laddus was entrusted to respondent no.3 indian bank, and it entered into a contract with m/s. productive security services for bringing the laddus from ttd kitchen to the distribution counter on payment of rs.0-75 ps. per tray. the said firm engaged the appellants for bringing the laddus from ttd kitchen to the distribution counter. the appellants were neither employed directly or indirectly with the respondent no.3-bank nor were they engaged by the ttd for bringing the laddus from ttd kitchen to the distribution counter. in order not to cause any inconvenience to the pilgrims visiting the shrine, ttd has entrusted the job of distributing the prasadam to respondent no.3-bank through its distribution counter. there is no privity of contract between the appellants and respondent no.3-bank. there are no posts of laddu carriers or cadre as such in the respondent no.3-bank, and therefore, no mandamus can be issued to respondent no.3 bank directing it to create any such posts or cadre. 3. no other point or question of fact has been raised. 4. for the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the impugned judgment, warranting interference by this court in writ appeal. hence, the writ appeal fails, and is accordingly dismissed. no costs.