Full Judgment
1. In this writ petition, the petitioners have sought for a writ of certiorari to quash the Award dt. 6-12-1982 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (Respondent-2) in L.A.C. No. 308/68-69 as well as the Award Notice dt. 11-5-1987.
2. The following are the facts involved in this case:
The petitioners are brothers and the land bearing Sy. No. 90 of Pantharapalya, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, measuring a total extent of 3 acres and 22 guntas is their ancestral property in their possession. The land is under agricultural operation.
3. The land of the petitioners besides the adjacent lands was proposed for acquisition by respondent-2 for the purpose of laying Avoid Sewer from Bangalore by respondent 3. The preliminary notification is of 13-21965 and the final notification was issued on 13-2-1968, whereas the awards in respect of other lands were made in 1968, in the case of the petitioners' land though the award is purported to have been made in 1982, communication of the passing of the award reached the petitioners on 13-5-1987. There were similar acquisitions made by respondent 2 for identical purpose in various other survey numbers and in all acquisitions were made four times during the years 1965, 1971, 1973 and 1974 and furthermore possession of the lands was taken over.
4. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that if the land acquired from the petitioners is intended for public purpose, they would have no objection subject to the condition that the compensation payable to the petitioners should be determined with reference to the date of communication of the passing of the award which is 13-5-1987.
5. In view of the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it may not be necessary to deal with the other contentions raised in this writ petition. Therefore, the short point for consideration is whether the compensation payable to the petitioners ought to be determined as on the market value prevailing on 13-5-1987 instead of 1982.
6. The learned counsel for respondent-3 strongly opposed the determination of compensation with reference to the date of communication of the award and insisted that what is relevant f or consideration is only the date of the passing of the award which, according to him, is 1982 even if there was delay in communication of the passing of the award.
7. Ordinarily, the accepted procedure and convention is to adopt the date oh which the award is passed. However, the Court is not precluded from taking into account if there are other relevant factors which necessitate the determination of compensation on a date different from the date of the award itself. In my opinion, this is one of the-cases in which the peculiar factors surrounding this case deserve to be taken into account and, if those factors are taken into account, the compensation payable ought to be on a reasonable basis and the reasonable basis would be the date on which the passing of the award was actually communicated and received by the petitioners. The additional factor which also becomes relevant in the facts of this case is that whereas the final notification was issued on 13-2-1968, it has taken 19 years for the acquisition authority to intimate the date of passing of the award even assuming that the award came to be passed in 1982 itself. This is a pointer to the indifference shown by the acquiring authority, to the rights of the petitioners to have the award passed within a reasonable time besides the right to compensation within a reasonable period. In the instant case, it appears to me that nothing other than administrative constipation was responsible for the delay which is not only unreasonable, but also inordinate.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioners brought to my notice a decision of this Court rendered in Writ Petns. Nos. 9125/83 C/W 10673 and 10674/83 on 30th Oct. 1988. Though the facts in the said cases are slightly different, they are substantially the same for the purpose of applying the legal principle. The observation made by the Court deserves to be extracted:
'In the circumstances, the appropriate order to make is to direct the Society to pay a higher compensation to the petitioners for their lands not on the basis of the valuation as on the date of the preliminary notification, but on the basis of the valuation to be fixed regard being had to all circumstances of this case. The writ petition was filed in the year 1983 soon after the final notification. The matter has been pending in this Court for nearly 5 years. The Society cannot be blamed for the delay in the disposal of the writ petition but since the petitioners have to part with the valuable land under the impugned acquisition proceedings which cannot be justified in the eye of law, I direct the authorities to fix the compensation on the basis of the price of the land prevailing in the year 1985 June (by taking a via media between the date of filing the writ petition and the date of disposal of the writ petition)........'
9. The present writ petition was filed on 18-5-1987 and is being disposed of today (8-2-1989). Apart from the delay, which is a product of the pendency of the writ petition before the Court, the abnormal delay not only in passing the award, but also in communicating the date of passing of the award, compel me to consider the application of the principle commended in the writ petitions aforementioned. The petitioners should not suffer either on account of the delay in the disposal of the writ petition or on account of the delay in communicating the date of the award besides the delay in passing the award. These incidental considerations which are peculiar to this case warrant a liberal treatment to the petitioners in the matter of fixation and determination of the compensation payable.
10. For the reasons stated above, I pass the following order:
Respondent-2 is directed to determine the compensation on the basis of the price of the land in question prevailing in May, 1987, modify the award and pay the compensation to the petitioners within sixty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. At the same time, the petitioners are directed to hand over possession of the land acquired forthwith. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.
11. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
12. Order accordingly.